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SEMINARY
BULLETIN

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THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

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How Shall A Believing Jew View Christianity?

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Toward a Theological View of Responsibility
in Communication

J. Randall Nichols

VOLUME LXVIII, NUMBER 3

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THE PRINCETON SEMINARY BULLETIN

DONALD MACLEOD, *Editor*

EDWARD J. JURJI, *Book Review Editor*

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PRAYER

O God of all life and love and power, in whose eternity our little times are held and in whose service there is perfect freedom, at the beginning of another year of teaching, learning, and sharing, we come to thee in the Spirit of prayer. None of us is worthy even to name thy Name, but all of us know that he who came to save us from our poorer selves assures us and appoints for us a place in his unending work of grace.

We thank thee this evening for the Church of Jesus Christ which he founded long ago upon a people and their confession of him as Savior and Lord. Especially do we bless thee for the common bond of Christian faith and life which brings us here and unites men and women of so many races and traditions into a community whose aims and ends are good. We have so much for which to be thankful. Lord, make our praises always to be strong and to reflect the fruits of our belief, for only then do we rise to our true humanity.

O thou who art the glad companion of all our going out and coming in, we pray for open hearts in order to hear thy word for us, especially when duties become complex and the pressures of schedules are strong. Keep us sensitive always to thy Gospel, so that in our chapel, our classroom, and our common exchanges with one another, we may feel its claim upon us and shall say what is true and do what is best. Mould and shape us into a family of concerned men and women who derive their peculiar lifestyle from him who is our common Head. Through each of us may his Spirit become helpful in making issues clear to someone who is confused, in sounding a happy greeting on a dull and rainy day, in placing a hand upon someone's shoulder when loneliness seems to be all there is around. Give us all a fresh commitment to our exacting work and may the vision of thy larger purpose for all creation make even the grind of the routine seem worthwhile. Impart to us the joy of taking up the task again and grant that through the mingling of old friends and new, through the contagion of the gifts of ministry, and through a vision of the Cross of Jesus going on before, something great may begin in this place for which another generation will give thanks.

Now unto him who is able to keep us from stumbling and to present us faultless before the throne of his glory with exceeding joy, to the only wise God our Father, be honor and glory, dominion and power, now and forever.

Amen.

(Prayer offered at the Opening Convocation of the Seminary, September 17, 1975, by Professor Donald Macleod. Printed here in response to a number of requests).

Excerpta et Commentaria

by the EDITOR

Loving God à la Muggeridge

Of the writing of lives of Jesus there seems to be no end. A decade ago, however, it would be well nigh incredible to predict a monograph of this kind from the pen of Malcolm Muggeridge. At any rate, it is here: a beautifully crafted volume entitled, *Jesus, The Man Who Lives*, with sixteen color plates of beauty and realism from classic art and written in equally classic prose (Harper & Row, Publishers, New York, 1975. \$17.95).

Literary pundits have treated Muggeridge's writing style with justifiable praise and acclaim, whereas religious leaders and thinkers have been both curious about and suspicious of the treatment of such a sensitive subject by the former editor of *Punch*. "Is Saul also among the prophets?" is the subtle question punctuated by a raised eyebrow or a smile. Moreover, some will not like Muggeridge's Jesus and accuse him of giving us a pale Galilean who is more a product of twentieth century culture than one whom winds and waves obey. Certainly everyone will not accept this portrait and interpretation either basically or completely, but open-minded persons will see here "one man's testimony to Jesus" among innumerable others and will expect as many peculiar facets as there are in the images the accompanying paintings project and portray.

One of the more thoughtful segments of Muggeridge's presentation is his discussion of the basic question: what does loving God mean? The author begins by enumerating many of the objects, phenomena and relationships which claim and excite human love and which have their origin in the creative intention of God; yet our human reaction to them is not loving God.

Similarly with the works of man: these any one of us can love. Writes Muggeridge:

"All the works of Man, so manifold and wide-ranging—what he builds, what he comes to understand; his explorations of the seen and unseen, microscopic and universal, as well as into mysteries and meanings; his pyramids and motorways, his subways and high-rises, his facts that are fantasies and fantasies that are facts; all the wide range of his quests and curiosities, about himself and his habitat; the dark despair that overwhelms him, and his moments of ecstasy when the doors of the prison of definition are unlocked, and he is free to speak without words and be without being. All this can be loved as emanating from God, and yet not even this is God." (p. 132).

How then, asks Muggeridge, is God himself, the very God of very God to be found and loved? Negatively: (i) Not as he is philosophically conceived; we are not made with a capacity to love an abstraction, such as a First Cause or a Categorical

Imperative. (ii) Not as he is humanistically conceived; the Life Force which has borne our species from primeval slime to modern *homo sapiens*, spectacular as that achievement is, cannot stir "in any breast an emotion that could be called love." Positively: Muggeridge says, "The simple fact is that to be truly loved God has to become a Man without thereby ceasing to be God. Hence Jesus provides the possibility of loving God through and in him and, as part of the same process, of loving other men, our neighbors, through and in him."

But this Man dies. Yes, says Muggeridge, but it is out of his affliction and pain a new sense of God's love came and only as we suffer along with him are we able to "grasp the splendor of God's love and how to love one another." The consummation of the two commandments—love God and your neighbor—was the Cross; there once and for all their image and fulfillment were seen. As Simone Weil wrote, "It is in affliction itself that the splendor of God's mercy shines; from its very depths, in the heart of its inconsolable bitterness." It is within the matrix of this experience, where a cry of dereliction seems the only natural thing to do, we come in contact with (or, are we contacted by?) something (or, is it Someone?) to rise by and it is then, at last and triumphantly, "we know what it is to love God, and looking outwards from within this love, we see our fellow men, all of them, the sick and the well, the beautiful and the plain, the stupid and the clever mongols and beauty-queens, imbeciles and athletes, every variety and category of human kind; see them all as brothers and sisters, members of one family, at once enfolded in God's love and chained together by it, as though they were his galley-slaves and this servitude their perfect freedom."

Honor Code in Academe

In an article entitled, "Colleges Are Finding Their Honor Systems Short On Honor," Edward B. Fiske, Education Editor of *The New York Times*, reports a general "breakdown of honor systems." "As a result," Fiske says, "many institutions are modifying, or even abandoning, long-standing methods of inspiring and enforcing academic integrity." Johns Hopkins University's student body "approved a new system in which faculty surveillance replaces student self-discipline . . . because students were no longer willing to report on each other." Notre Dame, three years ago, concluded that its honor system had broken down and now "it makes such a method optional in each course." Other schools known to be bringing their honor codes under review are Stanford, University of California at Davis, Barnard College, and Wesleyan. The University of Virginia, with expulsion as the penalty for a breach of the honor code, enforced the penalty in thirteen cases out of twenty-five in 1975. Like West Point, however, which gives cadets more guarantees of "due process," the University of Virginia has agreed this year "to let accused students submit the results to lie detector tests."

What is the essence of the honor code? Fiske answers, "self-governance, one of the loftiest of academic ideals." There are two sides to it: "Integral to most systems is a commitment by students not only to behave honestly themselves, but also to take action when they see others violating the code."

What reasons does Fiske give for this general breakdown in the honor system?

(i) Increased academic competition. The ombudsman of Stanford University, John Goheen, attributes this moral lag to "the economic and social situation." "Law and medicine particularly," he said, "are attracting very large numbers of students, many more than these professional schools can accomodate." In such competitive situations there is a "breakdown of ordinary standards of honesty" and "considerable disregard of the honor code." From a dean at Stanford University comes the comment that most students who violate the honor code are not borderline achievers but first rate persons who are "protecting a pattern of A's."

(ii) Changing attitudes toward education. "Before education was always looked on as an idealistic pursuit of knowledge. Now it is very pragmatic. You can't make it anymore without a college education. Students can sit down and calculate what each credit is worth in terms of career earnings," the president of the Student Council at Johns Hopkins has observed.

(iii) Broader social changes and responsibility. In the survey at Johns Hopkins, "Ninety per cent of the students said they would not turn another student in." A professor of history and religion at Florida declared, "If there's one moral principle universally observed here, it is 'Thou shalt not rat,' and that makes the older concept on the honor code ineffective." Hence, at Wesleyan University, the modification of the honor system eliminated "what had come to be known as the 'rat-fink' clause." "Peer group pressure" is another major factor. "Students are just not willing to stand up to those pressures and take the initiative in reporting cheating," said the president of Johns Hopkins. Moreover, he added, "we are becoming a society where, when people see trouble, the natural tendency is to turn away. Students are part of a general abdication of individual responsibility." This does not mean, however, that academic integrity is either bankrupt or considerably less. "After all," Hopkins' president reflects, "it was the students themselves who asked for the changes. It was they who said, 'Let's abandon a system that is not working and come up with one that will preserve academic integrity.'"

Curiously enough and almost simultaneously, an article appeared in *The Princeton (University) Alumni Weekly* (Vol. 76, No. 3) entitled "The Decline of Academic Morality," in which the author, Sandy Thatcher (an alumnus and social science editor at the Princeton University Press, as well as chairman of the Copyright Committee of the Association of American University Presses), remarks, "Students are not the only thieves hiding in the groves of academe. Some of their professors, too, have been known to play the game. . . ."

Thatcher writes out of personal experience supplemented by wide contacts with the world of American academe and deplores "this decline in academic morality, especially as it affects intellectual property, and which is undermining the foundations of education in this country." Evidences of this decline are, he cites, (i) among those who see "nothing wrong with students 'ripping off' books for, after all, we live in a capitalistic society that basically 'rips off' the underclass, and therefore students are responding only in kind." (ii) Plagiarism, which is theft re-

garding works of the mind, is on the increase and its seriousness is seen in the damage it does to "intellectual creation." (iii) The procrastination or default "on the part of scholars who are asked (and paid) to read manuscripts for publishers." This includes promises broken, books accepted and reviews left undone permanently, and Ph.D. theses showing that "no new evidence had been turned up, no new sources used, and no new interpretation offered." "Such behavior," Thatcher declares, "betokens a shocking lack of concern for the rights of authors to have their works reviewed with reasonable dispatch, all the more surprising when one considers that the readers themselves at one time most likely had benefitted from expeditious evaluations of their manuscripts by other readers."

Probably one of the more recent and most flagrant practices has come with "the advent of new technology" and the consequent abuse of "the rights of authors." "Nowadays," remarks Thatcher, "teachers think nothing of reproducing multiple copies of essays, short stories, poems, sheet music, and other copyrighted works for distribution to students on a regular basis without being concerned that they are undercutting the market which makes the production of such works possible in the first place and also depriving authors of the rightful return that is their due." This practice, he feels, "makes a mockery of copyright" which was instituted originally "to protect the creator's right to control the use of his property."

To sum up his observations, Thatcher asks the inevitable question: what is the explanation of this woeful trend? Easy answers are: "the pressures of competition, the economic crunch, the easy recourse to ideological rationalization, the over-emphasis upon success and getting ahead, with the attendant willingness to cut corners." These, however, Thatcher finds less than satisfying. "I am not a religious person in the orthodox sense," he adds, "but I cannot help wondering if our society has not lost touch so completely with the realm of transcendent spirituality, a dimension larger than the sum of human interests considered subjectively as individual preference, that no solid foundation exists any longer for a sturdy morality of principled behavior." Is "ripping off" to be "the new moral chic" and opportunism the basic guide to action, as Watergate so well exemplified? "If we can't depend on our institutions of learning," he asks, "to reverse the tide, then where *can* we turn?"

Revival of the Diaconate

A significant and what will be eventually a far-reaching religious event occurred in the City of Newark, New Jersey, on December 14, 1975, when ninety-four men were accepted as candidates for the permanent diaconate in the Roman Catholic Church. The program was begun in 1973 in the Archdiocese of Newark under the direction of Monsignor Richard M. McGuinness of St. Joseph's Church where the service of recognition was held. Prompted by Vatican Council II, the movement represents a revival of what was historically "in the church since the beginning." "What Vatican II did," says Monsignor McGuinness, "was to recognize the fact that we were not making full use of it. We were making use of bishops, priests and to a limited degree, laymen. It's like running on three cylinders instead of four."

The original class comprised 140 men; attrition brought the group down to 96. According to Father Caprio, "Many men had entered the program without realizing what was involved. There was no precedent. They had to enter to see what it was all about. After being in it for six months or so, some found that it was not for them."

To qualify, a man must be 32 years old, either married or unmarried, but upon entering he must agree to retain whatever his marital status is when finally he accepts ordination. The program involves classes two nights a week and ten hours of work correspondingly in the parish or community. In the guidelines drawn up by the United States Bishops Committee on the Permanent Diaconate, the Deacons are expected to be "the ears, mouth, heart and soul of the bishops," to make use of "special skills by helping alleviate housing problems in the archdiocese," to "mediate labor disputes and work with married couples as counsellors."

The three-year study program concludes with ordination and assignment to parishes. Most will continue their present jobs, although a few will assume full time ministerial responsibilities. Members of the diaconate will be authorized "to distribute communion, read the gospel, give the homily at masses, administer baptism, witness and bless marriages, officiate at funerals and burial services, and preside at prayer meetings." Their liturgical dress will be an alb (the long, white gown of the priests) and a stole. The stole, however, will not be worn as a priest does (over both shoulders), but more like a sash (going over the left shoulder and joined at the right hip). The colors of the stoles will change according to the church calendar.

The Job Market in the Parish

Recently Janis Johnson of *The Washington Post* wrote, "Major American Protestant denominations have more ministers than they need and many surplus clergy are seeking secular jobs." The situation appears to be most serious in the Episcopal church which had a 7.3 per cent net increase in clergy in 1970-74 and an 11.6 per cent drop in membership in the same period. Hence the number of Episcopal clergy who work at other jobs even while maintaining their function as priests has risen by 70.5 per cent in five years.

This trend is seen also, but to a lesser degree, among clergy of Presbyterian, Methodist, United Church of Christ, and Lutheran churches. Among the more conservative denominations, however, such as the Southern Baptist Convention and the Seventh-day Adventists, where membership has been growing, there is an expanding job market for ministers. The number of Roman Catholics entering the priesthood has declined slightly.

The director of the Mid-Atlantic Career Center, the Reverend Barton Lloyd, an Episcopal priest, has indicated that "there is no question that the employment picture for clergy is the worst it has been at least since the great depression." "There are more applicants now for every job opening in the parish," he reported. On the other hand, he said, "I don't think this trend is a bad thing. Some of it obviously is against people's will. But there is also a big trend toward secular ministries by choice. I think something new and creative is happening. Centuries ago all

clergy were not primarily in parish work. I regard what I do as a specialized ministry."

Probably the biggest obstacle for clergy looking for jobs outside the church is the difficulty of translating their parish abilities to secular job skills. "I was a seminary professor," Lloyd added, "and after thirteen years of seminary teaching, I asked, 'What else can I do?'" Further, clergy have difficulty in gauging their salary needs in secular jobs after they have been accustomed to the tax exemptions, housing and automobile allowances, and other "fringe benefits" in the parish.

Other factors have contributed also to the overall situation:

(i) In 1975 the Yearbook of American and Canadian Churches reporting on 221 religious bodies, including Orthodox, Roman Catholic, and Protestant, showed a decline in membership of 0.14 per cent in 1974. But since 1971, in the 195 seminaries in the United States and Canada, enrolments increased 24 per cent to about 41,000 in 1975.

(ii) The enrollment of women has nearly doubled during the past four years: in 1971, women comprised ten per cent; in 1975, eighteen per cent. "Although the number of women ministerial candidates has increased dramatically," remarked Johnson parenthetically, "churches' willingness to receive them has not."

(iii) While the rate of ordinations is holding steady, the rate of retirements and parish moves has declined. Clergy mobility has lagged by reason of the lengthened time it takes for a minister to effect a transfer from one parish to another.

A Newspaper Editor's Concerns

At the close of his 1975 presidential year, Howard H. Hays, addressing the American Society of Newspaper Editors in Washington, D.C., described the organization's round of annual activities and assessed the health and integrity of its various aims and projects. In the former, he sketched his own and each committee's involvement during the year in the administrative housekeeping chores, while in the latter he spoke to some of the serious problems and issues which beset and harry the complex field of communications in America today. Some of these are created within the journalistic profession itself; others result from social and cultural ills from which no group can quarantine itself or themselves successfully.

Speaking as the long-time owner and editor of *The Riverside* (Calif.) *Press-Enterprise*, Mr. Hays singled out the following as his concerns regarding the Press and Journalism in contemporary America:

(i) The unfortunate manner and demeanor of some reporters at press conferences. "The line," he said, "between forceful, probing interrogation on the one hand and rudeness on the other may be thin, but it's not invisible, certainly not at televised press conferences. Whatever our individual differences over the precise location of the line, I think most of us would agree that it's too often breached."

(ii) The burgeoning enrollment at schools of journalism. "I am concerned," he declared, "about too many young people, too many of them unqualified by any

valid standard, being allowed, sometimes even encouraged, to believe that opportunities await them in daily journalism." In view of this situation, Hays called for admission requirements to journalistic schools to be "comparable to those for law and medicine."

(iii) The perils of investigative reporting. In journalism as well as in other vocations and professions, practitioners go through cycles of interest. Once it was foreign correspondence; then, race relations and urban affairs; and then, consumer affairs and various phases of what was vaguely called "the new journalism." Today the vogue is "investigative reporting." This, Hays considers to be important and useful, but his "worry is that instant investigative reporters, those ungrounded in the basics of the profession and lacking commitment except to their own ego, may do more harm than good, and that what should be a solid trend could prove to be just another fad."

(iv) The adverse trend of newspaper circulation. Americans do not realize how effective has been the "erosive force of two significant phenomena: the distraction of television and the deterioration of instruction in reading and writing in the schools."

Until 1970, Hays pointed out, "the total number of newspapers published each day in the United States exceeded the number of households. In that year the number of newspapers fell below the number of households and it has fallen further behind each year." Some people attribute blame to the recession, but Hays identifies causes which he feels are more fundamental:

(a) He sees a disturbing decline of literacy in contemporary America. "More and more college freshmen are flunking English examinations given at the entrance," he observed. Indeed, just recently he reflected, "the faculty of the University of California recommended to the President that sophomores be required to pass examinations in reading and writing in order to qualify for advancement to junior standing." But, "what about those at the other end of the intellectual scale?" he asked. An increasing number can read little more than their own name. "We can't sell papers to people who can't read," he commented.

(b) He recognizes the challenge and distraction of television. He is referring here not specifically to news broadcasts but to the total orientation of the popular mind to television's ability to particularize the seen. Hence journalism must "make a greater effort to get acquainted with our readers—an effort to learn more about their interests and needs," he suggested.

(c) During a year of contacts with newspapers and with people who read them, Hays' concern has been deepened regarding the matter of credibility. "I now see," he said, "much of the public as seriously estranged. The problem of public distrust is more serious and more fundamental than even our problems with the courts and the legislatures. We can temporarily lose the politician and even the judge, and endure; but we cannot long survive without the confidence of the people." The people are demanding more of modern journalism and, therefore, Hays declared, "The only intelligent response in our circumstance, and surely the only response worthy of our role as a fourth estate, so challengingly described once by Justice Potter Stewart, is a renewal of commitment, a re-examination of performance,

and a redoubling of our effort." This implies and involves the continual elevation of "our goals," he added; for "it is our duty, in the words of St. Augustine, 'to seek truth as though about to find it; and finding it, to go on seeking it.' "

Finding the Point Again

A sensitive weather vane to the movements of things religious in Great Britain, *The British Weekly*, featured a survey article recently, "Building Fuller Worship," by Peter Casey. We report its essence here because the situation he describes and the needs he suggests are close parallels to liturgical conditions in America too.

Casey reflects upon a decade during which a new age seemed to have been dawning in Christian worship. "Scarcely a weekend went by," he observes, "without a worship conference being held somewhere. Ministers and laity gathered to discuss new worship material and talk about how to bring new vitality to their churches' worship." Moreover, there was a climate of excitement and expectation which Casey describes as "an intoxicating headiness in the coming together of people to share in learning about new worship." There was a determined effort on the part of both clergy and lay folk "to free themselves from the straitjacket of tradition and to express themselves fully in song, dance, and laughter." It was a popular hope that these persons would go back to their individual parishes and by their vision and influence bring a new liveliness to the local church."

But, observes Casey, "slowly the laughter died." Certain symptoms became obvious: the same faces and fewer of them appeared at weekend conferences and workshops; most churches carried on untouched by the verve of the new movement; visual aids and dialogue sermons failed to touch off fresh interest; and any conspicuous revitalization of the local congregation as a whole was rare or not at all.

What went wrong? "Was the whole liturgical ferment," asks Casey, "merely a meteor which burned itself out, leaving the church barely aware of its passing?" Certainly there was something wrong. "There was a shallowness," he maintains, "about the liturgical movement; not enough thought was given to what was being done, and why." Few people wanted or were competent theologically to dig below the surface and "to examine the whole nature of worship and its relationship to the life of the local church." Visiting performers were easier to come by than attempting to realize high liturgical ideals in practice. "One of the saddest aspects of the 'modern worship' movement was its almost complete absence of clear and consistent objectives. Activity may be feverish, but one searches in vain for a sense of long term purpose behind the façade."

"Where does this leave us now?" asks Casey. There are still liturgical conferences and workshops, although "the creative energy of those early years seems to have been sapped . . . few churches have any enthusiasm for group confessions or physical contact." Then Casey lays his finger upon a crucial matter when he declares, "Worship springs from the consciousness and commitment of

the local community; it cannot be forced on it. Only a deeply committed Christian community will have the freedom and concern to make its worship truly live. A worship which enables the Gospel message to speak more strongly to the worshippers, and them to respond fully and deeply, will help to create and strengthen that commitment. But the two must go hand in hand and develop one from the other."

Casey is writing from a British perspective, but the echo of his words sounds authentic in America. Is it not conceivable that having gone through the cycle of a liturgical revival that did not stick, Christian people are turning now to recapture the missing factor, namely, evangelism? Probably Casey puts the matter well for us too when he writes, "We need a worship that reveals the glory and majesty of God. A worship which challenges our cosy affluent Western lives. We need a renewal of the whole church so that it can be truly the body of Christ on earth." A beginning must be made somewhere, and Casey suggests, "We must be open to the promptings of the Spirit, willing to go wherever God wills us." Much of the liturgical movements were castles erected on sand. "The building materials are here," added Casey, "and it is right we are being forced back to the foundations."

Expository Writing: A Cure

Probably the pedagogical bugbear which exasperates college and graduate school teachers the most is the annual harvest from our high schools of young men and women who cannot write. The January 1976 issue of the *Yale Alumni Magazine* published a series of articles on the writing ills of the contemporary college generation. The February 1976 number of *Communication Notes* (a publication of the Council of Communication Societies) reports the opinions of a high school English teacher (Mark Johnson) and a college English teacher (Paula Johnson) on what are some of the causes of this literary *malaise* and what may be some viable cures.

To begin, Paula Johnson agrees with the Yale point of view that "a substantial source of today's writing problem dates back to the 1950's and 1960's when, in response to students' patent distaste for anything smacking of discipline, colleges dispensed with mandatory English courses and secondary schools abandoned the teaching of English composition." Moreover, she maintains that the current decline in SAT scores is not an index by which to measure the problem of poor writing. "Plenty of freshmen," she declares, "with astronomical scores can't write for sour apples."

The opinion of Mark Johnson is slightly different. The cause of poor writing among modern students is traceable, he thinks, to "the inability of teachers to read and comment meaningfully on daily or even weekly pieces of writing from 150 to 180 students who pass through their classes." With such unmanageable classes, teachers are inclined to drill students in the mechanics of parts of speech, sentence diagramming, vocabulary and the like (which can be done easily in open classes) but will avoid requiring them to write coherent and substantive essays. The result is that when they reach college and are assigned a topic to be discussed and expanded into a formal essay, they cannot do it.

Other causes, Mark Johnson believes, are cultural and sociological. Language patterns are acquired and formed by age seven or eight. "If these early years," he says, "are spent listening to television, reading children's books, having conversations only with other children, without even minimal parental in-put, it is little wonder that many children grow up with a contorted, deficient, and imprecise grasp of linguistic skills." Moreover, he feels that "popular song lyrics, advertising slogans, teen magazines, textbooks intentionally written for below the grade level of those who use them, and the inability of many to capture the music of language which offsets pedantry—all of these factors are to blame, some of which defy all efforts to control or remove them.

What, then, about the problem of cure? Paula Johnson sees no overall panacea in mandatory Freshman English. There has always been a built-in tension in such instruction because the teacher has felt the need of doing two things simultaneously: (i) to develop some appreciation of great literature; and (ii) to instill the basic mechanics of elementary writing. On the opposite side, wherever Freshman English was made optional, the curriculum in the area became pluralistic and each segment became an empire unto itself. A gleam of hope was found, however, in courses in "expository writing" where "students are reading the same kind of writing that they are trying to produce." Another experiment has involved the use of tutors who helped students with their papers in other areas and disciplines and who came into each enterprise at the stage at which they were most needed, whether at the planning phase or even for final polishing.

The problem of how to effect a cure is seen by Mark Johnson in this way: "No one person and no one department can adequately prepare students to write all the various types of prose they will need in the course of a college career—much less a lifetime; therefore responsibility for the teaching of English should be explicitly shared by all departments." Learning to write, he believes, is the occupation of a lifetime, not "something one does in high school or college and then never touches again." Probably no one has put the issue more sufficiently than he does: "We need to bring expressive content back into balance with correct form, so that the clear communication of ideas and feelings will return as the goal and result of writing."

Letter from Korea

Our year-end letter from Sam Moffett in Korea brings a combination of joy, expansion, and concern. From the perspective of a quarter of a century in the orient and of a family long committed to the Christian missionary tradition, few persons are as able as Sam Moffett "to tell it like it is."

His letter opens with a note of concern: "For the first time since Protestant missions entered Korea the growth of the Roman Catholic Church is outstripping us. We are thankful for their growth, but wonder why Protestants who outnumber them here 3 to 1 are falling behind." Moffett attributes the reason mainly to the fact that "Presbyterians, who represent 64% of the entire Protestant family in

Korea, are downgrading mission structures and reducing the number of missionaries, while our Catholic neighbors emphasize the strategic role of independent missionary orders and are pouring missionaries into the very areas we abandon." In South Korea there are almost thirty million still unreached by any effective witness for Christ.

There are, on the other hand, facts and figures of a positive nature which provide reasons for enthusiasm and confidence. In 1975 the Presbyterian Church in Korea established 99 new congregations and projected 300 new churches for 1976. (Incidentally, there are three other major Presbyterian bodies in Korea). The Christian roster lists 1,580,000 Presbyterians, 900,000 other Protestants, and some 800,000 Roman Catholics. No one counts the "brainwashed followers of the 'Korean Christ,' Moon Sun-Myung's Unification Church as Christians here."

The seminary in Seoul reports a record enrollment: "550 jammed into a campus built fifteen years ago to accomodate only 300." The increase, however, is due partly to a new study program for lay evangelists who have been responsible for the phenomenal church growth.

Among the more interesting and exciting educational projects has been the opening one year ago of the Asian Center for Theological Studies (known as ACTS) where, on a post-seminary level, an international alternative is provided to "an over-reliance on Western graduate studies." "We train Asians in Asia for mission to Asia," Moffett writes. And the emphasis is upon "theologically-minded evangelists and evangelically-minded theologians."

Other programs and projects include: social outreach into slum areas with a team of seminary students under Eileen Moffett's leadership; Bible Clubs to prepare teachers for new schools in undeveloped areas; graduate students of Asian nationalities at work on translations of the New Testament for ethnic churches; and even a special Bible class for Korea's top radio and TV personalities.

In view of "all this bursting vitality," why should Korea be calling for more missionaries? Some questions are raised also about perpetuating "the 19th century colonial missionary mentality" or, granted that all Christians are missionaries, why should the Korean church need assistance from the outside? Moffett responds: "Of course the Korean church can stand by itself and keep growing. But Christians don't stand by themselves. They need each other, across all boundaries." Moreover, "there are nine million more non-Christians in Korea today than when we came twenty years ago. Some whole sectors of society are still scarcely touched by the Gospel," he added.

In conclusion, Moffett writes, "Too much is still undone for United Presbyterians to be able to fade away with a clear conscience and leave the rest of the hard work to out-numbered Korean Christians, or to mission-minded Catholics, or to anyone else for that matter. Missionaries do not work by proxy. And if Korea which is more than 10% Christian still needs missionaries, how much more the rest of Asia where half the people of the world live on a continent which is only 2% Christian."

Whatever Happened to the Sacred?

Many of us have wondered how long it would be before someone would call our attention to the absence of a basic dimension in contemporary religious life, namely, the sacred. However puzzling this phenomenon may seem with regard to the general area of Christian belief, it becomes a serious matter when we consider it within the context of our liturgical aims and practices. In a recent book, which deserves careful reading by Protestants and Roman Catholics alike, James Hitchcock, an historian, draws our attention to "the foremost crisis facing Christian churches today: the drastic change in attitude towards worship and liturgy from one which views them as a sacred rite symbolizing divine, hidden realities, to one which sees them as no more than an essentially human celebration" (*The Recovery of the Sacred*, The Seabury Press, New York, 1975).

For some time Hitchcock has seen a movement from the traditional concept of the sacred in which certain persons, times, and places were viewed as having "an especially holy character" to the notion of a quality "suffused through all of existence," this quality being whatever any one considers in his or her eyes to be most worthy or valuable. This latter point of view, he feels, has invaded our contemporary liturgy in particular and "as much as anything else has contributed to the tensions, uncertainties, and suspicions which now wrack the Church" (x). The issue cannot be compromised: if the worship of the Church embodies and incorporates the sacred, then certain corollaries follow which are unavoidable; if, on the other hand, "liturgy is perceived as having an essentially humanistic and worldly focus," then it will be our business to thwart any attempt to sacralize it. Maybe the predicament may best be resolved by a shift of focus from merely subjective to more objective factors, to attention to meaning rather than to forms and our personal reactions to them.

Hitchcock is aware of and sensitive to the new climate in which he is trying to make his voice to be heard. Both liturgists and theologians in the late sixties appropriated, either consciously or unconsciously, Harvey Cox's thesis (*The Secular City*) that "contemporary man is content to live in a secularized world, in accordance with a pragmatic ethic, unconcerned about ultimate reality, interested only in improving the world" (p. 8). There followed in their train church architects who urged us to avoid all those temptations "to make of a church something different, special, or religious;" retreat masters who declared it to be "no time for long faces and frowning concentration;" and an abbot who decried the notion that sacred music was "a telephone to the beyond." Obviously the trend was away from an emphasis upon the timeless and towards "conformity with contemporary culture" (p. 14).

Hence the mood of the period came easily into focus in the form of slogans which were more likely to delude than enlighten and more caught up in trifles than shaped by meaning.

(i) The clamor for relevance. The new prescription read as follows: "Relevance is achieved by systematically eliminating, or allowing to be obscured, the distinctively religious aspects of worship in favor of a merely human activity" (p. 31). It

would seem that the only way to save the liturgy from obsolescence is by humanizing it "to the point where it is not substantially different from any number of human actions" (p. 32). Relevance is urged at any price. But unfortunately the kind of relevance imagined would produce a liturgy which was primarily "horizontal," focused on "the community itself and on God within other people." This kind, it is felt, would be free from the "churchiness" which has marked traditional worship experiences and which has provided only "escapes from life." Reflecting upon the career of such *avant-garde* liturgies, Hitchcock writes, "They seem for the most part to attract mainly those from within the Church who are experiencing some kind of faith crisis; there is little indication that they have attracted any large number of seekers from the outside" (p. 29). None of the radical sponsors of "liturgical reform" realized or sensed "the impossibility of transforming a vertical rite into something horizontal without destroying it in the process" (p. 42).

(ii) The cult of spontaneity. In view of the widespread liturgical changes of the past decade, it appears that one of several aims was to exchange formal rites for something spontaneous. "The subjective state of the individual was taken as normative" and hence the liturgy "could not be fixed to any significant degree but be subject to constant experimentation" (p. 44). Church rites with their traditional formulations were dull compared with an Alka-Seltzer TV commercial. Hence a Jesuit seminarian proposed rites which would reflect the random-ness of human life, feature sights and sounds from daily life that would "scream out for attention," project startling convolutions of images on the wall, and under the tyranny of the "visual rhetorician" and accompanied by loud music engineer a violent confrontation with the human environment (p. 46). He failed to comprehend, however, that "a spontaneous liturgy will of necessity be a liturgy which impoverishes itself because it will have to be based upon whatever sentiments are available at the time of celebration" (p. 51). And Hitchcock adds that "many experimental liturgies have amounted primarily to a sharing of confusions, which is never what Christian worship has been supposed to be in any church whatever" (p. 51).

(iii) The rejection of history. Dean Inge once remarked, "He who marries the spirit of the age is soon left a widower." The most creative periods of history have been those which found "ways to make the best of the past a living part of the present" (p. 55). However, when the decade of the sixties had slain the fathers and joined in the shout of "All things are now permitted," the inevitable results occurred: strange groups emerged "with intense but usually short-lived eschatological expectations"; freed individuals became more susceptible to other forms of social influence; and the "escape" from the burden of tradition resulted in "a new enslavement to a chaotic present" (p. 63).

(iv) The death of community. The intention of much "experimental liturgy," however poorly understood, was "to heighten the sense of community through celebration" (p. 74). The failure of this kind of liturgy resulted in the destruction of community. A strong and vital community finds in its past a major factor in delineating its character. "A community which seeks to live primarily on its past will petrify," says Hitchcock, "and a community which loses contact with its past or

comes to repudiate it is likely to disintegrate" (p. 75). Moreover, since liturgy and symbolism are inseparable, "the more the symbols were discarded or altered to make liturgy relevant, the more irrelevant it became" (p. 77). The manipulation of symbols (words, too, are symbols) ran counter to easy communication and resulted in members of the churches moving out into small groups of worship, holding their own private rites and thereby producing "a radically disunited community." No one seemed to be aware of the irreparable loss of the great congregation's celebration in which the "whole weight of the community is placed behind particular values" (p. 82).

No one can fault Mr. Hitchcock for his perceptive diagnosis of the condition of contemporary liturgy, with its lost dimension and its chameleon-like adaptation to the social structures in which it operates. "To the degree that liturgy tries to appeal to 'secular man' in his own terms, it is self-defeating and it squanders the liturgical riches of the Church" (p. 160). Whereas in true worship there is constantly a tension "between the sense of immanence and the sense of transcendence. God is perceived as present to the worshippers in a special way, but the symbols also point 'beyond' and to an 'other-world'" (p. 157). There occurs simultaneously in worship "the attraction of love and the inhibition of awe." What factors are necessary, then, to forestall what Hitchcock calls "liturgical drift" and to provide the ingredients which make this healthy liturgical tension possible?

Here one may question Hitchcock's bill of particulars because naturally his prescriptions apply specifically to his own (Roman) tradition. However, any one of us can sort these out and find directives which may prove to be helpful.

1. There should be an official and meaningful liturgy for the denomination as a whole and "local experimental variations," although permissible, ought not to displace accepted uniform rites.

2. All churches should maintain a healthy sense of continuity with their historical past which, in view of our understanding of the Communion of Saints, can never be regarded as dead, but as having validity as long as the best is cherished and re-lived.

3. The ingredients of Christian worship are biblical, although the contribution of tradition is sizeable. However, tradition must always be under biblical correction and its viability determined by the degree to which it is in accord with the spirit of the New Testament.

4. The "other-ness" and "timelessness" of the act of worship are sustained and rendered impressive through multiple factors—symbols, place, form, etc.—but also by the "attitude of deliberate reverence, care, and solemnity" on the part of the leader or celebrant.

5. Crisis in liturgy or worship emerges from crisis in belief. "People who say no private prayers will be unable to pray in the liturgy either," Hitchcock maintains. Uncertainty of belief counteracts unity of devotion, praise, and corporate commitment on the part of the congregation but genuine private prayer with inclusive intercessions contributes to the deepening of its spirituality.

6. According to the linguist Basil Bernstein there is in verbal communications both a "restricted" and an "elaborated" code of speech. The latter is used in com-

municating explicit meanings from one individual to another; the former is used among those of a group in terms of "shared assumptions." "The elaborated code seeks to impart information; the restricted code seeks to reaffirm identities," Hitchcock discerns. How much aimless discussion on the language of worship could be avoided if this distinction were taken seriously or clearly understood!

7. Too much of the so-called "ecumenical" worship is pointless and ineffective because it is based upon and prompted by merely the spirit of good will and not upon a healthy proportion of shared "religious identities."

8. True worship involves an encounter of opposites: visible with invisible, human with divine, action with contemplation, and finite with infinite. With these elements, three other factors play a clear part, but not as opposites; there is in worship a continuum of past, present, and future. Time and eternity are not opposites; the latter is the fulfillment of the former. The locus of worship is the here and now, but its reach is towards a city yet to come.

In Constant Prayer

Prayer is growing accustomed to that
Nazareth-place within us,
learning the quiet of its twilight hours,
feeling the silent ordinariness of its daily toil,
loving its simple fare and homespunness,
breathing the silent innocence
of His being there.

Prayer is a desert space within us:
a place where the Spirit can come and brood;
a place where we can go and be undisturbed,
not so much to shut out the city
and the sights of day,
but so that we can find within us the Way—
the Way that is our life
and our winding home;
a place where trivial things can resonate,
and, hearing their hollow emptiness,
we can learn to prefer the silent depths
of Spirit-life that merge our years into His.
Prayer is hearing our name called—
not once,
but twice, three times—eternally—
in every bell, in every duty, in every detail
of our day
until every moment of our existence
becomes a departure point,
a "leaving everything to follow Him."

(from "Where Speech Leaves Off," by The Poor Clare Nuns of Rocky River Drive, Cleveland. Used by permission).

The American Dream: Two Hundred Years After

by EUGENE CARSON BLAKE

For four decades the name of Eugene Carson Blake has been associated with distinguished churchmanship both in America and abroad. A native of St. Louis, Mo., Dr. Blake is an alumnus of Princeton University and Princeton Theological Seminary. After parishes in New York City, Albany, N.Y., and Pasadena, Calif., he was elected Stated Clerk of the General Assembly of the United Presbyterian Church in 1951. From 1967 to 1972 he served as General Secretary of the World Council of Churches in Geneva.

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Scripture: Hebrews 11: 8-16

At this beginning of the celebration of the Bicentennial of our nation I have chosen as my subject "The American Dream—Two Hundred Years After." For it was a dream, it was a vision which beckoned our forefathers to embark on a pilgrimage. They came in small ships across the Atlantic, setting out from Britain and the Netherlands, some fleeing for conscience sake, some hopeful for gain and freedom in a new, sparsely settled land, some either fleeing or indentured criminals. But, whatever their backgrounds, they came to share a religious sense of destiny in the New World so that their adventure more and more became a pilgrimage, even though it was to Massachusetts only that the "pilgrims" came. It was burghers to New Amsterdam, cavaliers to Maryland and Virginia, and criminals not only to Georgia but hiding among the others seeking a new start in a new land. And they kept on coming in the 17th and 18th centuries: Swedes and Quakers

and later Orangemen to Pennsylvania, French Protestants to New Rochelle and the Carolinas, and by 1775 they were all becoming Americans with a common dream of an ever westward march across a land more vast and empty than they had been able to imagine.

This American dream, looked at from a perspective of two hundred years afterward, has much in it which was and is admirable and which we ought to revive and reinstate in a time of celebration. By the same token, we ought not to let this celebration come and go without noting and repenting of the sins which were a part of it. These sins were both limitations and pretensions; there was false pride and cultural arrogance; there was cruelty and material greed. These realities too we need to remember.

And since the churches represented here tonight shared both in the best of the vision and the worst of its limitations and sins, it is right and proper that

during the national celebration, we should remind ourselves of both the good and evil in the American dream.

Much of that dream was explicitly in religious terms and symbolism, so we will examine together the story of Abraham, still the father of Judeo-Christian culture (even the father through Ishmael of Islam as well). But let us look at that Old Testament story through the eyes of the New Testament and the anonymous writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews. It is good for us to do it in this way, because in the religious life and thought of Massachusetts there was an identification with the history of Israel and the faith of the Old Testament (especially the Psalms) which has its closest New Testament parallel in the letter to the Hebrews. And the American dream in both religious and secular symbolism still partakes of both the best and worst of the pilgrimage begun by Abraham, and followed by Issac and Jacob, Moses, the Judges and the prophets.

According to the central passage of the Epistle to the Hebrews, the common quality in the life of the Old Testament heroes was faith. And faith is defined as "the assurance of things hoped for, the conviction of things not seen." It was faith, then, that transformed Abraham's westward wanderings from a simple nomad's seeking of space, food, and water into an authentic pilgrimage. By faith, we are told, Abraham turned his back on the cultured civilization of Chaldea, then the halfway stop in Haran, moving ever westward as our forefathers did to settle what was envisioned as a land of Promise: later described as a land

"flowing with milk and honey," a land which he, his children and his children's children, "as many as the stars of heaven and as the innumerable grains of sand and by the seashore," would at last receive as their inheritance.

That was Abraham's dream, but he wasn't sure it would come true. Nevertheless, he obeyed when he was called by God, not knowing for certain exactly where he was to go. And we are told it was his faith that changed his life from one of ease and contentment in a decadent civilization in the east to a rough westward journey, a life in tents, sojourning "in the land of promise as in a foreign land."

Limitations of the American Dream

It was not only the faith and obedience of Abraham that made his story important for us to recall, but it was the fact that he avoided confusing heaven and the heavenly city with the actual historical earthly accomplishments of his westward pilgrimage. Until the end he was a "sojourner," a transient even in the "land of promise." Abraham lived with his son and grandson in tents, not because he was moving farther west as our ancestors did, but because he knew there was a radical difference between the Kingdom of Heaven and the best of all possible kingdoms on earth.

A.

This, then, is the first limitation or the first pretension of the American dream (viewed from the perspective of two hundred years after). From the beginning until now Americans have too

generally refused to admit the difference between eternal life with God and our social, economic and political accomplishments on this new continent. Americans have generally failed to see that even after we reached the Pacific, our pilgrimage was not over. Like the Israelites after Abraham, we gave up our tents and built our temples of stone, our houses with foundations, our market places and our palaces. Spiritually we forgot the new frontiers that must always remain for a people of God until the *eschaton*, until the final coming of the Lord with both salvation and judgment.

Thus on the eve of our Bicentennial we are over-impressed with our accomplishments. We are a success-oriented people. We become more and more materialistic. And we must repent of this sin. We must look now beyond the physical frontiers of our domain and remember that the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob is also the God of the prophets and the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ: all of whom are committed to the vision of the whole world and all its peoples for whose salvation Christ died.

B.

This leads us to the second limitation of the American dream as viewed from the perspective of two hundred years. Let me put it in blunt modern terms. The American dream was arrogantly racist. Blacks from Africa bought and brought to the new world and sold as slaves were not included as full participants in the American dream, even though in Massachusetts some few blacks were "given" freedom—as if whites were being generous in bestow-

ing it. Southerners have always claimed that Massachusetts' racial liberalism was based on the economic waste of the institution of slavery than on any advanced moral sense of the full humanity of black people. Recent events in Boston schools indicate that their analysis was nearer the truth than Northerners like even yet to admit. The modern civil rights movement which began in the fifties and culminated in some small advance in the Civil Rights Act of 1964, has not as yet flowered into any basic conversion of the white man's arrogant dreams.

Now in the seventies it is evident that if our dream was deficient in that it excluded blacks, it rested also on an assumption that the native Indians who once roamed the forests, hills and streams of North America, must not be allowed to block the progress westward of the more efficient white pioneers. O, yes, there were missionaries to the Indians from the first, but conversion to Christ meant to most white Christians the transformation of proud indigenous peoples into red replicas of their conquerors. And even the churches turned their backs or closed their eyes to massacres of Indians by greedy, fearful white settlers: good church people overlooked the economic exploitation of native Americans, the breaking of treaties with the tribes, and successive waves of transportation to less and less fertile lands as their white conquerors moved implacably westward. "The only good Indian is a dead Indian" became the secular norm, except a few red men who could be found useful as allies against the French or, as in more modern times, as riggers of high steel construction in the cities.

Yes, our American dream was racist both positively and negatively and continued so, even as successive waves of new emigrants crossed the Atlantic and Pacific at the beckoning of the Statue of Liberty:

“Not like the brazen giant of
Greek fame,
With conquering limbs astride
from land to land;
Here at our sea-washed, sunset
gates shall stand
A mighty woman with a torch,
whose flame
Is the imprisoned lightning, and
her name
Mother of Exiles. From her
beacon-hand
Glows world-wide welcome; her
mild eyes command
The air-bridged harbor that twin
cities frame,
‘Keep, ancient lands, your storied
pomp!’ cries she
With silent lips. Give me your
tired, your poor,
Your huddled masses yearning to
breathe free,
The wretched refuse of your teem-
ing shore,
Send these, the homeless,
tempest-tost to me,
I lift my lamp beside the golden
door!”

For racism by color is closely related to discrimination against cultural and other geographic groups of aliens. Even the Irish were treated as animals; Southern Europeans and Jews from eastern Europe were not as acceptable as “our kind” of peoples from the whiter northland of Europe. And there was a time in California when Orientals

could not ride first class in trains even when blacks of African ancestry were granted Pullman privilege.

Have we yet repented of this limitation, this flaw, this radical sin in the American dream? If we in the Church haven’t repented (and there is little evidence that we have) will it be that we will only repent after the fact, once it becomes clear to us that the technologically interdependent world is populated by an ever increasing majority of dark-skinned peoples of every shade who resent us, our wealth and—even more—our arrogance. Will the Church revise its vision only when we see the fearful results of being a white, wealthy minority in an impoverished world? We are six per cent of the world’s population and presently have fifty per cent of the income of all mankind. When will we repent and begin to see the world as God sees it, with all its men and women, boys and girls as his children?

I have not drawn the parallel here with Abraham as one can easily do. I didn’t do it because anti-semitism remains a constant threat to Christians after two thousand years of ugly history. I leave it to the rabbis to analyze this for Jews everywhere—including the leaders of Israel—and to draw whatever parallels there may be between blacks, American Indians on the one hand, and Canaanites, Philistines, and Palestinian Arabs on the other. It does not become us well as Christians to draw that lesson.

C.

Again, one final flaw and limitation in the American dream—two hundred years after. Here too on the eve of our bicentennial we must repent. I can

treat it more briefly even though it is the primal sin of religious Americans.

The American dream thinks of God as being partisan, always on *our* side in any human conflict. When I was a small boy during the heady days of World War I, we were taught in school to deride Kaiser Wilhelm and his generals with their motto, "GOTT MIT UNS"—God with us. But this should not have been a shockingly strange idea to us. All of us who revere the spiritual insights of Abraham Lincoln remember the story of the delegation of ministers who called upon the President when the war between the states still hung in the balance. These church spokesmen said to the President that we of the North could be thankful that God was on our side. Lincoln replied quickly: "No, friends, rather pray that we may be found on God's side." And during the last quarter century we have deceived ourselves more and more because in the chief division of the world our enemies were explicitly atheistic. To bolster our self-esteem atheistic-Communism became almost a single word in our patriotic vocabulary and it still is a popular justification for the horrors perpetrated by the United States in Vietnam, Cambodia, and in Chile. It has been the justification of alliances with every sort of fascist government whether in Portugal and Greece until recently, and with all sorts of Latin American dictators.

Even Abraham did not grapple with this so common human religious sin. But it was among Abraham's descendants that there finally arose in the sixth century B.C. that prophetic understanding of God which saw him as above all tribes and nations, never partisan and always just. And it was this

prophetic tradition that the Lord Jesus accepted and, we believe, enhanced by his life, his teachings, his death and resurrection.

Can we, who dare in our churches to regard ourselves as "people of God" fail to repent of the still common tendency to think of ourselves as God's favorites? Only so can the Bicentennial be an occasion for the renewal, the revival and the recapturing of the best of the American dream.

What then is the best of this American dream which during this Bicentennial we should celebrate, enhance, and continue?

The Permanent Values of the American Dream

A.

The founding fathers were agreed that they were establishing a nation under God. But let me hasten to say that I am not here promoting that kind of national religion which consists of routine prayers in schools, perorations by politicians at Fourth of July picnics, or even worse, the tribal faith in God which dares to cover over our national sins and shortcomings with hypocritical religious platitudes.

The fact of the matter is that the religious convictions of the founding fathers were diverse. We can even say that they were polarized into two conflicting positions. On the one hand there were the Deists—represented in the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia by such men as Jefferson and Franklin. On the other hand, there were Calvinists such as John Witherspoon and James Madison.

Deism arose out of the then

"modern" thinking of the French intellectuals; whereas Calvinism was the theological position of the organized churches, Congregationalists (as later they came to be called), Presbyterians, Dutch Reformed, Episcopalians, and Baptists (to name the most influential colonial churches).

There is not time to summarize either of these religious systems adequately, even if I were an historical theologian capable of doing so. But I can identify the political result of each position.

Deism, with its emphasis on the creator God, the Almighty, produced a faith that had in it a hope for mankind that included faith in man's natural goodness and in his potentiality with sufficient education for a decent self-rule. Deeply affected by the romantic humanism of Rousseau and modified by the caustic acid of Voltaire, it was the elitist faith that made the great experiment worth attempting.

Calvinism, on the other hand, whether reflected in the thirty-nine articles of the Anglican Episcopal tradition, or the Westminster Confession, or the theology of the Puritan independents, or (most rigid) the Canons of the Synod of Dort, had a very different view of mankind and God. Man's sin, original and all-pervasive—set forth in doctrines labelled with such frightening titles as total depravity, unconditional election, limited atonement, irresistible grace, and the perseverance of the saints—had the political effect of making Calvinists very skeptical about human virtue and very sure of the corruption of all political power.

Reading either of these positions today, it is difficult for a twentieth century Christian to accept full-blown

either early eighteenth century Calvinism as taught by as able a man and philosopher-theologian as Jonathan Edwards, or late eighteenth century Deism as expounded by a Jefferson in the glow of the romantic and rosy hopes stimulated by the still apparently successful French revolution.

What did happen politically was what we may believe to have been a providential amalgam of hope and realism. This blend has now for nearly 200 years enabled constitutional government to survive in this nation. The separation of powers, the checks and balances of our constitution are the political effect of these two limited and contradictory understandings of the nature of God and man by the founding fathers of this nation. And the American statesmen, presidents such as Washington and Jefferson, Madison and Jackson, Lincoln and Cleveland, Wilson, yes, and Franklin Roosevelt have always been informed by this dual religious tradition, different as they were among themselves in their personal faith or churchmanship.

What I am saying in short is this: On the occasion of the Bicentennial, as a people we must recapture and reinstate in our national culture at least as sophisticated an understanding of what "a nation under God" must be as the founding fathers had. But the tragedy is that in these last years the loudest and most successful voices of the churches have been so thin and shallow theologically that in encouraging a "proper" political belief in God, they have been a prime factor in the growing secular agnosticism of American culture. When you have named Reinhold Niebuhr and John Mackay and Walter Rauschenbusch you have almost finished the

list of those of our times who could discuss the relationship of God to political decision with such men as Wither-
spoon, Madison, Washington, Jefferson
or Abraham Lincoln.

First, then, on this Bicentennial let
us start to put some theological content
into the popular expression "a nation
under God."

B.

The second permanent value of the
American dream which we should cele-
brate, enhance, and continue is the vi-
sion of a free people in community and
under law. But we must understand
that freedom is not individual license,
community is not totalitarian uni-
formity, and law is not simply what a
Congress or legislature enacts and
what the courts interpret these enact-
ments to mean in judicial decisions. In
these latter days, too often freedom has
been interpreted as rugged individu-
alism of the right or left. "Let me be
free to do what I want, whatever it does
to my fellow citizens." Community has
too often lost its vision of all the people
bound together in a measure of
equality. Law has too often degenerat-
ed (as, by the way, Marxists have al-
ways said it would) until it has had little
to do with justice and everything to do
with order imposed by the powerful
upon the weak.

"Freedom, community, law"—these
three words envisioned by the founding
fathers as protected by the power of
the people under the Constitution and
immediately amended by the Bill of
Rights, represent still a viable way for
free people to govern themselves. But I
am Calvinist and realist enough to
hasten to say that freedom has never

been perfect, community is always less
than the envisioned Kingdom of God,
and that at best law provides only a
rough justice, again and again unevenly
dispensed even when it is in our best
tradition.

Let me take but one example to
illustrate what I mean. The Bill of
Rights was written at a time when the
greatest danger to a citizen's freedom
was an all-powerful government un-
checked by any court of law. To protect
the citizen's rights, such things were in-
cluded in the bill as private property,
the right to bear arms, freedom of in-
formation, to name a few. But each of
these rights is always subject to abuse.
So, property rights, without equitable
taxation, support accumulations of
wealth that allow people to go hungry
in the most affluent nation on earth. We
are a violent people with more hand
guns available than any civilized nation
needs, and the free press and electronic
media—still vital to our freedom—are
often irresponsibly used by publishers
and broadcasters for the profit of their
owners.

Reinhold Niebuhr made it clear that
a representative democratic society
was an *almost* impossible mechanism of
government. And yet, he also warned
that we must make it work, even when
its actions are slow and cumbersome
and its justice, at best, is rough—so
long as its only alternative is tyranny by
the powerful. In these recent years, for
the first time I have begun too often to
hear good men say: "Perhaps our
democracy can't longer be made to
work." As a part of our celebration of
the Bicentennial of our nation, let us
highly resolve to continue to enhance
human freedom in community under
law.

C.

And finally let us recapture, enhance, reinstate and continue that part of the American dream which envisioned a new nation and a new people strong and wise enough to solve new problems, and to reach new levels of human life and happiness. Two hundred years ago our forefathers faced a vast land ready for their cultivation and development. I have already spoken of the severe limitations and distortion of that vision because of its racial and cultural arrogance. But the vision itself should not be lost even though the problems grow more complex and their solutions demand new vision and new sacrifice. Over these two hundred years this nation has reached the Pacific and even the northern slopes of the Arctic Ocean in Alaska, and finally has included the islands of Hawaii. The physical frontiers have marked the end of our national expansion. In past history this reaching of the natural frontier has either been the beginning of the decline of a nation or its expansion into an empire. In these last years of our two centuries we have been facing both possibilities and are deeply divided in our answers to the question, "What next?" Some continue to be empire-builders in their vision and others have become isolationist again. What do we as members of Christian churches have to say to our fellow-citizens and to the other peoples of the world?

It must be a word about God. It must be our response to the best vision of our heritage of faith. It requires from us more than an American dream.

This leads me in conclusion to return to Abraham as seen through the eyes of

the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews and specifically to the scripture passage to which I have not referred since I announced it at the beginning of my address. The writer is talking about men and women of faith, who like our founding fathers "died not having received what was promised"; and I remind you that however long our nation endures, we too will die without any perfect fulfillment of God's promise.

But then comes the crucial context, the combination of historical hope: "having seen it and greeted it from afar"; and the heavenly faith: "having acknowledged that they were strangers and exiles on the earth." The writer goes on to describe a people of faith in God as "people who speak thus, make it clear that they are seeking a homeland." This is to say, people of faith are seeking God's rule in history on earth. "But as it is, they desire a better country, that is, a heavenly one." That faith in God always adds to every historical hope an eternal dimension.

So, in 1976, we may celebrate the past and look forward to the future as a people of faith only if we remember that no one nation is God's kingdom. No separate people are the favorites of God's concern. Not only must our faith historically go far beyond the national boundaries; it must repudiate the false visions of empire, of course, but it must also at last transcend even the dream of a whole world community of love and justice and of peace—for only thus can we come to the ultimate hope and the conclusion of this address and of Hebrews 11:16. For such a people of faith, we are assured that "God is not ashamed to be called their God, for he has prepared for them a city."

Can The Church Join Abraham Lincoln?

by Frederick B. Speakman

A native of Oklahoma, the Reverend Frederick B. Speakman is minister of the Third Presbyterian Church, Pittsburgh, Pa. Dr. Speakman is an alumnus of the University of Oklahoma (A.B. & M.A.), Harvard University (M.A.), Princeton Theological Seminary (M.Div.) and Washington and Jefferson College (D.D.). He has served pastorates in New Jersey, Ohio, and Pennsylvania and is a member of the Board of Trustees of Princeton Theological Seminary. He is the author of three books, including Love Is Something You Do (Revell).

You can still hear the story in the Central Woodward Christian Church in Detroit, that shortly after the great Lincoln Memorial Window was dedicated in their sanctuary in 1928, a Detroit businessman brought his mother from the deep south to worship there. They were seated toward the front and just opposite that Lincoln window. The service was beginning, when the alert little lady lurched in the pew and muttered something of explosive alarm, and her son whispered, "Is something wrong, mother?" "Oh, my stars, yes! Look what they've done now! They've got Abe Lincoln in a Christian church, all dolled up in a stained-glass window!" And only the swell of the organ and the standing of the people for the hymn gave the man a chance to placate her ire and persuade her to remain for the service.

Amusing as I've found that incident, I'm even more intrigued trying to imagine how amused Lincoln himself would have been at her reaction, how very understanding he would have been at her indignation, and what a wry comment he might have added to her sharp protest.

I know of five magnificent Lincoln windows in American Christian churches. But to know even of these tempts me to amend Vachel Lindsay's

lines to read, "It is portentous and a thing to state" to notice it took Abraham Lincoln many decades to join the Christian church, but he finally made it. And that prompts me to remember that strikingly peculiar prophecy in an editorial in the *London Spectator* a week after President Lincoln was shot. The *London Spectator* had been the first British newspaper to make the shift from the enmity against him of all the British press, ranging all the way from the haughty hostility of the *London Times* to the open contempt and cruel ridicule of *Punch*. Though before we Americans make much of that we should be cautioned that many an American editor, at the news of Lincoln's death, before he could clamber aboard the bandwagon of eulogy, had to rip from his paper some upcoming vicious cartoon or raging editorial. And not all our pressmen could bring themselves to so sudden an about-face. There actually were papers that hailed Lincoln's assassination as the judgment of God upon a Dictator! Yankee papers, mind you! It was the Northern Press that kept alive for a while the slogan, "He was not a hero in his life, don't make him a martyr from the manner of his death!" But here again, we the people can point no finger. There was no outcry from us when the

Chicago Times called the Gettysburg Address "An exhibition of ignorant rudeness which was an insult to the memories of the dead"! There was no public shudder when the *New York Herald* called the opening of Lincoln's campaign for re-election, "A Gathering of Ghouls, the Great Ghoul from Washington and all the little ghouls, vultures and hyenas that like him, feed on carrion." While his incomparable Second Inaugural Address, his "with malice toward one, with charity for all" masterpiece, which I once heard Dr. Reinhold Niebuhr call an incomparable declaration of statesmanship, grounded in unswerving biblical faith and theological insight, was slurred at by one powerful American journal at the time, as being "so slipshod, so loosely joined, so childish in its ideas, its sentiments, its grasp that by the side of it mediocrity seems superb." That's surely what the then young William James, who was on an expedition up the Amazon with Louis Agassiz, meant, when he wrote his father, "When I think of Lincoln's death, and the treatment he had from all of us, unused as I am to the melting mood, I'm forever on the verge of blubbering."

We, the people, were guilty enough when from the moment that silly, harmless sounding pop of that Derringer pistol was heard in Ford Theatre that Good Friday night, and of all the frenzied rumors that followed, the reporter, L. A. Gobright, took the risk of wiring the Associated Press Office in New York, "The President was shot in a theatre tonight and perhaps was mortally wounded." He got that wire off just before the power failed, isolating the city for hours in a cloak and dagger silence of conspiracy and frenzy

which historians may well never quite unravel. From that hour until many days later when his casket on its special slow train reached Springfield, the nation tried to take stock of its sudden deep grief, and some editors at last did hurry to extemporize type to make their headlines the biggest and blackest and politicians and preachers stockpiled their heaviest munition of eulogy, and groped among the words Lincoln himself had used with such clarity, only to discover they could find no words to sum him up. And all that while, it was at last the people who began to sense the stature of the leader we had lost, a stature we had taken for something less than stature, and now he was gone. For nights the muted crowds aimlessly milling around the streets of New York could have noticed one man standing at the gas-lighted curb, well-dressed, sober-mannered, wooden-faced, saying to anyone who would listen, "Do you know what he'd tell us if he could come back? Do you know what he'd tell us about Booth? He'd say, 'Forgive him, he knew not what he did.'" While in a city farther south, as a throng stood quietly outside a newspaper office awaiting details of the killing, a husky young tough, unaware how grief can quickly be triggered into violence sauntered up to say loudly, "Well, I'm glad it happened." And they ripped every shred of clothing from his body and only deft action by the police kept him from serious physical injury.

So it was in retrospect at the end of those days of national American mourning that the *London Spectator* attempted this mixed appraisal, "Perhaps," it wrote, "perhaps the only traits of Mr. Lincoln that remain unappreciated by the American public at

large are his religious faith and his simplicity." Those words have been under my skin ever since I first discovered them, because surely we know by now they were only half true. And though I know some who would say that's a rather higher average for the British when they are commenting on anything American, to be fifty per cent correct. With the exception of Alistair Cooke, of course, since he's been a naturalized American citizen for years. But whenever I find historian, poet or orator speaking of Abraham Lincoln's simplicity I wonder where they got such a notion. It is worth asking whether the lens of American history ever focused on a more complex man than he was. A six foot, four inch giant of a man of remarkable physical strength but haunted by melancholia and complexes which extracted such physical toll from him that at fifty-six you wonder if Booth's bullet had to sink very deep to shatter him. So famed for his wit and his gift for pointed anecdote that the company he did not make laugh felt slighted, and his enemies branded him an incurable buffoon.

Yet there always was about him that air of solitary tragedy of one who had listened too long to the "still, sad music of humanity," and he knew moods of depression so severe that for days he could not eat, sleep, and would see no one. He had one year's formal schooling and never in his life owned as many as a hundred books, yet he wrote the greatest prose his time was to hear and if we had from him only the Farewell at Springfield, the Gettysburg Address and the Second Inaugural, we would know the master orators of the race had met their peer. His wife and friends were ever complaining he had no ambi-

tion, but ambition consumed him inwardly. He once wrote to Joshua Speed, "I only live in the hope I can link my name to the great events of our time." He was the despair of his advisers as a clumsy politician, yet when Stephen Douglas heard Lincoln would oppose him for the Senate, Douglas said, "Then God help me, for I happen to know that clown is as shrewd as he is honest." When his friends insisted his debates with Douglas would cost him that Senate race, he replied, "They will kill bigger game than a senate seat, they will mean Douglas will never be President." He was called "gentle as a woman" and never would he publicly rebuke or belittle, yet privately his words could strike blunt as a cudgel, and his telegrams to his generals often cut like a hand-honed razor. To McClellan he wired, "You complain of exhausted cavalry. Could you tell me what the horses under your command have done that could exhaust any creature?" Supposedly immune to public opinion yet with each news of defeat his first words were, "How will the nation react now?" Supposedly impossibly idealistic yet he withheld for months the timing of the Emancipation Proclamation so that it too could be useful as a weapon. That only hints the list of his complexities, the lanky giant from Springfield with the tousled hair, and leathery skin, not so much lined as furrowed, and the deep-set gray eyes, pain-filled and dull as worn agates, and the surprising shrill voice, and the nasal twang with just a trace of Kentucky in his accent, and that beard he grew when a little girl advised him to, and the shawl he wore that night that looked so odd on such a big man, worrying his friends before he left for the theatre

with a dream he had dreamed, a dream of disaster. And then that silly little pop from that silly little pistol in the hands of that crazed little man, and though I'm fairly certain Stanton didn't say it, he only claimed he did, but he should have said it, then "he belonged to the ages."

I was taught, you see, that Abraham Lincoln was an atheist and a madman. Oh, yes, that was taught to young people in some areas of America not so very long ago. After all, he never would join the church, wasn't that the tip off, the key to all his other oddities? I cannot tell when it was in my own digging into the record of those times, I came to realize Abraham Lincoln did not join the Christian church because he did not find the church of his time Christian enough! With tears on his face he sat in Springfield and said to a friend, "There are in this town twenty-six clergymen and all are working against me but three. I know there is a God. I know He hates all injustice and all slavery. I see the storm coming and I know His hand will be somewhere in it. I may not see the end but it will come, and these good men will discover they have not read their Bibles aright." In the cold drizzle at Springfield station the day he left for Washington he told the throng of friends he was so surprised to find there, "Without the assistance of that Divine Being I cannot succeed. With His assistance I cannot fail. So I leave you trusting in Him who can go with

me, yet remain with you, and be everywhere for good!" To a delegation of clergy from Chicago who claimed their advice for him was the will of God, he replied, "I would think it strange if this were God's will for me, that He would not have made it as plain to me as He has to you. For I seek His will daily more earnestly than you can imagine." The last time Joshua Speed visited the President in the White House he found Lincoln reading the Bible. And Speed rather curtly expressed some of his doubts. "Not now, Josh," Lincoln said, "Take as much of this Book on reason as you can, then take the rest of it on trust." Three weeks before Gettysburg, he told the President of Illinois Wesleyan, "The God of our Fathers who raised up this nation to be the refuge and hope of the world, will not let it perish now." And to the assembly of Methodist Bishops only days before his death he wired, "Thanks be to God who in this hour of crisis has given us the churches." And then, so soon, so soon, the absurd noise of the silly gun in the hand of that pathetic man, and the question to face America in every time of crisis since and now, not why didn't Abraham Lincoln ever join the church? Rather: Can the church of America finally join Lincoln? Can we realize his biblical witness? Can we come by his granite-like trust? Can we reach the maturity of his religious faith while still there is time?

How Shall A Believing Jew View Christianity?

by HERSEL JONAH MATT

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I

The relationship between Judaism and Christianity is, on a theological level, essentially ambiguous. The relationship between individual Jews and Christians is, on a psychological level, almost inevitably ambivalent. And the relationship between the Jewish and Christian communities has been, on the historical level, so frequently marked by Christian persecution, by Jewish fear, and by mutual hostility, suspicion, and mistrust that it is inherently problematical. No wonder, then, that through the ages Jews and Christians have almost never been in position to confront squarely or explore fruitfully the true nature of their relationship. Indeed, our own age may be the very first in which such confrontation and exploration are possible. And even for us, any chance that the problems can be solved and the ambivalence resolved depends on whether the basic ambiguity can be clarified.

II

The heart of the ambiguity in the relationship between Judaism and Christianity is the dual reality of their similarity and difference.

The similarities are numerous and basic, flowing from the common acceptance of the Hebrew Scriptures as Holy Scriptures: e.g., the common affirmation of the Creator God who formed the universe by His will and man in His image; who established His covenant with the Children of Israel and redeemed them from bondage; who revealed His word and will at Sinai; who gives commands to human beings, judges them, rewards and punishes them, and forgives them when they truly repent; who hears their prayers and responds; and who promises a messianic era of judgment and redemption.

In the face of such mighty similarities, shall we say perhaps that the two religions are really variants of one religion, and that any differences between them are minor? But how can we possibly say that, once the differences even begin to be set forth: on the one hand, Christ and his Universal Church; on the other hand, the People Israel and The Law? Surely, the inherent duality of relationship between Judaism and Christianity—however puzzling it is—must be maintained: the two faiths are at once fundamentally similar and fundamentally different!

III

Were we dealing with an exclusively historical phenomenon or an entirely theoretical issue, this duality of relationship, though it might intrigue us, would not trouble us. What makes us troubled—religiously disturbed and psychologically ambivalent—is that issues of existential truth are at stake. As a believing Jew, I know that God, through the Covenant He has made with my People Israel and through the Torah-of-truth He has given us, has revealed all that human beings need to know about Him and about our relationship to Him and to each other; why then should there be another Covenant and another revelation? Even assuming that somehow I could come to terms with such duplication, what if that second Covenant, that second revelation, affirms something that is *not* included in my original Covenant (e.g., that God was in Christ, that the Messiah has come) and denies something that *is* included (e.g., that Israel's Law is still binding, that it is a fully adequate channel of God's word and of His love)? How can such a second Covenant be equally valid? Yet Christianity claims its Covenant with the same One God to be of equal—if not superior—validity with Israel's own Covenant!

Must I, therefore, as a believing Jew, deny the Christian claim and impugn the full validity of Christianity, granting only its partial validity? ("What is true in Christianity is not new, and what is new is not true.") Or is there another possible approach to the two faiths, whereby their respective claims to full validity can both be accommodated?

Let us explore the rationales for each of the covenants—and see.

IV

Why the Covenant with Israel?

God's original hope—it is clear from the Torah—was that through the creation-in-His-image all human beings would not only know right from wrong but would consistently choose the right, simultaneously advancing God's purpose and promoting their own true well-being. The biblical stories of the Garden of Eden and of Cain and Abel are parables of the frustration of God's hope; hence the Flood and the subsequent establishment of the Covenant with Noah and the new mankind. But human beings again showed themselves to be sinful (witness the story of the Tower of Babel): too unaccepting of God's authority, too unmindful of His word, too ready to deface the image in which they were created.

It is at this point that God establishes His covenant with Abraham—singling out one man and his descendants; concentrating, as it were, upon one family of humankind; providing the deed of Abraham with a fuller measure of instruction and guidance, demand and discipline ("to keep the way of the Lord, doing righteousness and justice")—not to the detriment or neglect of the rest of humanity, however, but to their greater benefit ("through you shall all the nations of the world be blessed"). At Sinai the Covenant was renewed and confirmed with the entire People Israel, called to be a "kingdom of priests and holy nation," to serve—as later prophets declared—as God's light and witness to the nations, until the day when all would acknowledge the One True God.

V

But what of those individuals among the nations who, drawn by that light

and example, wished *now* to cast off the idolatries and immoralities of paganism and to take upon themselves *now* "the yoke of the kingship of heaven" and "to keep the way of the Lord?" Was such a course possible, was such a step permissible? There are clear indications—in the Hebrew Scriptures to some extent, in the New Testament and contemporary writings to a greater extent—that not only was it possible and permissible for non-Israelites to join the Covenant Community of Israel, but many actually did so. (There is some evidence that on occasion there were even missionary efforts on the part of Jews.) Indeed, according to the estimates—perhaps exaggerated—of some historians, at one point as many as ten percent of the inhabitants of the Roman Empire were Jewish!

To convert to Judaism, however, meant not only to affirm one's personal faith in YHVH, the One True God of Israel, but to become part of the *People* Israel and to accept the discipline of Israel's entire regimen of holy living—including circumcision, kashrut, shabbat, etc. Not all who were attracted by the light of the Torah found themselves able to make such a complete commitment. It thus came about, around the turn of our era, that in addition to those who actually became full-fledged members of the House of Israel, there were countless others who surrendered their pagan ways and became "fearers of the Lord." But although those who came near in these two ways—either through full conversion or through acceptance of something less—numbered in the hundreds of thousands, they obviously constituted but a small fraction of mankind.

The Christian claim is that at this

juncture in history—about two thousand years ago—the same One True God who had long before revealed Himself to the People Israel now decided to reveal Himself—or perhaps had decided long before to reveal Himself now—in the "Christ Event," establishing the New Covenant. Through this New Covenant in Christ—so Christianity claims—God now made available to all mankind His word and way, His love and forgiveness, true salvation and redemption.

VI

How shall a believing Jew respond to this central Christian claim?

It would seem apparent that as a Jew he cannot acknowledge its truth. From the Torah text-and-tradition he knows that God's covenant with Israel is forever valid; from his personal appropriation of the central events of this people's past—again and again being redeemed from bondage, again and again receiving the Torah—he knows that this Covenant is real; from his daily personal experience he knows that this Covenant is adequate. Whatever is claimed by the Christian to be provided through Christ the Jew already received a thousand years and more before the Christ of Christians ever appeared. Christ fulfills no need for the Jew and offers him nothing new. How, then, *could* a Jew possibly acknowledge the validity of the Christian claim?

And yet, cannot a believing Jew grant the possibility that what is not new to the Jew—or even addressed to him—might yet involve something new when addressed to others? Can a Jew not grant the possibility (as Rosenzweig

and Herberg have taught¹) that an alternate form of God's Covenant with Israel was now being made available to the rest of humanity? This new (form of the) Covenant would be with the same one-and-only God of Israel; those who would enter it through accepting Christ (the one-man embodiment of Israel) would thereby become linked to the People Israel—but as a de-nationalized, de-ethnicized, de-particularized form of Israel. (Christians sometimes speak of themselves as the "New Israel" or "Spiritual Israel.") The role of this New (branch of) Israel would be to go forth to the ends of the earth and seek to spread the New (form of the) Covenant—the de-nationalized Torah way of the Lord—and thus, through Christ, bring all mankind to the God of Israel. The role of the original People Israel ("Israel of the flesh") would be to remain identifiably apart in holy separation—continuing to be faithful to the original (form of the) Covenant, continuing to serve as a living model of holy community: a community of true righteousness and justice, true love and compassion.

VII

Herein lies the key to the mysterious phenomenon of the basic similarity-and-difference between Christianity and Judaism. All of the genuine differences between them—both major and minor differences, both obvious and

subtle differences—can be seen, upon careful examination, to stem from this fundamental difference of role in the divine purpose and of the situation in the world.

VIII

One crucial set of differences stems directly from the differing nature of the two *vehicles* of revelation: in the one case, the *People* Israel, bearers of the Torah; in the other case, the *Person* of Christ, one-man embodiment of Israel and the Torah. Through their respective vehicles—Judaism and Christianity affirm—God makes known His word and will and way, His resources and even His indwelling presence. ("I shall dwell in the midst of Israel"; "God was in Christ"); in both cases the recipients of the revelation are, through that very revelation, constituted into a community. Yet the nature of the community and the manner of entering are significantly different. In the case of Judaism, the members are normally *born into* the covenant community (except for occasional converts), as are also, therefore, their brothers and sisters and cousins; the Jewish community thus has an ethnic base; the intense we-feeling is almost familial; the pattern of Jewish holiness has a constantly corporate reference and dimension. In the case of Christianity, since the members of the covenant community identify with each other and with God through the Person of Christ, their religious identity, though also corporate, tends to be more individualized and privatized—and so too their life of prayer, their sense of sin, their yearning for forgiveness, their awareness of God's judgment and love, and their vision of salvation. Similarly even with the hope

¹See Will Herberg, "Christianity and Judaism: Their Unity and Difference" in *Journal of Bible and Religion* (Vol. XXI, No. 2, April, 1953) for an incisive analysis and creative extension of Rosenzweig's seminal thinking on this whole subject. I am deeply indebted to, and have borrowed heavily from, Herberg's presentation.

for life after death. For the Jew, the grounds for that hope are through the Torah granted to the People Israel; fulfillment of that hope is envisioned as a function of the vindication and redemption of Israel; and the locale of that fulfillment is identified as the (perhaps expanded) Land of Israel. (The Vision of the Dry Bones in Ezekiel is extremely apt in its portrayal of the resurrection of individuals as an expression of the revival of the People.) For the Christian, that hope—grounded as it is in the resurrection of the Person of Christ—tends to highlight his own individual resurrection.

IX

A second set of differences relates to "The Law." "Law," however, has various meanings, and in assessing the alleged differences between Judaism and Christianity with regard to "the Law," it is important to distinguish among its several meanings.

Law in the sense of "ritual law"—kashrut, circumcision, and shabbat, for example—which serves as a constant reminder of God's Covenant with the People Israel and as a means for distinguishing that people from the other peoples of the world would obviously not be appropriate for the New Israel, which was meant to encompass all peoples. (The word "ot," sign, when used in connection with circumcision and shabbat, and the word "kadosh," set-apart-as-holy, when used in connection with shabbat and kashrut, both involve consecration not only in the usual meanings of holiness but also in the sense of separation and distinctiveness.) In this first usage of the term "law," therefore, it is correct to say that "The Law" constitutes a signifi-

cant difference between Judaism and Christianity. (Christianity, of course, gradually develops its own body or ritual law, which serves to distinguish Christians from non-Christians.)

With regard to law in the sense of "moral law," the two faiths of course agree that it is essential to the life of holiness. Yet the claim is often made that in their approaches to the moral law the two faiths are radically different. Judaism—it is claimed—is characterized by a stress upon divine sternness of command and human dread of punishment for the constant failure to fulfill the ever-present "thou shalt" and "thou shalt not"—and that Judaism is therefore plagued with a grim pre-occupation with a "book-keeping morality" of debits and credits, and a casuistic concern with the technicalities of the forbidden and the permitted. In sharp contrast—it is claimed—is the Christian emphasis on love: God's love for man, man's love for God, and the love of man for fellowman. Is there anything to this claim? For the most part, such a contrast is ridiculously (and unlovingly!) false. On the one hand, the Hebrew Scriptures—which are presumably the source of this supposed Jewish over-emphasis on strict moral law—are also filled with passages about this very three-fold love! (Indeed, the original source of Christian teaching about love is in those very Jewish scriptures!) On the other hand, the New Testament places great emphasis on certain "thou shalts" and "thou shalt nots," stressing at least as strongly as does Judaism, their absoluteness and bindingness, and the dire consequences of their violation or inadequate fulfillment. Furthermore, a major branch of

Christianity has been characterized by a highly developed body of canon law and a whole tradition of casuistic interpretation. Nevertheless, there is perhaps a grain of truth in the alleged difference between the two faiths regarding the moral law. In the Christian situation, partly because of the keen expectation among the earliest Christians of the imminent return of Christ and partly because of the emphasis on conversion through personal acceptance of Christ as lord and savior, the stance has tended to be "charismatic"; in the Jewish situation, partly because of the corporate dimension of the holy life and partly because of the assumption that life in the present world-and-age would continue indefinitely, that stance tended to be "halachic"²—and in the halachic perspective each act *does* have manifold consequences, each person *does* have definite social obligations, and each particular situation *does* call for careful scrutiny before making a decision and genuine accountability afterward.

With regard to law in the sense of "legalism," it is sometimes claimed that Judaism urges—regarding both ritual and moral law—strict adherence merely to the letter of the law, punctilious observance solely of externals, mechanical performance by rote—in contrast to a Christian emphasis upon the spirit of the law and upon reverent inwardness. This supposed difference, like the previous one,

is basically false; indeed, it constitutes more of a caricature than a characterization of Judaism. On the level of general principle, Judaism urges the importance of kavanah, direction of the heart to the loving fulfillment of the divine command and the joyful performance of God's will; on the level of actual practice, Christians—no less than Jews—must be assumed to be subject to the peril of rote prayer and routinized ritual, of grudging performance of moral obligations, and of hypocritical words and deeds. It may well be, however—because of the larger scope of Jewish ritual and the greater emphasis on the corporate dimension of life—that there is greater *resort* to law in Judaism and hence greater *risk* that law may degenerate into legalism.

There is still another sense of "law" wherein Judaism and Christianity are said to differ: law in the sense of "social justice," "law and order." Is there any basis for the widespread view that Judaism sees the stability and viability of any social order as dependent upon just law, whereas Christianity sees as sufficient the simple practice of love among its members? As regards Christianity, it is true—once again—that because the earliest Christians felt sure of Christ's imminent return, with its messianic dissolution of human government, they could afford, in the short run, to "render unto Caesar that which is Caesar's," could preoccupy themselves with the spread of the Gospel, and could depend upon the resources of the loving community. As the hope for an early return diminished, however, Christianity came to accept the need for government and enforceable justice on a continuing basis.

²See Monford Harris, "Halakhah and Charisma" in *Judaism* (Vol. I, No. I, Jan. 1952), for the very suggestive use and development of these terms. See also his two further articles, "The Bifurcated Life," *Judaism* (VIII, 2, Spring 1957), and "Interim Theology," *Judaism* (VII, 4, Fall 1958).

(Through the centuries Christians have had to face—but perhaps have never fully resolved—the question of how great should be their involvement as Christians in the governance of society, and how great their responsibility.) As regards Judaism, it is true that whenever Jews have lived in their own land, or in other lands where they had a large degree of autonomy, they have recognized as central to their task of holy living the establishment of a just social order in accordance with Torah law. (When under the jurisdiction of non-Jewish governments, Jews have had to face the question of whether and to what extent they were still bound by the civil and criminal laws of the Torah; often the “law of the land” has come to displace—or, more exactly, to suspend—the laws of the Torah.) In this sense alone one can say that Judaism has stressed justice over love. It has recognized that although ideally love transcends justice, in the absence of a just government which protects basic rights and imposes basic obligations, complete dependence upon personal love will almost inevitably result in tyrannical subjugation of the weak by the strong—for the temptation to sin is ever-present. (“The greater the man, the greater his temptation”; and “were it not for the fear of government, one man would swallow up his fellowman alive.”)

Mention of sin raises another issue which is often said to constitute a crucial difference between Judaism and Christianity: the belief in original sin. Christianity is inherently pessimistic about human beings—it is claimed—because it recognizes, even emphasizes, that all human beings are under the burden and taint of the

original sin of Adam and Eve, and are therefore bound to sin. Judaism—it is claimed—by not accepting this doctrine remains inherently optimistic.

To what extent is this contrast valid? It cannot be denied that certain Christian formulations, however, make a significant distinction: in theory, no human being needs to sin; in practice, all human beings known to us actually do; each moment in life presents man with the theoretical possibility of avoiding sin; the possibility turns out, however, to be an “impossible possibility.” In any case, whether or not authentic Christianity draws such a distinction, authentic Judaism does: since every man bears the image of God, every one is endowed with genuine freedom to choose between right and wrong—and thus to avoid sin; in actuality, however, “there is no righteous man upon the face of the earth who lives and does not sin,” and “the inclination of man’s heart is evil from his youth, only evil all day long (or, every day).” As Buber puts it, every person sins “not *because*, but *as*, Adam sinned.”

The emphasis upon this “inclination to evil” (yetzer hara) its power, its constancy, its universality and ubiquity, its insidiousness—has been very great in the Jewish tradition, even though in contemporary Jewish teaching it is often slighted and, consciously or subconsciously, largely censored out. And yet, with all its stress on the yetzer hara, Judaism has not succumbed to despair about humanity—because it has insisted that humanity need not succumb to the yetzer hara! Judaism has taught that the same Lord who created in man the temptation to evil has provided Israel with the antidote to

that temptation: the Torah. Through the Torah the human inclination to good (yetzer hatov) can be nourished and strengthened; through the Torah not only can a person learn the good but can be fortified to do it. The life of holiness and righteousness—good deeds performed with pure intention—although not *guaranteed* by study of Torah remains in principle a genuine possibility; through the Torah, which not only contains God's word but harbors God's presence and conveys God-given strength, human beings can be delivered from the power of the sinful inclination. And even when one momentarily succumbs to the yetzer hara, he can—by availing himself of the resources available in the Torah—turn back to God in repentance (t' shuvah); and having truly repented, he is purified from sin and is granted atonement.

XI

"Purification," "atonement," and "deliverance from sin" lead us to another alleged contrast between the two traditions: the contrast between faith and works. In Christianity—it is argued—the sole basis for hope, the sole key to salvation, is belief in Jesus Christ ("believe and you shall be saved"); the basis for hope in Judaism—it is argued—is the individual's own record of righteous deeds, his faithful fulfilment of God's commandments ("behave and you shall be saved"). This contrast is so widely accepted and so emphatically stated—by Jew and Christian alike—that it would seem to be undeniable; yet it actually represents a distortion of both faiths. On the one hand, Judaism does *not* teach that an individual has a right to count on God's approval and vindica-

tion simply on the basis of his own accomplishments, standing on the record of his own achievements. ("If You would keep account of sins, O Lord, who could stand? . . . Our Father, our King, show us Your grace and answer us; we have no deeds; deal with us in righteousness and lovingkindness, and save us . . . Not on the basis of our righteousness do we implore You, but on the basis of Your abundant mercy.") On the other hand, does authentic Christianity really teach—in spite of some of its extreme formulations—that an individual may count on salvation through Christ *regardless* of whether he *wilfully* spurns God's commandments and *regardless of whether he repents*? Indeed, not only do many Christian formulations stress human behavior as the test of true belief but they often make clear that the very forgiveness of sins made available through the death and resurrection of Christ is intended for *repentant* sinners and is efficacious only upon their contrite acknowledgement of their sin.

XII

But even if these alleged contrasts are seen to be grossly exaggerated and largely invalid, is it not true nevertheless that in their general perspectives on life and the world Judaism and Christianity are basically different? Is it not true that Judaism is this-worldly and Christianity other-worldly? Does not Judaism stress the bodily and the material, and Christianity the spiritual? Does not Judaism exalt the rational, Christianity the mystical? And don't all of these together constitute a crucial and fundamental difference?

Let it be granted that since Christians in the earliest years—as we have

had occasion to note already several times—looked for an early re-appearance of Christ and the speedy establishment of the messianic kingdom, many of the above tendencies did indeed characterize early Christianity. What need to be concerned for history (any more than for government), for physical well-being and economic sustenance, for marrying-and-begetting, for the problems of this world—when the end of history and the beginning of a transformed world with a transformed humanity were at hand? (A very similar spirit and outlook has characterized those occasional moments over the course of Jewish history when the coming of the messiah was believed to be imminent.) Since that early period of Christianity, however, these alleged contrasts between the two faiths are valid only in the sense that they represent slight differences in emphasis and tone—except with regard to the issue of body vs. soul and material vs. spiritual. For here it is true that Christianity has often been subject to mystical and Greek philosophical influences that have tended to denigrate, deny, and suppress the bodily, the sexual, and the material. Often, however, Christianity remained true to the hebraic acceptance of body-and-soul—or, more correctly—to the hebraic affirmation of the worth, unity, and potential sacredness of the whole person. (It is also true, however, that foreign influences have similarly crept into Judaism, introducing a tendency—sometimes widespread—toward asceticism, mortification of the flesh, and a sharp dichotomy between body and soul.)

As regards this-vs-other-worldliness, Judaism—though it has sometimes, as

we have seen, given more attention than Christianity to the establishment and maintenance of a just social order—has actually been as much concerned, after the biblical period, with the world-to-come; as with this world. ("This world is like a vestibule before the world-to-come; prepare yourself in the vestibule, so that you may enter the dining hall.") And Christianity, in spite of its great concern for the "heavenly city," has in most periods also been deeply concerned for the this-worldly condition of individuals and groups. And more often than not, both faiths have kept both worlds within the purview of their concern, sharing the conviction that this world is crucial as the time-and-place for striving to live the life of holiness, and the world-to-come is crucial as the time-and-place for facing the full consequences of the faithfulness and faithlessness of that striving. Both faiths have also affirmed the possibility—and have provided the "means"—of receiving at least a glimpse and foretaste, in this world and in this life, of that which in full measure is reserved for the life of the world-to-come.³

As regards "rational vs. mystical," the situation in both faith traditions is almost identical: both include teachings and teachers that are rationalistic and others that are mystical. When they are to be counted within the mainstream of authentic Judaism and Christianity, however, all will be found to make—explicitly or implicitly—this three-fold affirmation: a) that human reason is one of the primary means with

³For a summary and interpretation of Jewish teaching on this subject, see "An Outline of Jewish Eschatology" in *Judaism* (XVII, 2, Spring 1968).

which God has endowed man for understanding God's teaching and design, and man's role and task in the world; b) that human reason, alone, however, can never grasp the vastness of God's creation, or the wisdom and greatness of His ways—and certainly not the profundity of His thoughts or the nature of His being; and c) that God nevertheless grants to man the ability to perceive—through a dimension of knowledge beyond the rational—a measure of the mystery and miracle of His creation, His revelation, and His redemption.

XIII

Inclusion of "mystery" and "miracle" as elements common to Judaism and Christianity may to some come as a surprise, for it is often alleged that Judaism, unlike Christianity, places no great stress upon the miraculous. No one, of course, denies that accounts of miracles occur in the Hebrew Scriptures, but—it is argued—miracle plays no *central* role in Judaism, and belief in miracles certainly does not constitute a dogma. In fact—it is claimed—Judaism has no dogmas. On one sense, this is certainly true: the denial of any particular belief, such as the belief in miracles—or even the denial of all belief—does not call into question one's status as a member of the Jewish people, as it does in the case of membership in many Christian churches. In that sense it is correct to say that Judaism, unlike Christianity, is not a dogmatic or creedal religion.⁴ In the sense of centrality to the pattern of traditional faith, however, miracle is as

important in Judaism as in Christianity! The belief in God as Creator of the universe and of man, as Redeemer of Israel, as Giver of the Torah-and-commandments—these are pivotal, and as miraculous, in traditional Judaism as are the Incarnation and Resurrection in Christianity. Concerning the other miracles recounted in Scripture and in the post-biblical tradition, varying versions of Judaism (as of Christianity) accept them in varying degrees of literalness and authoritativeness: but that God is in principle *able* to perform—directly, through His own act, or indirectly, through any of His creatures (including humans)—*any* act that He *wills* (except an act involving a genuine self-contradiction) is stoutly affirmed by any authentic version of Judaism. (If He *could* not, He would not be the God of the Torah.)

But note: this means that from the point of view of Judaism even the miracles that are said in the New Testament to have been performed by Jesus—such as curing the "incurable," multiplying quantities of food, walking on water—are theoretically possible. Judaism, far from denying, must insist on affirming that God *could* perform them!

Whether God not only but actually did bring about these particular miracles of Jesus is of course another question, but even to this question a believing Jew need not, on grounds of Jewish faith, necessarily answer "no." For one thing, there are parallels to these New Testament miracles in the Hebrew Bible, where they are portrayed as brought about by God through the agency of men like Moses, Aaron, Elijah, and Elisha. Besides, there are numerous instances through

⁴For a further discussion of this issue, see "Dogmas in Judaism" in *The American Rabbi* (II, 7, March 1967).

the ages—and even in our own age—where events that had been totally unexpected, previously considered impossible, contrary to what were held to be immutable “laws of nature”—have nevertheless actually occurred. They are perceived as miracles when the power and wisdom and love of God are seen to be at work on our behalf.⁵ That such miracles may have been performed by Jesus *need* not be *denied* by a believing Jew.

XIV

But a much more fundamental issue now presents itself, one which *would* seem to constitute a crucial difference between Judaism and Christianity: the issue not of miracles performed *by* Jesus, but of miracles performed *in* Jesus; not what he is said to have done but what he is said to have been. We speak now of such central and distinctive Christian beliefs as the Virgin Birth, Incarnation, Resurrection, Christ as Savior, and the Trinity. These certainly mark the dividing line between the two faiths. To the vast majority of people—except for occasional Jewish converts to Christianity (who claim that as “Jewish—or Hebrew—Christians” they remain Jewish though having accepted Christ) and except for occasional halachic theorists (who claim that even a Jew who has sinned through apostasy remains a Jew) it seems self-evident that no Jew can make such basic Christian affirmations and remain a Jew.

Granted, then, that a Jew cannot affirm such miracles. But need he deny

them? We ask now, concerning these miracles that are at the heart of Christian faith, the same question we have asked twice before: does Jewish non-affirmation of their truth require affirmation of their falsehood?

As already implied in the preceding discussion of miracles alleged to have been performed *by* Jesus, a believing Jew need not necessarily deny even these miracles alleged to have been performed *in* Christ—at least in their visible, outer form. Surely the theoretical possibility that God could (if He so willed) cause conception to occur without the agency of a human male, or the dead to live again, is not a contradiction but an affirmation of Jewish faith. (Indeed, that God will in the future raise the dead to life is not only affirmed in several passages of the Hebrew Scriptures but in talmudic Judaism is affirmed to be an essential “article of faith”: “He who says that the resurrection of the dead is not derived from the Torah has no share in the world-to-come!”) But even the historicity of such wonders need not necessarily be denied by a believing Jew. After all, if the dead were revived in the time of Elijah and Elisha, why may the dead not have been revived in the time of Jesus?!

But this, of course, misses the point of the central Christian miracles. The point is not their mere occurrence but their significance, not their outer manner but their inner meaning, not their empirical verifiability but their religious authenticity. But as soon as we speak of inner meaning and religious authenticity, we are in the realm of personal, existential appropriation: “the knowing in faith.” And in this realm the whole notion of affirmation *or* denial by

⁵See “Miracle and Berakhah” in *Synagogue School* (XXII:3, Spring, 1964).

one person of the faith-knowledge of another is inappropriate, pointless, and even ridiculous. The question of whether "God was in Christ, reconciling the world to Himself," whether God (The Father, First Person of Trinity) has through Christ (His uniquely-born Son, Second Person of the Trinity)—and since Pentecost, through the Holy Spirit (Third Person of the Trinity)—provided love and forgiveness, light and truth, salvation and redemption, the key and way to eternal life—such a question is for the Jew not a meaningful question at all, and is therefore not *possible* for a Jew to answer, affirmatively *or* negatively! The most that a Jew can do—and while this "most" is less than some Christians would like, it is more than some Jews would like—is to acknowledge that in the lives of countless men and women who profess Christ the power and presence of God appear to be evident.

XV

But doesn't the word "Christ" itself bring us to the point where a Jew must go beyond mere non-committal concerning the Christian claim? After all, since "christ" means the anointed messiah, in affirming Christ the Christian affirms that the messiah has come. The Jew, however, has a vivid picture of what the coming of the messiah entails: the end of war, poverty, suffering, sin, and death; the resurrection of the dead; the ingathering of scattered Israel to the Land of Israel and the rebuilding of the Holy Temple in Jerusalem; the final judgment, involving reward and punishment; the inauguration of the true community of mankind, where perfect justice and love and true fellowship are an

enduring reality; in a word, the establishment of the Kingdom and Kingship of God upon earth. In the face of the Christian claim that the messiah has come, must not the Jew insist that he has not?!

How would Christianity respond to this challenge? Not by rejecting as incorrect or irrelevant the above Jewish description of the messianic era, for Christianity shares the same vision. And surely not by claiming that such messianic fulfillment is manifestly here! Rather, by referring the Jewish challenger to the Christian doctrine of the Second Coming—when Christ in all his glory will, at history's culmination, return and visibly usher in that fulfillment. But if the fulfillment must wait until that Second Coming—the Jew will ask—what was the purpose and meaning of that First Coming two thousand years ago? The Christian answer is: to mediate to mankind the reality of both God's judgment and His gracious, sacrificial love; to implant in their hearts the vision of the final day; to teach them, by precept and example, how to prepare for that day and how to hasten its coming; and to provide, within believing hearts and faithful communities, a foretaste here-and-now of the love and peace that constitute the messianic reality.

XVI

This explication of the roles of both Christianity and Judaism does not, of course, alter the faith affirmations of either one. It does, however, disclose a striking parallel: not only the messianic vision but almost all else too that the Christian becomes heir to through the New Covenant of Christ, and the community that professes Christ, is—as we

have seen—strikingly similar to what the Jew became heir to long before, through God's original Covenant with the People Israel when they received the Torah. A host of terms are common to the two traditions, referring in the one case to Israel-and-the-Torah, and in the other case to Christ and the Church: covenant, cornerstone, the word, the way, the truth, the light, first-born son, witness, chosen one, suffering servant of the Lord, beloved one, anointed, God's dwelling place, key to life eternal. Again, even these breathtaking parallels do not in the slightest degree persuade the Jew to "accept Christ" nor the Christian to "surrender Christ". They can nevertheless remind the Christian that God's Covenant with His People Israel abides unbroken, and remind the Jew that God's Covenant promise and providence have been opened up to extend beyond the People Israel.⁶

Israel and the Church of Christ: how

different they are in role and situation—and yet how similar in their common source, their common teaching, their common commitment, and their common goal. Until the messianic goal is achieved, they must remain separate—to some extent blind to each other's true nature and to the full measure of each other's validity. (The Christian cannot grasp the full adequacy of the Old Covenant; the Jew cannot grasp the full meaning of the New.) But together they can, and are obliged to, both work and wait for the coming of the promised messiah. (Each must be careful not to become so pre-occupied with the waiting as to shirk the working.) And together they can cherish the certainty—since each knows that the Lord has promised but one messiah—that he whose second coming is awaited by the Jew will be seen, when he comes, to have the same face . . .

⁶We must reserve for separate treatment two very important related questions: (a) whether in principle there could be not only a dual form of the Covenant but multiple forms; and (b) if the

answer is "yes," whether—and if so, to what extent— Islam, being the only other religion that is a direct offshoot of Judaism, constitutes a valid third form.

Schleiermacher: "On Practical Theology"—A Summary and An Analysis

by RONALD E. SLEETH

Friedrich Schleiermacher, often called "the father of modern theology," is known to all informed students of theology for his monumental work, *The Christian Faith*. Lesser known, but perhaps in its own way just as important, is the *Brief Outline on the Study of Theology* which was published in 1811 and 1830. These lectures to his students were his attempt to state succinctly a schema for the whole of theology. Especially pertinent is his material "On Practical Theology" which, however relevant to his own thought and times, has remained a classic statement of the ministry of the church both for its theological basis and its contemporaneity.

There are at least two basic underlying assumptions in Schleiermacher's work which commend themselves to the attention of all students and teachers of theology.

First, and foremost, Schleiermacher saw unequivocally the primary task of theology as providing church leadership. He was not in the least concerned with theology as a disembodied discipline. He was unashamedly a Christian theologian and his work gives support to the current emphasis that theology is servant

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of the church's mission in the contemporary world. Every theological discipline contributes to the church's understanding of itself and therefore its work. Conversely, the church cannot function without scientific knowledge and practical instruction which are the provinces of Christian theology. The religious interest and the scientific spirit are brought together for the purpose of both theoretical and practical activity. The reciprocal relationship between church leadership and theological study can be seen as theological subjects stand in the purview of church leadership, and church leadership is within the province of theology. The scientific work of the theologian promotes the welfare of the church, and clerical activities belong within the circle of theological sciences.

Indeed, the scientific spirit and the ecclesial interest must be united in each person. Otherwise, the scholar would not be a theologian but simply one who works with theological subjects, and the clergyman would lack the skill and foresight of good leadership, "degenerating into a mere muddle of attempted influence." (p. 22) Obviously, one or the other will be dominant depending upon the function one performs in the church, but the

mandate is there to combine both within either the theologian or the church leader.

The second assumption, which follows logically and naturally from the first, is that all of the theological disciplines are interrelated. Simply stated, if one is to deal with any of the theological disciplines, then the basic features of them all should be mastered. "Only when each person in a general way comprehends the whole, along with his special discipline, can each and all communicate. Only then can each person exert an influence upon the whole through his main field." (p. 23)

The various parts of theology are joined together not only in their essentiality, but also through their relationship to a common mode of faith—a particular way of being conscious of God. That is to say, a student of theology does not begin his study by abstractly considering man or God. He begins with the relationship between God and man—what has already happened—and that from within the Christian community.

And, like the first assumption, theological studies attain cohesiveness in so far as the ecclesial and scientific interests are joined. Specifically, for Schleiermacher, the interrelatedness of Christian theological study is focused on three over-lapping areas which are the whole of Christian theology. These three fields are Philosophical Theology, Historical Theology, and Practical Theology.

Though the concern of this paper is Practical Theology, the very interrelatedness of the disciplines makes it imperative to look also at the other two branches of theology.

I

Philosophical Theology fixes the subject matter with which Practical Theology has to deal; and does so by fastening upon certain scientific constructions. At this point it would be well to indicate the meaning of the word "science" as Schleiermacher employs it throughout his work. "Science" is using rational and orderly methods to assemble a particular kind of knowledge which can be validated in experience. He does not use the term as one would in general science, for the actions of God are inexplicable on natural grounds. Specifically, Christianity cannot be construed purely scientifically or strictly empirically. Philosophical Theology, then, has as its controlling factor God's revelation of himself in Christ. On the other hand, church communities calling themselves Christian need to be subjected to critical treatment, which is the role of Philosophical Theology. Further, Christian faith itself is represented and communicated principally by thought.

Functionally, Philosophical Theology gives the perspective on Christianity whereby it is recognized as a distinctive mode of faith. It also describes the form the Christian community takes, and determines the manner in which these factors are subdivided and differentiated. In short, philosophical theology operates as a critical control on the faith and life of the Church. In so doing, Philosophical Theology is concerned with the careful definition of the basic terms of theological discourse. It, therefore, gives clarity to what is the distinctive nature of Christianity as over against other kinds of human experience.

One very practical concern of Philosophical Theology is its role in the areas of apologetics and polemics. In the former, it attempts to clarify in terms recognizable to insiders and outsiders alike what Christianity is. In the latter, it seeks to detect the "diseased" (*Krankhaft*) condition within Christianity itself. Interestingly enough, Philosophical Theology has an ecumenical nature. It actually came into being to enable Historical Theology to operate more honestly, more efficiently, and therefore more convincingly in view of the divided state of the one church.

Above all, Philosophical Theology is individual in that a person's whole theological way of thinking is really philosophical. One should study other theologian's work, but in the final analysis one's own philosophical theology is not an adherence to another's, but is that which has been appropriated as one's own firm and clear conviction.

II.

The second and largest area of theological study for Schleiermacher is *Historical Theology*. For him it is the core curriculum of a well-grounded theological education combining three large fields: 1. Exegetical theology, the knowledge of primitive Christianity, 2. Church history, the total career of Christianity, and 3. Contemporary theology, the state of Christianity at the present time.

Primitive Christianity should be studied first. Called exegetical theology, it refers to the earliest times of Christianity in which doctrine and community first developed in relation

to each other. The Christian writings, therefore, are the original and normative representation of Christianity. This "normative representation" forms the New Testament canon, and understanding this canon is the essential task of exegetical theology. The documents of the canon contain both the action and effect of Christ on the disciples (*evangelion*) and the action of the disciples in the establishment of Christianity (*apostolos*).

The great task of exegetical theology is to try continually to determine the canon more exactly. The canon may permissibly be in two forms: that which has been handed down historically and that which has been separated critically. Because of its close connection to philosophical theology, every theologian must do exegesis for himself. This critical task must be done with the same care and by the same rules that apply anywhere else in criticism. There are no special rules for the biblical critic, though a philologist should not turn to the New Testament apart from an interest in Christianity. Any extended occupation with the New Testament canon not motivated by a genuine interest in Christianity can only be directed against the canon.

Since the canon contains Jesus' own proclamation and the testimony of those influenced by him, the New Testament in particular becomes our authority. We do not assume this but go to the scripture to find out what he said and did. Through the same spirit that enlivened and illuminated the early Christian community, we are able to discover him too. In other words, exegetical theology makes the New Testament available to the church so

Christ may disclose himself to us as he did to his earliest disciples. That is how we attain conviction about the authority of scripture.

As might be expected, Schleiermacher contends that real exegesis, including exposition, can only be done by the person who works with the canon in its original language. This would mean that every theologian would have a basic knowledge of Greek; and the original languages of the Old Testament in order to understand the Hebraisms in the New Testament; and an acquaintance with the use of oriental materials.

Church history naturally is a branch of Historical Theology and in the broader sense is knowledge concerning the total development of Christianity since its establishment as an historical phenomenon. It develops in two essential ways: 1. through the history of doctrine which is the development of the religious ideas of the community, and 2. through the history of the community in the forming of its common life—polity.

The church develops a common worship which is the manner in which the religious elements in life are publicly communicated. Alongside worship is the development of morality which is the influence the Christian principle makes upon the various areas of action. Worship and morality are conjoined, then. If separated, worship becomes empty ceremonies with Christian life becoming only morality, or else there will be Christian piety maintained in worship while morality conveys motives foreign to Christianity.

Besides exegetical theology and church history, Schleiermacher considers dogmatics as a branch of His-

torical Theology coupled, surprisingly, with a category called, "church statistics." Church statistics, which presumably would be labeled "Sociology of Religion" in our time, is the knowledge of existing social conditions in different parts of the Christian Church.

Dogmatic theology is the systematic representation of doctrine which is current at any given time, whether for the church in general or for any particular party within the church. In Schleiermacher's mind, dogmatic theology was the doctrine current in the evangelical church. As with other branches of theology, he believed that a dogmatic treatment of doctrine was not possible without personal conviction.

Dogmatics as a field is the scholarly servant of proclamation, but also of ethics and Practical theology. It gives Practical Theology the norm for popular communication. A comprehensive dogmatic treatment must take into consideration everything relevant to its own church community at the time. And, it has within its bounds both orthodox and heterodox elements. Orthodoxy (holding fast to what is generally acknowledged) and heterodoxy (the inclination to keep doctrine mobile) are both necessary. There is no true unity without the orthodox element and there is no conscious and free mobility without the heterodox element. A dogmatic theologian who either innovates only or simply exalts the old is an imperfect organ of the church.

Every doctrinal proposition must be verified by referring the contents directly or indirectly to the New Testament canon. Orthodoxy, thus, should not stand in the way of exegetical investigation. On the other hand, the

absence of proof texts is no testimony against doctrinal propositions.

A student of theology should be engaged in forming a personal conviction regarding the proper locus of doctrine not alone based upon the Reformation but on anything new that has been significant. The inward receptivity to new investigations is essential to the spirit of the church—either to changes in the canon or to new sources for dogmatic terminology. This requirement, however, does not relate to *faith* which is common to all Christians, but strictly to didactic statements about that faith.

Dogmatics has two facets: theoretical doctrine and a practical side—ethics. However, the separation should not be thought of as essential. Rules for Christian life are theoretical propositions, but they are also faith propositions. Together, doctrine and ethics keep dogmatic assertions from becoming lifeless formulas, and ethical propositions from becoming bare, external prescriptions.

A general knowledge of the condition of Christendom as a whole is an indispensable requirement for every theological student. However, detailed inquiry into the present condition of Christianity which does not proceed from ecclesial interest or in relation to church leadership could produce only an uncritical collection of information.

III.

Since theology is the servant of church leadership, *Practical Theology* for Schleiermacher is the crown of theological study. In *Practical Theology* the ecclesial interest and scientific spirit are united. Both clerical and theological activity are to be regarded as overlapping and coordinate.

The subject matter of Practical Theology comes through the apologetical and polemical constructions of Philosophical Theology. Philosophical Theology, in other words, identifies the proper areas of concern for Practical Theology. Its doctrinal foundation, however, is in the whole of Historical Theology without which its rules become mechanical presentations. On the other hand, Practical Theology connects Historical Theology with the active Christian life and gives Philosophical Theology its moorings in the actual experience of the church. In this way, theological disciplines are protected from isolation no matter how technical their work. Once again, Schleiermacher is reiterating his contention that theological studies are an integrated whole.

Schleiermacher speaks constantly of the "leadership of the church" or "church leadership." Though this concept is meant to be regarded in the broadest sense without any restrictions as to any particular form, it is clear that the term is synonymous with "clergy." The duties, however, are not always so easy to categorize. For example, church leadership is essentially the care of souls (*Seelsorge*). Even the most menial administrative task in the church should bear this character. But, care of souls is the responsibility of all Christians, not just the clergy.

In discussing church leadership, Schleiermacher makes a distinction between church service and church government. The former (*Kirchendienst*) refers to the local church congregation while the latter (*Kirchenregiment*) applies to the whole church. Leadership in church service

consists in edification in common worship or other assemblies of the congregation for religious matters. It also has a governing function through the ordering and direction of morality through direct influence on the lives of people.

In general, Schleiermacher's comments upon specific areas of Practical Theology are sketchy and brief. For example, he avers that the evangelical church tends to regard religious discourse as the real core of common worship, yet for him the form "sermon" or "preaching" is something that is uncertain and accidental—especially when its inequality in effectiveness is considered. "Homiletics" presupposes an established form, while in reality the subject should be treated in a broader and freer manner. The distinction between "sermon" and "homily" does not obviate the concerns Schleiermacher has in considering preaching as a discipline.

Common worship has two elements: the free productivity of the one doing the service, and two, the same person in the role as an organ for the church. In the first instance, the person is primarily the "preacher." In the second, he is the "liturgist."

"Care of souls" (*Seelsorge*) is thought of in terms of members who have lost identification with the rest. However, the subjects of pastoral care in the congregation are primarily the children through the subject called "catechetics." ("Church pedagogy" relates to the total educational task of the church.) The children through catechetical practice become receptive to the edifying activities of the congregation through the quickening of religious consciousness into thought and through

the regulative activities by awakening motivation for action.

Church government—that area of church leadership beyond the local congregation—has two elements. First, those expressions of the present spirit and disposition of the community which are binding or authoritative. Second, those expressions which are discretionary marked by free spiritual power to bring something new into the communal disposition.

In concluding remarks under Practical Theology, Schleiermacher gathers up several disparate concerns. Without attempting a complete summary, some few can be indicated:

The academic instructor, dealing with youth who are motivated by religious interest, brings to the student the theological aspect of the scientific spirit. He should be concerned with quickening the spirit without weakening the religious interest.

In terms of what is obligatory for every theologian and what constitutes a specialty, Schleiermacher affirms that every person in church leadership can become effective in every function. The tasks of Practical Theology in the area of church government will be most accurately stated by the person who has thoroughly and completely developed his philosophical theology. The most appropriate methods will occur to the person whose historical basis for living in the present is deepest and most diversified. Execution of these methods is promoted by means of a person's natural talent and general culture. However, not everything in an entire encyclopedic outline of theology is required.

The highest accomplishment of Practical Theology is to fashion both

church service and church leadership in light of its opposition position to the Roman Catholic Church.

IV.

Without attempting a detailed analysis of Schleiermacher's work on Practical Theology, it seems desirable to highlight several areas which lend themselves to discussion and further study.

First of all, the underlying assumption that there is a unity between churchmanship and theology commends itself to the attention of all those interested in theological education. To consider Christian theology as the servant of the church from the beginning of the proclamation of the earliest witness until the present, furnishes a backdrop for seeing the function of the theological education.

Presumably, though, the temptation to parochialism is always present as one examines what the concept of "serving the church" means in any given context. For example, Schleiermacher's contention that any study of the New Testament not motivated by a genuine interest in Christianity moves against the canon, certainly raises an interesting point for scholarship. Or, can dogmatics be studied, or for that matter, taught without personal conviction? In other words, is faith a pre-condition for theologizing? The interrelatedness of theology and church is emphasized clearly. The enslavement of one or the other needs to be avoided.

The assumption that all theological disciplines are interrelated seems self-evident. Nevertheless, due to the training of teachers and ministers, fragmentation occurs and plagues

theological education as it seeks to integrate theological studies. The perennial tension between the "generalist" and the "specialist" is one facet of the problem. Can one master all of the basic features of the theological disciplines as Schleiermacher seems to suggest? As a teacher, for example, should one's competency as well as interest be broadened to include several areas? Or, should any one field unite the varying disciplines? If so, which one? Or, can integration of the disciplines ever occur by educational means apart from a student's own predisposition to correlate the various areas himself or herself?

One of the basic questions concerning Schleiermacher's Practical Theology is whether his categories of the entire theological enterprise are viable ones. Are the divisions into Philosophical, Historical, and Practical the most useful way of conceiving theological education? Further, are the divisions within each category accurate and helpful? For example, is the coupling of morality and polity the most desirable way to think of both concerns?

As to Practical Theology itself, a basic ambiguity occurs at the outset in regard to its essential character. If theology is the servant of the church and its ministry, then praxis is constitutive of its very being. To conceive of theology apart from its role in the church's witness seems by classification at least to encourage the not so humorous label, "impractical theology."

Among other things, this ambiguity raises not only the question of whether Practical Theology is a separate entity, but also where it should be taught? By the descriptive title it would appear

that all functions of ministry—what is often regarded as *praxis*—would fall under Practical Theology. Thus, the so-called divisions on the Ministry would be the departments of Practical Theology. However, in addition to the problem mentioned earlier that theology has its own *praxis*, it is also true that functions of ministry are often taught without reference to explicit theological assumptions even though the rubric Practical Theology encompasses the individual functions.

Problems occur, then, not only in defining Practical Theology, but even in determining whether it can be considered a separate entity, a separate course, or a separate category of theological studies.

Another way of looking at the problem connected with Practical Theology is to see it in personal terms of theological instructors. Must not an instructor in practical studies be his own philosophical theologian and see his/her work explicitly in that way? Conversely, should not the philosophical theologian and the exegetical theologian see *praxis* in their disciplines? That is, Practical Theology may reside more in an individual with that proclivity for the dual church/theology role than in a course, a department, an area, or a division.

Practical Theology has not been historically a classical discipline in American theological education. In European universities a Practical Theologian would be quite common and his work clearly delineated, but often lacking specificity and concreteness. In our theological scene it would be difficult to point to a Practical Theologian in the classical sense of that term.

In theological education in general we have often had two extremes. On the one hand, there have been so-called content-centered theologians and biblical scholars who have disdained practical studies by either ignoring them, or assuming they cannot be taught, or feeling they can be picked up in experience, or else grasped by implication from the “serious” theological disciplines. On the other hand, practical divisions have been peopled by those who by interest, if not training, are not concerned as much with the theological grounding of their field as they are with the applications. Many have come into faculties as “practitioners” and others have been trained as much in the social sciences as they have been in the theological ones. Thus, instructors in practical areas often are defensive about the integrity of their areas or insecure in treating their subjects theologically. Even if they did do so the problem of fragmentation is difficult to avoid when *ministry* is conceived of as embracing several functions which have little relation to one another and when all are seen as equal in terms of requirements.

Fortunately, there have been in theological education theologians and biblical scholars who see Schleiermacher’s concern to keep theology and churchmanship together. The seeming dichotomy is bridged by what might be called, church theologians. On the other hand, there are those engaged in the *praxis* of ministry who see their work as a theological, historical, and biblical discipline as well as a practical one. Even so, there is still the question of whether a single discipline of Practical Theory can reside in a

single person, a single course, or a single area.

Schleiermacher's failure to cover a great deal of specific material reveals that even those involved in the classical discipline of Practical Theology have problems with the category. There are many areas not covered in his work and not much written in terms of volume under the category of Practical Theology which he considers to be the crown of all the branches of theology. Some aspects he ignores, some categories are strange, and some are relegated to other writings. One has the feeling that he feels uncertain about the content of the field as he states, "No prescription of practical theology can be other than a general expression . . ." (p. 93) He is cautious about "rules" other than the most general sort, relegates "arts" to aesthetics, and speaks of effectiveness through "natural talents." Much of what remains unsaid, ignored, or underplayed could be considered creative content within the theological framework of practices.

Finally, none of us can be separated from our milieu. Schleiermacher writes of the nineteenth century German evangelical church. The question of

how paradigmatic that stance is for our context is obvious, especially in light of his own conviction that theologizing is for the church in its contemporary setting. To take only one example, his theology is enunciated quite clearly as propositions in contra-distinction to the Roman Catholic Church of the day. Without for a moment accusing him of an anti-Catholic position, it simply exemplifies the backdrop of his understanding of faith and church life.

Nevertheless, it is patently clear that Schleiermacher also took seriously the church and its faith. He saw the church's witness in its unity and therefore its studies in their interrelatedness. That insight is universal and in that affirmation he remains our mentor even now.

(Apart from checking certain nuances of meaning with the original text (*Kurze Darstellung des theologischen Studiums zum Behuf einleitender Vorlesungen*), the work studied for this paper is: Friedrich Schleiermacher, *Brief Outline on the Study of Theology*. (Translated, with Introduction and Notes by Terrence N. Tice). Richmond, John Knox Press, 1966. In the summary sections I have made no attempt to avoid the exact language of either Schleiermacher or the editor-translator.)

Liberal Education for Leadership: 1776-1976*

by J. DOUGLAS BROWN

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In the coming months, the citizens of the United States will increasingly turn their minds back to the days of the founding of this country. For most of us, our ancestors were not here in the 1770s and '80s, but we all have benefited more than we can ever measure from the wisdom and foresight of the small group of able men who led us to independence as a nation and, later, established the system of government under which we live.

The members of the Continental Congress of 1776 and of the Constitutional Convention of 1787 who debated, drafted and approved the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States were a most remarkable group. They came from a wide range of backgrounds in respect to occupation, home environment, and economic status. But they had one great resource in common: *they had read widely and had thought deeply concerning the fundamental principles which should guide human affairs.* As a group, they had the attributes of leadership to an extent seldom duplicated in the two centuries which have passed since their day.

The founders of our country in both the Continental Congress and the Constitutional Convention felt and understood that a society rose or fell according to the qualities and aspirations of the *individuals* within that society and not because of vast systems of management or elaborate technologies. It was a time when the individual counted and valued his freedom of self-expression and not merely his wealth, influence or social status.

Without the mounting accumulation of scientific, technological and statistical information that overwhelms us today, they were, in their thinking, *man-centered*, not knowledge-centered. They did not try to prove things by computers, but rather by the judgment and insight gained by personal experience, intelligent discussion, and their reading of history, philosophy, and classical and critical literature.

Without the glut of communications through radio, TV, news magazines and wordy newspapers, they had the time and the interest to read fundamental books. Reading for them was not merely a means of passing courses or of recreational diversion, but a way of life which continued throughout life. The private libraries of many were im-

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pressive in a time when books were scarce and expensive.

In their thinking about Man and Society, the founders of our country were concerned with values, *fundamental* values, and not with political and economic gadgetry. The old-fashioned word was "virtue." Many had studied law, which then involved far more a demanding exercise in philosophic reasoning than a mastery of an accumulation of detailed rules and procedures in a wide range of specialized fields.

Most of all, the members of the Continental Congress and the Constitutional Convention were men accustomed to assuming responsibility, even at a relatively young age. They were dedicated to the public interest as they saw it. They didn't all think alike and there were many differences in their interests, political predispositions, and social traditions. But they were willing and able to discuss issues at length in a climate of mutual respect and emotional restraint.

In a time when our country desperately needs leaders of the kind we had in our formative days, it is a valuable exercise to analyze the factors which influenced the development of that rare group of men who in a period of a dozen years established a great nation. It is easy to say that the critical events of the revolutionary period brought out talent in persons who in quieter times would have been less challenged and less influential. But America has gone through many other critical times with *some* outstanding leaders but seldom, if ever, with a group of leaders of the quality and effectiveness of those who started us on our way.

America today needs such leaders

more than at any time since the Revolution. In government, we have passed through a period of moral bankruptcy in the highest offices of the nation. In a time of political and economic tensions throughout the world and in our own country, there is a paucity of able, respected leaders at all levels of government who can present and gain support for viable policies. Our cities are in trouble. Big business has become impersonal, amorphous, and often suspected of questionable practices. Even our leading professions are more questioned than ever; the medical profession for using its political and economic power at the expense of the people, and the legal profession for not keeping its house clean of scoundrels. We have come to realize, at long last, that a country which has placed its faith in democratic capitalism has a greater need to create for itself more and more able leaders to solve its complex problems than have those countries which accept, willingly or not, subservience to an authoritarian government.

There is, of course, no single solution to the problem of developing a greater flow of wise, able, honest and dedicated leaders in America today. But in our search for answers I am convinced that we must look to the *character of persons* rather than to techniques, systems, or procedures to find a solution. We now have a plethora of specialists in every profession or occupation, including those in managerial techniques and controls. Our lack of talent is not at the cutting edge of specialization but in the handle—character—which guides the whole.

What were the common factors in the development of the leaders in the

1770s and '80s which were most influential in preparing them for the great task of establishing our country?

Of the two great developments 200 years ago, the Declaration of Independence was the more dramatic, but the drafting of the Constitution was the more demanding upon the judgment, intuition, foresight, sensitivity, and mutual understanding of those participating. The Declaration was essentially a single political manifesto expressing in stirring language a great decision. The Constitution was a vast yet precise design of a continuing structure. For this reason the men who worked for months in Philadelphia in 1787 are the more interesting to study. We know a good deal about them. Many had been members of one or more Continental Congresses. Adams and Jefferson were then abroad.

When one looks for the common factors in the development of the 55 members of the Constitutional Convention, and especially the common factors in the development of their characters and minds, one is immediately struck by the great preponderance of educated, *liberally educated*, men in the group. Of the 55, 31 were college graduates at a time when college graduates in America were less than one per thousand in the population. By 1776, the three largest colleges in America, Harvard, Yale and Princeton had less than 2,500 graduates alive and active. The Federal Census of 1790 gave the population of the 13 states as three million six hundred thousand, including slaves. We know that the college graduates in the group were liberally educated: nine were from Princeton, five each from Yale and William and Mary, three each

from Harvard and Columbia, and two from Pennsylvania. Several had studied at Oxford and Edinburgh, and in the Middle and Inner Temples in London. The biographies of all 55 show that most were remarkably well read in legal, theological, philosophical or classical literature. The King James version of the Bible was a common source of understanding.

The program of study in the colonial colleges is well known. It differed in content from that covered by most students in liberal colleges today because of the elaboration of the sciences and social sciences since that time and a lessened dependence upon the classics. But, compared to the best of liberal education today, the purposes, approach, methods and results were remarkably the same. The great change in American higher education in the last 200 years is not that the liberal approach in higher education has disappeared but that it must now strive to perpetuate itself against a massive pressure toward size, impersonality, "practicality" and specialization in publicly financed higher education.

I am convinced that the survival of the liberal approach in higher education is vital not only in what it contributes to the individuals whose lives are enhanced by it, not only because it enriches our general way of life, but because more than any other force we know, it helps to create a flow of young persons who are willing and able to assume places of leadership in the vast range of professions, institutions and organizations which determine the effectiveness and quality of our country. Men of liberal education started us on our way. We now need, as

never since then, men and women of liberal education to lead us through the mounting problems of maturity in a far more complex world.

In 1776 and 1787, the nature and purpose of liberal education were taken for granted. Today liberal education is widely misunderstood, not only by our people generally but also by a great stream of educational specialists, technicians, and administrators who have confused the transmission of specific knowledge and skills with the essential function of developing human quality and capacity. The latter is far more difficult and costly. The former appears to give readily measurable results in credits, hours taught and examinations passed—that is, examinations which involve the testing of the retention of the specific knowledge and skills transmitted impersonally and systematically in predetermined doses.

With the great expansion of higher education, educationists have justified a departure from the central purpose of collegiate education by the pressure for mass production. In a country which marvels at the effectiveness of mass production of standardized cars and gadgets, it is easy to accept the concept in another area where demands have multiplied. Unfortunately, some educationists have defended their changed concept of higher education by a mistaken appeal to egalitarianism and an intimation that liberal education is a relic of an elite culture.

Given such confusion about the nature and purpose of liberal education, and to justify my argument that America needs liberal education as greatly now as in 1787, it seems appropriate to set forth again the essential

attributes of liberal education as I understand it after a half century or more of involvement in it as student, professor, and dean.

1. Liberal education is *man-centered*, not knowledge-centered. Its major purpose is the enhancement of the individual. It assumes that his contribution to society will grow first out of what he *is as a person*, and but secondarily from what he knows and from what techniques he has learned.

2. Reflecting the most fundamental needs of the individual, liberal education is *value-centered* in climate and approach. It is not neutral or aloof from values. It seeks to free men from ignorance, hatred, tyranny, greed, insensitivity, and cynicism, and to strengthen in the student his sense of dedication to the dignity of his fellowmen and their self-fulfillment in all things good and beautiful before God.

3. Liberal education, in enhancing the values of the individual, does not resort to indoctrination but rather seeks the development of values through a complex of interactive processes—in the class, in the library or study, with the teacher alone, or with fellow students.

4. Liberal education emphasizes *fundamental* values and knowledge because such values and knowledge are the most challenging to the human mind and spirit. Knowledge is a means of education, not its end. The end is wisdom. It can be assumed that great truths stretch the mind more than detailed facts. In a time of mounting specialization, liberal education must withstand the pressures to divide and subdivide knowledge into neat little, manageable bits.

5. Liberal education must seek to help the student in his *integration* of knowledge, analytical thought, and sensitive evaluation in some area of special concern to him in order that he may gain the satisfaction of attaining a degree of mastery and, at the same time, a sense of humility before that which remains unknown.

6. Liberal education should nurture the premise, by all possible means, that the liberally educated person should assume responsibility for more than his own private concerns and that leadership is an obligation for those who possess the talent for it.

7. In sum, the main purpose of liberal education is to draw forth and thereby enhance the potentialities of the individual student for intellectual analysis, sensitivity to values, emotional restraint, maturity of judgment,

and, in general, to assure a personal and positive tone of attack upon the problems he will face in life, whether in his profession, his occupation, or his participation in organized living.

These, I believe, are the essential aims of liberal education at the collegiate level. One cannot assume the successful attainment of these purposes with every student or in every institution. But I am convinced that the great need for wise leadership in the governments, corporations, institutions, and communities of our country demands that all of us concerned in higher education should reemphasize and vigorously sustain a long-tested approach to the education of our youth which has provided us with leadership in the past and will again in the centuries to come.

The Accusation and the Promise

Sermon by CHARLES C. WEST

Stephen Colwell Professor of Christian Ethics at Princeton Theological Seminary since 1961, Dr. West is an alumnus of Columbia University, Union Theological Seminary, N.Y., and Yale University (Ph.D.). He served successively from 1947 as a missionary in China, as associate director of the World Council of Churches' Ecumenical Institute, Geneva, and as lecturer in the Graduate School of Ecumenical Studies at the University of Geneva. The author of several volumes, his latest is The Power to Be Human (Macmillan, 1970). This sermon was given in Miller Chapel at Princeton on September 12, 1975.

Psalm 10. Ephesians 1:3-10; 3:7-10; 4:1-7

Two voices speak to us here out of the word of God. One contains some of the most magnificent words in the Bible, words about the ultimate promise and purpose of God and about our place as its witnesses and stewards. At the end of this sermon I want to ask whether we can believe the words and make them our own, whether they express our promise and our calling.

But I cannot do this directly because of another word which also comes to us out of the Bible. It is a bitter and accusing voice out of Israel's past which speaks to us in Psalm 10, but it is a voice which has not been silenced by the intervening centuries. We hear it one way or another from our fellow human beings today. So, I invite you first to turn with me and face the psalmist and his message.

"Why dost thou stand afar off, O Lord? Why dost thou hide thyself in time of trouble?"

The psalmist begins by accusing God. This is troublesome already. What is this attack doing in the word of God? Here God is not speaking but a human being like you and me or perhaps more accurately a human be-

ing like some of those around us, the ones who don't come to church, who don't count their blessings, who resent the world which is keeping them down and who make our world less safe and less stable to live in by the way they express their resentment.

A human being speaks—and yet this human cry is within the word of God and part of His word to us. We are invited to accuse God as the psalmist did. At the same time it is we who are being accused by him before God—and God allows it to happen. This is where we are if we are honest enough to admit it: both accusers and accused. It is a good place to start taking stock of our relation with Him.

Here is a human being speaking, a "poor" man, he calls himself. In the Hebrew the word "poor" means much more than wanting money. The poor are the meek who have no weight to throw about; they are the losers, the afflicted, the victims of the power of others. They are those who are denied their rights, who don't make it in our society and who regard us, members of the dominant culture, the dominant race, the secure who have enough to eat

and to wear and who can look forward to a bright future in education and in our professions, with resentment and hostility. Such a person shouts to God: where are you in the time of trouble?

Already in the shout there is a bias. Time of trouble? What time of trouble? Oh, we have a recession perhaps but we are promised that it is bottoming out. The unemployment rate is high of course, but there is welfare. There is an energy shortage to be sure, but good technology can certainly solve this problem in due time.

But our psalmist has a different perspective. "In arrogance the wicked hotly pursue the poor and catch them in the schemes which they have devised. . . . his mouth is filled with cursing and deceit and oppression; under his tongue are mischief and iniquity. He sits in ambush in the villages; in hiding places he murders the innocent. His eyes stealthily watch for the hapless, he lurks in secret like a lion in his covert; he lurks that he may seize the poor, he seizes the poor when he draws him into his net. The hapless is crushed, sinks down, and falls by his strong ones."

Now this is certainly an exaggerated and unfair picture of the real situation. It is not exactly an objective political and economic analysis then or even now. It is a bad thing to be sure when the advertiser spends millions to find out just the right psychological twist to sell his product to those who don't really need it, but isn't it a little strong to call it mischief and iniquity of the tongue?

When a manufacturer fights safety rules for his product or against pollution in his plant, he may indeed be endangering the life and health of some people, most of whom will probably be

the poor, but is it quite fair to say that he sits in ambush in the villages and murders the innocent in hiding places?

It may not be right that a wealthy and powerful country like ours should so dominate the world's economy through our corporations that millions in other countries contribute their labor and resources to our enrichment and their poverty, while they are kept in line by dictatorships we support. But is it not one-sided to cry that the poor are seized and drawn into our net, that the hapless is crushed and sinks down and falls by our strong ones?

This is a biased picture, an unfair picture, we know that right well. It is the agonized, frustrated protest cry of the poor themselves not a balanced indictment. And yet in the psalm *this* is the cry that is directed to God. Here and in a hundred other places in the Bible this is the cry that God hears. These are the people whom He reaches down to help, whom he justifies, whom He loves and for whom He cares. There is a strange contrast in this psalm which the whole Bible reflects. It is the protesters, the accusers, the haters of those who oppress them, who turn out to be the pious ones. It is they who take God seriously by His power and His promises. Beneath the surface blasphemy lies a faith that storms unjust reality in the power of that God.

Whereas the others? Well, let us listen to the psalmist again.

"The wicked boasts of the desires of his heart, and the man greedy for gain curses and despises the Lord. In the pride of his countenance the wicked does not seek Him; all his thoughts are, 'there is no God.' His ways prosper at all times; thy judgments are on high, out of his sight; as for all his foes, he

puffs at them. He thinks in his heart, 'I shall not be moved; from generation to generation I shall not seek adversity.'"

Once again this is certainly an exaggeration. The people whom the psalmist accuses are not the *goyim*—the people of the nations serving other gods. This psalm is about social conditions within the people of God itself. The people here described were probably in fact the pillars of a very religious society. They were doubtless found in the temple on the Sabbath. They were the managers, the rich who ran the system, the responsible leaders.

The self-defense of these people, should they condescend to it, can be quite convincing. The judgments of God *are* high and out of sight when it comes to economic and business reality. Success in the field—call it greed for gain if you want to be nasty—requires strict attention to a different kind of accounts than those which the Lord presents. Divine power is of very little help in this area, except for maintaining a kind of religious integrity in individual and perhaps family life, and in church attendance and support. It would be nice if the world were otherwise, but one must deal with it responsibly as it is.

Precisely. This is what the psalmist's cry is all about. The management of the goods and power of this world is a demanding task in its own terms. Survival and security, and perhaps prosperity from generation to generation must be built on sound financial and business planning, only after which one can pay tribute through philanthropy to the demands of God. It is better that He stand afar off, that He bless this stewardship but not try to correct it. Even He and his church will come out better in the long run.

This is atheism where it counts, in the psalmist's day and in ours. This is atheism in practice, whatever the religious practices or professions of the one who so lives. And opposed to it is the accusing, protesting, bitter, but believing, cry of the victims of the system to the judgment and power of God.

"Arise, O Lord; O God, lift up thy hands; forget not the afflicted. Why does the wicked despise God, and say in his heart 'Thou wilt not call to account'? . . . Break thou the arm of the wicked and evil doers; seek out his wickedness till thou find none. The Lord is king forever and ever; the nations shall perish from his land. O Lord thou wilt hear the desire of the meek; thou wilt strengthen their heart, thou wilt incline thine ear to do justice to the fatherless and the oppressed, so that man, who is of the earth, may strike terror no more."

The psalm does not record how the Lord in fact answered this plea. The poor man too is a sinner in need of grace. We have no simple theological justification of revolutionary words or action here. Enough that we have been shown two basic things:

1. First, we have been attacked by the word of God, just where we thought we were strong and secure. We profit from a system that others experience as unjust and as wicked. Our security is threatened by their protests. Let no one take comfort from the fact that the riots of the sixties have abated for the time being. Our religion is scorned as a cover for privilege, or an escape from responsibility, and because the religion is Biblical and Christian in foundation, the protesters today are denied access to the faith of the psalmist. But through the psalmist our responsible manage-

ment of this world is called atheism; and God allows the indictment to stand. The final judge has not spoken to be sure, but the grand jury has brought the case before the court. Make no mistake, we are accused.

2. Second, those who cry out from their weakness, often with distorted emotions and with flawed and even contradictory logic, those who have been pushed aside in the competition of life, the victims, the meek, the poor, are the channel by which the ear of God is reached. They are, in their cry, the real believers who reckon with his power to justify and save them. This should be tremendously comforting for you and me, for it means that we too are justified just at the point where we thought we were most the victims of others in his life and farthest from the power of God. We too can cry and be heard.

II

Now we are ready to hear the message of the Apostle Paul. It has two sides, neither of which we dare forget. One is intensely personal.

"God has destined us in love to be his sons through Jesus Christ, according to the purpose of his will, to the praise of his glorious grace which he freely bestowed on us in the beloved. In Him we have redemption through His blood, the forgiveness of our trespasses according to the riches of His grace which He lavished upon us." (Eph. 1:5-8)

Here is the new relation which overcomes the enmity between the accuser and the accused. Here is the guarantee that none of us need to be lost out of the fellowship with one another or with God. Love is the key to it—and the for-

givenness of all our trespasses. We are chosen—the election of Israel is reaffirmed—but we are chosen in grace and by God's love, not according to some arbitrary decree or some law to which we must measure up. So the bitterness of the protester is forgiven. So is the heedlessness, the atheism, of the prosperous and secure. A new power has entered our lives and this is now what counts.

But Paul does not stop here. This is not some transcendent personal fellowship which leaves the conditions of the world where they were. "For," he writes, "He has made known to us in all wisdom and insight the mystery of His will according to His purpose which He set forth in Christ as a plan for the fullness of time to unite all things in Him, things in heaven and things on earth." (vv. 9-10)

This is the incredible overwhelming news which really changes things. In the One who was killed by the power of human society, God sets forth a plan to unite all things in heaven and on earth. Lest we misunderstand the scope of this reality, the word translated plan is in Greek *oikonomia*, from which comes our word "economy." Paul's hearers could not but associate it with the management of estates to which Jesus referred, with the management of cities (Romans 16:23) and indeed with the whole scope of earthly power and responsibility for material things and human relations. Here is the beginning of the new context in which we live and the new possibility for all of our lives—for the management of this earth and for justice for the poor as well as the fellowship of love in the church, in families and among people of

every race and culture. Everyone and everything is included—*ta panta*—all things—in heaven and on earth.

"Of this Gospel I was made a minister," writes Paul, "according to the gift of God's grace which was given me by the working of his power. To me though I am the very least of all the saints, this grace was given to preach to the nations the unsearchable riches of Christ and to make all men see what is the economy of the mystery hidden for ages in God who created all things that through the church the manifold wisdom of God might now be made known to the principalities and powers in the heavenly places."

Of this Gospel we are all made ministers. This describes what we are all doing and preparing to do in a theological seminary. The principalities, the powers, are still around us, and in many cases they still have their own principles of operation which bear very little reference to God's economy. They are also in ourselves so that we too are called to repentance and new life. But we need not be afraid of them, whether within or without. Our task is to learn how the divine economy works and to make it known on every level from the most intimate bond of personal love to the behavior of nations and multi-national corporations. To live out the divine economy—this is our message and our task.

There is one more word to hear. "I therefore," writes Paul, "a prisoner for the Lord, beg you to lead a life worthy of the calling to which you have been called with all lowliness and meekness with patience forbearing one another in love, eager to maintain the unity of the spirit. There is one body, one spirit just as you were called to the one hope that

belongs to your call. One Lord, one faith, one baptism, one God and father of us all who is above all and through all and in all. But grace was given to each of us according to the measure of Christ's gift." (4:1-7)

The differences and the conflicts between human beings have not disappeared in the new economy. Rich and poor, black and white, Americans, Canadians, Koreans or Africans—we will still challenge each other. Each of us will still need to hear the word of God in the accusation of the brother and sister who suffers from the conditions which make us comfortable and secure. But in the church conflict itself has been transformed. Dying to self or to class, or to race, or to economic security, or national pride, has no terror for the Christian believer. We can take the conflicts of the world into our selves, at seminary, in the church, or wherever we are. We can listen for the word of God in the protest of our neighbor and find the new promise of God for us both. We can confront the principalities and powers of this world with the new economy, knowing that it is also promise for them, though it threatens their dominance and control. The church, and this seminary as a part of the church, is called to be a place where we do conflict with and challenge each other, but where in grace we hold the tension between the different experiences and convictions which are the measure of Christ's gift to each of us. To learn how, in this community, to challenge one another in truth and to forbear one another in love is our first task and our first witness to the plan of God for the world. To live out this creative tension all our lives, will be our ministry.

The Listening Presence

Sermon by A. ARNOLD WETTSTEIN

An alumnus of Princeton University and Union Theological Seminary (N.Y.), the Reverend A. Arnold Wettstein is an ordained minister of the United Church of Christ. After pastorates in New York, Ohio, and Florida, he pursued graduate studies at McGill University and received the Ph.D. degree in 1968. Presently he is the Dean of the Chapel and Associate Professor of Religion at Rollins College, Florida. This sermon was given in the Chapel of Princeton University on October 12, 1975.

"What doest thou here, Elijah?" I Kings 19:13

Our own daily experience confirms what so many analysts assert: that one of the most critical problems of our time is the problem of communication. Never have our instruments of communication been more sophisticated, from switchboard and satellite to instant replay—yet never has our inability to communicate been more obvious, between generations, between nations, between cultures and sub-cultures, between students, faculty and administrators, between authors and artists and their audiences, between persons often hardly able to articulate their own feelings, much less understand those of others. To those who suggest that we need more new techniques, we may repeat Thoreau's classic response when told that the telegraph wires being strung through Concord would enable the people of Boston to speak to the people of Texas, he asked, "What if the people of Boston have nothing to say to the people of Texas?" To others who suggest that the medium is the message, the technique is the content, we may agree with the insight but wonder about the solution. The crisis is hardly relieved when the people of both Boston and Texas are so entangled in the lines that they forget why they were strung together in the first place.

God's question to Elijah on Mount Horeb suggests quite another approach to communication, beyond the issues of either content or technique. The setting is so dramatic that we may miss the simple, central element. Here is the prophet, bruised and battered by his conflicts with entrenched opposition, having withdrawn through the wilderness to the mountain of God for forty days and forty nights, witnessing the spectacles of wind, earthquake and fire only to discover that the Lord is not in any of these techniques or contents, and then hearing the still, small voice, or as another translation has it, "the sound of gentle stillness"—whereupon Elijah wraps himself in his mantle and goes to stand in the presence of the Lord. Now what he hears the Lord first say is: "What doest thou here, Elijah?" God discloses himself as ready to listen, present not to overpower but to understand; he is there to pay attention to him, and that is where their communication begins.

Behind the problems of communication, whether with God or with each other, lies a deeper problem: Is anyone really listening? Without listening, there can be no communication. Thoreau might well have asked, "What if the people of Texas don't care to listen to the people of Boston?" We

may care, but still not be able to listen because nothing can penetrate our own sounds. You know we cannot hear with the water running—the torrents of our own thoughts, needs, desires, the distractions of so much countervailing noise. For listening, all those faucets must be turned off. Really to listen, I must be there in a kind of inner stillness. Anyone can make us hear, but no one can make us listen. We may be barraged by sounds, words, instructions, demands, requests, truths or untruths, but our listening is a function of our freedom. Jesus spoke in parables. In explaining why to his disciples he said, “He that hath ears to hear, let him hear” or, in the language we are using, “He that can listen, may he listen.”

Something I was once told on this point has remained with me. The man who said it was a superb listener. You knew he was really there when you talked with him. He could set aside his own concerns and pre-judgments and be present, with his “center of gravity,” as Bonhoeffer put it, “always where he is.” We were talking about what did and could happen in counselling when he said: “You know, I’ve long had the conviction that a person grows more by being listened to, than by listening.” Is that not the functional principle of all effective counselling, professional or unprofessional? What is more, the principle in every deepening friendship, in every satisfying love-partnership is that a person grows more by being listened to than by listening? How far we are from recognizing the full potential of that in education. Is not the opposite the basis of our educational system, that students learn by listening, to a lecture here and there, to what authors have to say on this and on that, when in actual practice, we learn more, we

grow in learning, by being listened to? In those moments in a precept, when the usual academic discussional games are set aside, and students and faculty sense they are being listened to—is not that when the educational process suddenly takes on a new reality and excitement?

“What doest thou here, Elijah?” It is the listener’s question conveying the listener’s statement: I am ready to listen, to how it is with you, to what brought you to this place. We are so familiar with these biblical stories that we often miss their surprise. Notice that God knows and uses his name. He knows who it is in front of that cave wrapped in a mantle, though Elijah had never been there before. Years back, God had called to another on this mountain, “Moses! Moses!” How amazing that he knew his name, when Moses had not even known God’s name. The use of the name here emphasizes the person in all his immediacy. God is not saying, “How is it with the world?”, but as the Listener: “I am interested in how it is with you.”

And notice, “What doest thou here, Elijah?” does not ask for any report on previous activities or any justification whatever apart from the present. There is no probing of psychic history, how Elijah felt about his mother or gets along with his friends, unless that would be part of how he feels now. We label it “reality therapy” these days—to begin with where we are at, what we understand about ourselves and our world now.

(i)

See what happens. In the encounter Elijah grows by being listened to. The availability of the divine listener opens all the floodgates of his inner percep-

tions and they all pour out. "I, only I, am left" while all the people have broken their covenants; religion, values are all in ruins. Catch the self-pity and self-righteousness and paranoia of the lonely, misunderstood hero, now covered by the same threats he had faced down many times before. They all come out. The difficulty for Elijah is that so much of what he says is true that he believes all of it is true—that none remain faithful, apart from him. He hasn't noticed any of the seven thousand who have not "bowed the knee to Baal." But now, he is being listened to and all those paralyzing inner perceptions can be released. They no longer hold him in their grip. And for the first time, in that long desolation of forty days and forty nights, he, too, can listen.

Perhaps we experience enough of the Elijah complex, of feeling alone and not understood, that we know what is happening. Elijah dearly cherished those perceptions of his, but they were strangling him. Only now with their release is he able to listen—really to hear and pay attention to the calls of his time, see its signs and act responsively though the ways be weighted with moral ambiguity. For he hears himself told not to settle there in the sacred silence—rather to go out and virtually re-order all the political and social structures of his time. So that is what listening involves: to be listened to and then to listen, to listen to attentively that the divine intention becomes our own, the source of our creative participation in human life.

In the summer of 1774, John Adams was travelling to Philadelphia for the Continental Congress, stopping at all the colleges along the way. He wanted to know how students and faculty

viewed the issues. What a day that was, when political leaders went to colleges and universities to listen. Adams stopped at New Haven, at King's College in New York, and then came to the College of New Jersey. The commitments of students and tutors impressed him deeply and following an evening of conversation over a glass of wine with President Witherspoon, he wrote in his diary that here was "as High a Son of Liberty" as could be found anywhere in America. (Now it was only one glass of wine, so we know what he meant.) Yet what he wrote of with greatest wonder was, on his tour of Nassau Hall, on seeing the Orrery of David Rittenhouse the college had recently purchased. The first mechanical wonder of the American world, it was a kind of planetarium which, through the cranking of gears, put its model of the solar system into motion. From a small telescope fitted to the ball representing the earth, readings could be made of the longitude and latitude of any planet seen from earth at any time, up to 5,000 years into the future or the past. And when the gears were in motion, the machine produced music!

Adams was astounded. I suspect the experience was for him like that of Elijah's on the mountain, a listening one—Adams was overcome by a sense of the wonder of God in the creation and the human capability of understanding it and learning to live according to that understanding. These are the two guiding principles that governed him in those crucial years when he would affirm, with his friend and colleague, Jefferson, that "the God who gave us life, gave us liberty." the liberty to learn and to know and to construct our lives and societies ac-

cording to those divinely-ordained unalienable rights. When we examine the spectrometers, lasers, cyclotrons and computers of our science centers, the books, microfilm and microfiche of our libraries, shall we be listening? For what we hear may be something of the divine intention for our time.

(ii)

When listened to, we learn to listen. What shall we hear? Can we hear the sounds of the world's starving children with their bloated stomachs, too weak to cry? Can we hear beyond their shouts, the persons calling for their identity in a mixed but unbalanced society? Can we hear beyond the Columbus Day celebrations, the needs and aspirations of those for whom the discovery of America occurred some 35,000 years ago, who have yet much to say to us, had we the grace to listen? Can we hear what is really being said by those closest to us, whose words we often hear but to whose voices we rarely listen?

Nathan Scott claims that the cultural crisis, revealed in the breakdown of communication in literature and the arts, is the result of our lack of common root-metaphors, shared myths and symbols, whereby the artist may convey his meanings to his audience. With the loss of these common symbols, artists have had to reach into their own depths for their own symbols, which accounts for the obscurity of Kafka, Rilke and Joyce, of expressionists and surrealists. However profound the analysis, we had better be careful lest we conclude that it is our primary business to create new common symbols. The biblical insight is that real communication begins with

listening, and the aim of communication is not a shared myth but a shared presence: the aim of communication is communion. The parables of Jesus, all about homely, everyday experiences, become sacramental words, disclosing "the secrets of the kingdom" because of his listening presence, into which they draw us.

Do you remember when, just a few years back, we were all reading Hesse's *Siddhartha*? We may not have fully grasped the message—how Siddhartha in his long odyssey, began to come into touch with reality and with himself by being listened to, by the ferryman who had no answers, except to teach him, too, to listen. Siddhartha's difficulty in listening to his son, who marched to the beat of quite a different drummer, underscores that message. You remember it was then that Vasudeva, the ferryman, left for the forest, he said, to unite with the All. The name Vasu means "abiding" and "deva" of course is God. Where there is listening, God abides. Kierkegaard had said much the same thing when he analyzed worship, pointing out how, using the analogy from the theatre, some say that in worship God is the prompter, the ministers are the actors, and the congregation is the audience. Kierkegaard revises the application: the ministers are the prompters, the congregation are the actors, and God is the audience. In worship, we are listened to.

What are you doing here, Elijah? Mark? Amy? Susan? Scott? Our responses are given content, for each of us, by our own lives, but the fact for each of us is the same: "I am being listened to, and perhaps, by the grace of the Listening Presence, learning to listen."

Truth or Data—Which?

Sermon by ERNEST GORDON

*Since 1955, the Reverend Ernest Gordon has been Dean of the Chapel at Princeton University. A native of Greenock, Scotland, Dr. Gordon is an alumnus of St. Andrews University and Hartford Theological Seminary. He is the author of six books, including the best seller, *Through the Valley of the Kwai* (Harper). The recipient of many honors, Dean Gordon will be recognized by St. Andrews at its July 1976 convocation. This sermon was delivered at the opening Chapel Service September 21, 1975.*

"You search the scriptures, because you think that in them you have eternal life; and it is they that bear witness to me: yet you refuse to come to me that you may have life." John 5:39

The significance of these words is more contemporary than many of us like to admit. The kind of people Jesus was, and is, addressing are those who have given up truth for data: life for machinery; personality for conditioning processes; and imagination for the rule book.

A few years ago a rebellious professor of psychology in Great Britain wrote an excellent criticism of modern educational institutions, i.e., universities, in which he typed Jesus' opponents as convergent. The convergent type is the teacher's pet—the pupil who gives back what he or she gets like a high-class sponge. This results in the monotonous cycle of untruth in which the lies of one generation are safely passed on to another. So much of authentic education, as a consequence, is uneducation: unlearning the falsehoods that were passed on as facts. Not so long ago I heard an elderly alumnus challenge a responsible historian by saying, "That isn't what I learned in school!" Thank God! We could all have said that of Albert Einstein and Albert Schweitzer.

I needn't bore you with examples.

You know the type. Time is set in concrete—when I was a boy. Truth is defined by popular prejudice—as everyone knows. And the moral imperative is reduced to law and order—do what you're told or else!

By the time people of this type put you through their tight little wringer, you know how the centerfold girl of *Playboy* feels.

We've been subject to the nightmare of their creation for too long. When you find yourself walking through Times Square in a top hat and pajamas, saying, "What am I doing here?", it is time to wake up.

And it is!

That is the kind of feeling a graduate student told me about last week. He said, "I've been subject to a barrage of data for so long that I can no longer think. I don't know who I am. Or where I'm going. I don't think any more. I regurgitate facts."

He gives us a picture of a victim who has had the life shattered out of him by a barrage of heavy data. He is, thus, left confused and shivering at the exit door of existence.

It might be appropriate, at this point,

to ask if the Christian Faith has an answer. But this, I think, is the wrong question. One, which in the end, leaves us in the old and cold *cul de sac* of the faith versus reason school.

The truth is: the community of faith and the community of knowledge cannot be divided. It is not true that an atheist is a Methodist who got a Ph. D. Although that may occur once in a while. No, the truth is, there can be no authentically higher education without faith. As Jesus pointed out: only a fool would build his house on a point of sand in a dried out stream: for when the monsoon comes, the spate will rip away the sand and the house with it.

The house of learning is no stronger than its foundation.

Last year one of our Princeton alumni asked at a conference if the University believed in God. The reply, I gather, was typical. "Well, no, although some individuals do and others don't. But faith, *per se*, is not an essential characteristic of a university."

Isn't it?

Shortly after this conference one of our faculty—a great man—a great scientist—told me about this incident. "Twenty years ago," he said, "I would have agreed with that reply. Now I don't. At this point in physics we don't know where we are. There isn't much that makes sense. We need a sub-structure, a foundation—a kind of meta-physical base—in order to get on with our job."

I

We live, or we die, by the quality of our faith. By that I mean we have faith whether we like it or not. The quality of our faith is characterized by the object of its concern. Paul Tillich was correct

in identifying faith with ultimate concern. We all have that, whether it is the ego, the dollar, the orgasm, or the idea. But it is more than that. It is the response or non-response to the living God. This is the beginning of reality—that reality which is essential for higher education. We take it for granted that reality is that which stands over against us in its own objective right.

It is this reality which the Bible affirms with its opening words: *in the beginning God*. He has given us the cosmos. It is there confronting us. Although it is, and although this suggests separateness, we are part of it. We're in it. It is given to us as blessing: for in his sight it is good, including mosquitos and scorpions and other objects we've often wondered about. According to the Bible, the Creator delights in his craftsmanship like any good artisan. "Look," he seems to say, "the whole Creation is there before you to enjoy, to care for, to think about. It is no illusion. No dreich shadow. No unhappy accident to be discarded on a cosmic garbage heap."

There is a bubbly confident quality about this faith that initiates reflection, thought, inquiry, observation, participation. As a country boy—or rather a seashore boy—my hobbies were biology and astronomy. The microscope and the telescope were tools of wonder. Like the psalmist, I found myself bowing before the infinitely small and infinitely great. That sense of wonder continued through my experiences on the sea, in the air, and in the jungle.

I mention this because I believe it is this kind of faith—consciously or unconsciously understood—that is the bedrock foundation of western civiliza-

tion at its best with its culture of literature, art, philosophy, and science. Our universities are an exclamation of that wonder which first shone in the eyes of God when he looked at his handiwork, "and behold it was very good."

It is on this foundation that our great universities have been built. That is why the Bible is invariably at the center of their heraldic shields as a testimony to their source.

II

The otherness we experience through creation would be but dimly understood, if at all, were it not for the divine/human covenant that marks Abraham as our spiritual ancestor.

He is the paradigm of faith: The divergent type of person who breaks with the safety codes of his convergent brethren to follow the call of God into the wilderness in an act of magnificent madness. By that act Abraham claimed the cosmos as the dwelling place of his spiritual descendants. As I have said, creation is given to us as a blessing. Because "the earth is the Lord's and the fullness thereof," it is ours as well. Creation has a purpose. It is for us. It is a gift to be used reverently and graciously. It is a garden. We are the gardeners who may bring forth wheat and roses or thorns and nettles.

The cosmos is our home with its center for us on this little planet earth: for it is here God speaks to us. His words evoke consciousness—that condition the Bible classifies as being a living soul.

To return to the metaphor of the garden, we may affirm that a good gardener will make every effort to know his garden. He will name, classify, organize, and analyze the facts that

confront him. He will do more than know it, however; he will care for it and improve it.

Contrary to what the behaviorists have declared in the past, many of us are unwilling to forego the experience of consciousness. Along with Pascal, we shall agree that although we are only as reeds in the cosmos, we are nevertheless "thinking reeds," who may think of the very cosmos that may seem at times determined to destroy us. Even if it should, we alone would be aware of what was happening.

To be conscious of being conscious is to be aware that the life we have received is a miracle. The odds against us, I believe, are terrific. Yet despite these odds, we exist. I may, therefore, say, "I am, therefore I count. Because I count, I think. And God has given me more than enough to think about—and enough to keep the universities busy for centuries to come."

III

Before we take too much pride in this gift of consciousness, let us remember that it also condemns us to ask those cursed questions that plagued thinkers such as Jeremiah, and Pascal, and Dostoevski, and Berdyaev, and you. Perhaps it is because we are living body-mind organisms, dust with the potentiality of eternity, that we are plagued with thoughts that transcend formulas and refuse to be forced into any mould. Thoughts of time and destiny and freedom and mortality and beauty and truth and sin and righteousness and love and God. Those thoughts that have not as yet been taken over by computers and which separate us from them and the clockwork universe.

These are the questions we ask be-

cause we are gifted with faith—the potential of responding to the divine initiative. It is this faith which, when centered on the Lord Jesus, provides us with the knowledge that is the foundation of all knowledge. Read again the Sermon on the Mount, or the Sermon on the Plain, and touch base with the eternal truth of which Jesus is the Teacher.

Albert Schweitzer named this essential knowledge *Reverence for Life*. A hippopotamus helping another hippopotamus in difficulty was the catalyst of his thought. This is what life is all about, he realized. And he was a big enough thinker to learn it from the ugliest of animals.

Interesting, isn't it? How some thinkers blame our aggressions on the animals, while others learn from them the greatest lesson of all.

Faith, reverence for life, elemental knowledge, or whatever you may choose to call it, is creatively scientific. It may only be tested by experience, your own experience. Think again of our Biblical directive: "O taste and see that the Lord is good" (i. e., examine the truth, try it for yourselves). Seek. Knock. Ask.

I am being asked, that is, to come out of my introverted hiding place to face God who is there—there, other than myself—the eternal *I am* who calls me into authentic being.

As I mentioned, Abraham is the paradigm of this divine/human encounter. Like him, all his descendants live on the frontiers of civilization and knowledge: for it is here that basic ignorance and stupidity are overcome.

I was reminded of this truth when I read about the United States and the Soviet Union astronauts' meeting

about 140 miles above the Atlantic Ocean on July 17 (1975). "Glad to see you," said Col. Leonov of the Russian crew. "Ah, hello, very glad to see you," said General Stafford of the American crew.

Why couldn't they have said that in Moscow or Washington?

During the first Christmas of World War I the Germans and the British stopped killing each other on the front lines in order to swap cards, plum duff and streudels. When the politicians heard of this in Westminster, they were furious. They threatened the battalion and company commanders with courts martial. You can understand why?

Once we step beyond the controls of stupidity and meet each other outside the boundaries, we are liberated to see truth for ourselves—with our own eyes.

In this respect the Christian faith has a great deal to do with the character of a university. Education occurs within the community of faith. Truth is known and experienced on the frontiers for which our faith sets us free. It is this freedom for truth that we are struggling to preserve at this time. Whenever a university steps down from its role as a servant of God in order to become the tool of a government or a particular economic group—whether it be of the left or the right—it is no longer a university. It is a data processing mechanism. Or, whenever it becomes a system of departments competing for that nebulous prize called prestige, it is a divisive and sectarian cult worshipping at the blood dripping altar of success.

The proper designation is: *universitatis magistorum et scholarium*: a unified community of masters and scholars pursuing a common theme.

In such a caring community we are liberated to make mistakes and learn from them; to make friends and stand by them; to uphold a moral obligation; and to confess that we don't know everything. We are free, therefore, to learn from one another: poetry from engineers; *belles lettres* from physicists; common sense from chemists; theology from mathematicians; ethics from historians; love from one another; and wisdom from God. And, of course, *vice versa*.

In such a community we are free to pursue knowledge, but not for selfish purposes only; to communicate knowledge in the only way communication is possible, i.e., within community; and to do the truth, at whatever cost.

The prophetic word, which challenges us to freedom, and the word of wisdom, which inspires us to seek knowledge, is the same word. Its ultimate expression is love—*agape* love.

This is what our text is all about. God comes to us in the flesh that we may come to him in the flesh.

According to the findings of recent

biblical archaeology, the pool by the sheep market with the five porches that we read of in John, Chap. 5, was a healing place for pagans. But the pagan god was powerless to heal a powerless pagan man. Jesus came to him and healed him. The consequence was that those who knew better sought to kill Jesus for three reasons:

(a) because he broke the law of the Sabbath by healing a sick man;

(b) because the man for whom the Sabbath was broken was a pagan;

(c) because he claimed oneness with God.

It was to those experts of closed minds and hearts who had narrowed knowledge down to precepts, and truth to formulas that Jesus said:

"You search the scriptures, because you think that in them you have eternal life: and it is they that bear witness to me: yet you refuse to come to me that you may have life."

God grant that some of us are hearing these words afresh.

Unshackle Your Mind

Sermon by ABIGAIL RIAN EVANS

Presently, the Reverend Abigail Rian Evans is the Associate Minister of the Broadway Presbyterian Church, New York City, and Presbyterian Campus Minister at Columbia University. A graduate of Jamestown College (A.B., magna cum laude) and of Princeton Theological Seminary (M.Div.), Mrs. Evans read theology with Karl Barth in Basel for two years and later spent seven years in missionary work in Brazil. This sermon was given in the Chapel of Princeton University on September 28, 1975.

"Brethren, do not be children in your thinking; be babes in evil, but in thinking be mature." I Corinthians 14:20

Noah Webster, who helped give a distinctive language and literature to our country by the writing of his dictionary, said on the occasion of its publication, "Unshackle your minds; you have an empire to raise and support by your exertions, and a national character to establish and extend by your wisdom and virtue."

At the university we are engaged in the business of using our intelligence in all areas of life. Yet so often in the area of the Christian faith we are sub-kindergarten. We need to unshackle our minds.

We tend to apply all the discipline, maturity, dedication, and energy to excelling in our academics and coast along on a Sunday School knowledge of Christianity. So many students feel they are too busy with course work now to worry about spiritual questions or to examine their faith. But knowledge of our faith affects our value system, ethics and learning experience. Now is the time of priority setting. Paul says, "Be babies in evil, but in thinking be mature." Sometimes it seems as if our maturity is in sin rather than faith. We know all about sin but little about the God who can help us overcome its power. In time sin begins to distort our

perspective so everything gets jumbled up in our thinking; we don't know why we are in school or what is the reason for all our study. We see little relation between our belief in God and studying for a chemistry final or the Bible and our latest course book.

In I Corinthians, Chapter 14, Paul is challenging us to a clear and reasoned faith; to mature thinking; to unity of mind and spirit so that God's power may be real in our lives and we may give a clear and powerful testimony to those with whom we come in contact. There are three themes to note from this text: 1. Clearly Communicate your Faith; 2. Unity of Mind and Spirit; 3. Know the Content of your Faith.

1. Clearly communicate your Faith

Speaking in tongues was a problem in the Corinthian church, along with the general disorder caused by women jumping out of turn during the service and several men prophesizing at once. Speaking in tongues was one of the gifts of the spirit given at Pentecost; Paul himself exercised this gift. It was a highly coveted but very dangerous one; it was abnormal, hence greatly admired. Moreover, it was easy to

develop spiritual pride in this gift. Paul recognized the dangers of this ecstatic language which in itself did not communicate God's message. If we make unintelligible sounds with our tongues we cannot convey anything. The person exercising this gift is engaged in private communion with God.

It is like playing the flute or harp; no music is played unless meaningful variations in sounds are produced. The tongue is like a musical instrument with speech its sound. Communication is basic to any human endeavor, and we experience the frustration of this on going to a foreign country and not understanding what is being said; soon we begin shouting. In any case I'll never forget my first Sunday in an interior church in Brazil where we were to spend four and one half years. I had studied Portuguese for one year, so I was fairly confident of my ability to communicate. A woman greeted me with "Qual é sua graça?" I caught the word *graça* and thought "Ah, she's asking if I'm full of grace," and I answered, "Yes! Yes!" She looked puzzled. Later I discovered this was an idiomatic expression for "What's your name?"

Think of the word "barbarians." When the Romans referred to barbarians the word was actually onomatopoeitic: it denoted a person whose language sounds like "bar, bar," i.e., whose language made no sense. So it began to mean those who were beyond the pale of civilization.

For many non-Christians we are like barbarians. Our Christian faith makes no sense. We might as well be speaking in tongues. Many in my church in New York City tell me it takes at least three years for a minister to recover from his

or her seminary training. What I guess they mean is all that jargon, that theological mumbo-jumbo. Preaching should be clear because here we share with others God's message of reconciling love through death and resurrection of Jesus Christ. Preaching of the word is for non-believers, speaking in tongues for believers. Preaching, as Paul indicated, five words with the mind is better than 10,000 words in tongues. Prophetic preaching edifies, exhorts, and comforts. It is a means of building Christian character, of strengthening and giving comfort in distress.

We can clearly communicate our faith when we practice the unity of mind and spirit.

2. *The Importance of the Unity of Mind and Spirit*

God created us to be whole human beings, but our culture and tradition militate against such wholeness. We see the dichotomy in our society: intellectuals vs. hardhats, men vs. women, whites vs. blacks, rich vs. poor, church vs. unchurched—from there we make statements such as women are emotional; intellectuals are cognitive; blacks and maybe the church are spiritual. Within ourselves we see the same divisions and fragmentations. God created us to be whole persons as well as unified society. Kenneth Keniston talks about the whole person in this way, "His cognitive abilities remain in the service of his commitments, not vice-versa; his ethical sense guides rather than tyrannizes over his basic passions; his deepest drives are the sources of his strength but not the dictators of his action."

The ironical fact is the two institu-

tions which could hopefully help to alleviate these dichotomies—the church and university—only manage to intensify them. The university gives the greatest status to the cognitive with the well-known separation between fact and value and almost a paranoia against the spiritual dimension. The church, on the other hand, seems to believe that it is unspiritual to think too much. I am not criticizing the institutions in some abstract sense but rather we who comprise them.

The 1973 Carnegie Report on "The Purpose and the Performance of Higher Education in the U.S." highlights the university's emphasis. We note even here a dichotomy between what the students want, "a total developmental growth as desired goal of this college experience" and this report which states "the campus is above all, a place where students enrich their minds through study. Totalism in the campus approach to students, we believe, is neither wise nor possible." At best it concedes some of this may take place through extra curricular activities or better before the student enters college. Minds are a thing apart; the fact vs. value distinction is stressed. The goal of the university is on the side of fact; all else is tainted with absolutism and inappropriate commitment.

Here we observe the divorce of the cognitive from the emotional, spiritual, and active dimensions of human existence. As Sallie Te Selle stated, we need scarcely be reminded in a post-Auschwitz, post-Vietnam, post-Watergate society of the results of an education designed to produce people whose technical knowledge is impressive but whose moral and emotional lives are dessicated.

On the other hand, we note the dangerous trend in the church that it's unspiritual to think too much. A decade ago Albert Schweitzer troubled by disposition of contemporary Christianity to keep the mind in cold storage wrote, "Renunciation of thinking is a declaration of spiritual bankruptcy. Christianity cannot take the place of thinking, but it must be founded on it." The brochure of the C. S. Lewis Society at Princeton University says, "The Christian's temptation to retreat from the intellectual arena at many of our colleges and universities too often has prevented countless young people from coming to a saving knowledge of Jesus Christ. . . . The Christian life is more than a mental exercise but a person whose mind is unfruitful is not true to his or her Christian calling."

Jesus talks about loving the Lord your God with all your mind. He gave to us a thinking faith. We are to be obedient to God whose creation reveals the scope of his own reason. This is part of the Old Testament, e.g., Proverbs 3:19, 20: "The Lord by wisdom founded the earth; by understanding he established the heavens; by his knowledge the deeps broke forth and the clouds drop down the dew." The gift God gave to the author of the unity of mind and spirit. Unfortunately in the Christian church the pendulum swings one way or another—rationalism then emotionalism—a religion which is scholasticism or spiritualism—spirit filled or mind centered.

One of the most encouraging signs of renewal in the church today is that Jesus freaks are now serious Bible students. The fervor is still there but a solid foundation in the study of the scriptures is being built. There is emo-

tional drive with rational direction. Certainly one of the first areas in which this should be evident is in our worship. As Paul points out in this Corinthian letter. In prayer we should use our minds. This is one of the problems with speaking in tongues—the spirit and mind are not allied. Too often prayers are in some emotional jargon. We say things to God we wouldn't dream of saying to our professor. We sing music which is maudlin and poorly written. We should come away from worship being filled with God's spirit and built up in our knowledge of the faith. Instead many people say, "I don't go to church because it's so boring." Perhaps this is partially due to the divorce of spirit and mind. We are not advocating a barren intellectualism but a unity of fervor and intellect.

3. *Know the Content of your Faith*

This fourteenth chapter of I Corinthians emphasizes the importance of clearly communicating your faith, of practising the unity of mind and spirit, as we have discussed. Actually this third point—knowing the content of your faith—is the starting point from which the other two will happen.

The use of the intellect is not enough. It is not a matter of manipulating ideas or the exercise of rational powers, but the end of all thinking is to glorify God. As Christians we have a new way of looking at and living all of life. Paul writes in Ephesians: "And be renewed in the spirit of your minds." This renewal, literally seeing in a new way, takes place through God, who is the source of knowledge. Jesus said, "I am the way, the truth and the life" (John 14:6).

Karl Barth, Swiss theologian with whom I studied in Basel, wrote volumes on Church Dogmatics. When asked what was the profound truth to know he said, "Jesus loves me this I know for the Bible tells me so." To accept the love and forgiveness of Jesus Christ is to transform every area of our life.

This is why Paul suggests we stop being children in understanding, "Be babes in evil, but in thinking be mature." The characteristic of a child is to prefer the amusing to the useful and the brilliant to the solid. Do we really desire to grow in the knowledge and love of God. We need to "unshackle our minds" and open ourselves to God's spirit.

This is the most important thing we can do with our lives right now. We need to be equipped for unforeseen crises. We never know what may happen. Is our faith mature enough to equip us for unfaithfulness of a loved one, the death of an only child, rejection from medical school, losing our job? I have a friend who was just sent home from the hospital because the doctors said, "There is nothing more we can do for you. You're dying of cancer." Now this past week all her friends are coming to say Goodbye and she ends up comforting them. Are we that certain in our faith? Is our prayer life so disciplined and regular that when we are distraught and in anxiety we can turn naturally and un-self-consciously to God? Perhaps we feel that when we pray nothing happens. We don't feel God's power. But how are we praying? Five minutes before we go to bed when we're too tired to concentrate on anything. Prayer is work and discipline.

Do we know our Bible so well that we find those passages we wish to share

with others or are they vague recollections? How many hours a day do we spend in study of the scriptures? We stay up all night studying for an examination; would we do that to learn about our faith? I can guarantee you that the Bible is more profound than any other book you may be studying right now. We take our study of Christianity in small doses like distasteful medicine. Dr. Bosley, who had a friend who said he liked to read one book a year about religion, commented that it reminded him of the man who heard that feathers made a soft bed so he got one feather and tried it.

Are we investing our time, energies and talents into knowing the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ or are we content to remain with doubts and half-knowledge? Goethe wrote, "Tell me of your certainties, I have doubts enough of my own." My friends, now is the hour to decide how important your faith in Jesus Christ is. Unshackle your minds, open yourselves to God's power, wisdom and grace—know the content of your faith, practice the unity of mind and spirit, and then you will clearly communicate the gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ.

Chapel Talks

The Sacrament of Selfishness

Arthur M. Adams
Dean of the Seminary

There was a war going on. King David was at home, taking his ease on the roof of his palace. Bathsheba, the lovely young wife of the king's noble friend, Uriah, was bored during the absence of her husband in battle and chose this moment to take a bath in full view of the monarch. One thing led to another. She became David's mistress. They told each other all the old lies: their love must be right because they could not live without each other. Uriah was a stolid, unromantic stick. Their affection was the purest and loveliest ever known. Passion invents its reasons, and it does more: it ruthlessly makes its way. David ordered a battle in which hundreds were killed, and in this bloody way he achieved his end: the murder of Uriah. Then Bathsheba became his wife. This flagrant violation of the commandment against adultery resulted in a chain of evil that plagued David's house for generations.

Adultery is the sacrament of selfishness. It takes the sign and seal of love, the highest thing man knows, and makes it the devil's own rite.

We are so constituted that our highest spiritual development requires a material base. The purely physical arrangements for the continuance of the race, plus the necessities of mutual support for the sake of the young, led to monogamous marriage. This in turn led to the development of an emotion with tremendous promise for humanity. It directed the most powerful drive in the human body and spirit outward, away from self, to concern for another, to an identification with another which made the finest sympathy appear pale. It bound two people together with chains of gold. It built a firm foundation for healthy affection toward children. Children reared in this atmosphere of love learned faster and seemed more intelligent than other children. They were better able to adjust to new situations and to devise new improvements. Thus, love proved to have survival value, and this led to its continuance and refinement.

Love had to struggle with other emotions, especially those which belong to the sub-human origins of the race, the purely sensual. Societies everywhere have recognized the danger of reversion to the animal level—not only to the individual who chose to be sub-human—but to the whole social fabric, and therefore developed severe taboos and penalties in this area, along with all sorts of rationalizations and arrangements, even some connected with religion, permitting reversion to sub-human types of emotion and activity.

Into such a world came another humanizing element: the revelation of God, the Person who created all things and guided their development to the emergence of creatures uniquely like the Creator and able to live nobly as his family. At first conceived as naked power clothed in strangeness, God became successively a King, a Priest, a Lover, a Parent best understood after the analogies of family

relations. Thus, the intimate relations between men and women became the source of the complex emotion at the foundation of human society and also the basis of the highest analogies by which we understand God. An emotion so important is no mere product of material vitalities, but divinely intended and designed, and the intimate relation out of which it grows and in which it is expressed should be considered sacred.

Our Church has two sacraments: baptism and the Lord's Supper, outward and material expressions of deep spiritual realities. In the Middle Ages, vicious persons held parodies of the sacraments, one of which was called "The Black Mass." Adultery is a perversion of the sacrament of love; it is the black sacrament or sign of selfishness. It has its clear expression in C. S. Lewis' *Screwtop Letters*, where a senior devil shows the characteristic emotion of hell by turning into a spider who would like to devour his relatives. Says he, "The only love we know in hell is the appetite to devour,"—pure selfishness!

There are four possible attitudes towards adultery, the sacrament of selfishness:

(i) One is to say, selfishness is natural. Adulterous action is normal. Men and women are merely beasts. Polls indicate that a majority break the seventh commandment: Let yourself go; be normal! One might as well say, "Half the race is hungry, sick, illiterate. Why rise above them?" We do not deny the humble origin of the race. God took dust and breathed upon it his Spirit. The question is whether we are moving toward dust or God! Are we going to crawl back to slime or walk with him? We have seen Jesus. We know where love is leading. We can be the children of God.

This calls for marriage as a life-long union of one man and one woman, a union of body and spirit at the personal level—neither treating the other as an object but as a person. This is as far beyond the level of adultery as the human body is above the amoeba. It leads to a type of emotion as advanced over lust as thought is beyond the reflexes. The fact that half the population is unable or unwilling to reach this level of emotional life is not surprising, nor does it call for a relaxation of the ideal, any more than popular taste in reading should lead to a new norm for literature. We need to realize this, for the sacrament of selfishness leads to weak and vicious persons, and unstable children and tears at the social fabric.

(ii) A second attitude toward adultery is repression: strict laws and penalties. Repression has been tried to no avail: drowning, burning, stoning, branding, imprisonment, all with the same effect as beating an ape for not being a man.

(iii) Education is a third answer to the problem of adultery, but Americans are better informed about this matter than any people have ever been, and yet the sacrament of selfishness flourishes.

(iv) The fourth suggestion is that men and women must be brought to a new stage in living. Mature love is the first mark of a new level in the development of the race. Jesus Christ is the first-born of many brethren. He pointed the way to an emotion that acts and reacts personally instead of selfishly. Studies suggest that religious faith has a definite effect in producing lives disciplined in the direction of the ideal. No one claims that this is easy or that in a few thousand years of effort

the whole of mankind has risen to the personal level. We do know that for those willing to try, it is possible and worthwhile. Anyone who has experience of truly personal love has sensed the real destiny of humanity. For such to fall into unfaithfulness has its parallel in the kiss of Judas.

This suggests what is deeply true: the best safeguard of Christian morality is experience of personal love in all its attractiveness in Christ. Jesus, whom we come to know in Bible reading, prayer and fellowship with others in the church, is One whose love individualizes. It does not devour life, but leaves it enriched. It does not enslave, but frees. Jesus takes hold of the great irresistible thrust of your life, moving like Niagara in torrent. He will not say, "No" to it, but channels it so ordinary expression is filled with beauty and satisfaction, and at the same time uses it to bring you and others light and power. In this development, adultery—sacrament of selfishness—is left behind as a worm's preoccupations are forgotten when it becomes a flying thing.

The Corrective: An Educational Mandate

James E. Loder

Associate Professor of Christian Education

John 12: 1-10

In this episode on the way to Jerusalem—on his way to crucifixion and resurrection—Jesus is portrayed by John at the critical center of a nexus of social, political and religious interactions, and all but that truly liberated person, Mary, seem to miss the central point.

This way of speaking makes this an educational text—appropriate for the beginning of a new term—because of course the cardinal sin in academia is to miss the point. (Even if there is debate as to what that might be). So I am just going to meditate a moment on the persons involved and take note of a common structure between the text and the beginning of our new term.

First, there is Judas Iscariot, champion of the oppressed, including apparently himself above all. He proves that good causes collect all kinds of motives, even if they are Christian causes and *au curreant* with the dominant sentiments of the times. Wrong motives of course do not exclude anyone from the work of a cause, they only exclude one from getting the point.

And to miss the point can lead to perversity. You remember how the Berkeley Free Speech Movement of the 1960's reverted into the Dirty Speech Movement—a mockery of the very freedom espoused in the first, by many of the same persons who were involved in that first cause; so, the second movement betrayed the first as publically acceptable cause that was, for many, designed to pursue perverse self-interests.

This is the principle behind the Judas motive: to pretend to be supplying a corrective to human suffering, but motivated in this only by one's own suffering is itself destined to betrayal. In this one purports to be supplying for others what is really only a means to the end of relieving his own frustrations, satisfying his own needs, whether for power and manipulation or for personal gratification and the comfortable illusion of service. Causes—even those done in Jesus' name—collect all kinds of motives and some are swollen with betrayal.

And *Martha*, what would we do without Martha to domesticate the protestant ethic for us? She is dutifully doing a good work for Jesus, feeding not the poor but *him*—and she exposes the fact that we can miss the point out of the very “goodness” of our hearts. Even if we examine our motives, attend to them with critical diligence, making sure no perversity appears . . . we can miss it again! Out of being faithful to our duty not to miss the point—we miss it.

Martha is Judas' motivational opposite, but his companion in portraying for us how difficult it is to “feed” this life and get the point Christ would make about it.

In the background is *Lazarus*, a silent symbol of the point not to be missed. A symbol that not this life but Jesus' transformation of it—*that* gets to the point. The point cannot rest with this life because in itself, of course, it is pointless. We all die—we all go down one by one—not like leaves even, for they all go down

gracefully. Some of us just wither, some flash and explode and die dramatically, there are both "bangs" and "whimpers," but the meanings that are *of* this life go down with us in yet another tiresome episode in the cycle of nature which in itself we must agree is pointless—the final affront to intelligence and all our carefully constructed "meaning of life" formulations.

Lazarus' silence is a symbol of the hiddenness of this transformational point; no one can shout this and make it more convincing, no chorus or holy assembly can solemnly make it more true or make it true for you. It must be discovered in the silence of one's own tomb—like awakening and finding that one has been wrapped up in the linens of this life and left for dead.

But most of all I marvel at *Mary* who with total disregard for the environment of envy and suspicion inspired in the religious dignitaries around her since the raising of Lazarus, and in diametrical opposition to both Judas and Martha, she moves not to celebrate the life and work of Jesus or to serve the poor of this life, but to celebrate to his face, Jesus' *death*—his death to this life . . . and so she had gained the point. She wasted this financially precious, extravagant luxury upon him and upon his death.

While everyone around—whether for good motive or ill—was celebrating and preserving this life, providing the correctives needed, Mary's extravagant perfume was wasted on a celebration of his death. *There* is a truly liberated person for us all to recognize and wonder at! The odor of her extravagance filled the room and for some it stank and for others it was a strange smell, but for her that was *their* problem and her joy.

He in His movement from life to death and life anew was to give to everything deemed precious its proper shape; to give to everything deemed precious its lasting meaning; its central point. His transforming power over this life—through its very destruction—is the *corrective to all our correctives*. To claim it we may have to move against the currents of our time, or espouse those views that are not "mainline," to critique the causes, and motives behind them, and even doubt the dutiful good that well-meaning folk do in His name.

If the odor of our conviction stinks to some and seems strange to others, it is only because we do not want to miss the point—even if it exposes deep-running perversity in those close to us, or seems unkind to good intentions.

Now we are about to engage in a good work "in Jesus' name." The school term is like that, but our motives are no doubt questionable. Sometimes I think "in Jesus' name" here sacralizes certain anxieties and self-interest—maybe to stay in school; there is anxiety about commitment (so we *study* commitment), or it sacralizes the need to get a degree from "Prince-uh-ton" (as Shirley Booth once put it)—and will his name then suffer the perversity of our inverted intentions to acquire a respectable union card, to acquire a slick professionalism that says we are very bright, competent and also Christian.

Dutifully we will try to avoid that—stick to our tasks, attend to the Lord! But woe is us! We have so much trouble examining ourselves and defining our duty. No, it seems we must die *to* the task—if we are to ever consider dying for it.

We the faculty will present our outlines of constructive positions and their

analysis, our subpoints and perspectives on critical issues, further facts and their interpretation—all of which the church in her relatively short history has accumulated. You will learn it—that is a part of our agreement. But if theological education has any integrity among other educational systems, you will have to waste all that this theological world deems precious on your convictional knowledge of Him. The notes must come apart . . . the outlines must fall away; it must all be decomposed, and this expensive luxury, which you will have purchased for a good price must now be allowed to take the form of His life, death, and resurrection in and among you.

Do you really believe what you are learning? Is what you believe connecting with the knowledge we pass on to you? If not, then you make us your oppressors. Moreover, if we ignore you and insist on our integration of your learning, we are in a war against your freedom to let His life in and among you give the shape to the material we all deem precious.

It just happens that this is not merely a theological consideration but also educationally sound. We become bizarre if we expect you to take an outline from any course directly into ministerial practice and pass it on as such. The laity would look at you and politely ask “What are you talking about”? It must be alive and growing in you before you can pass it on.

No—this does not mean that we stop teaching, nor does it mean that what is taught should not call forth, deepen and differentiate conviction for you and for the church—by all means! But it *is* to say that when our convictional relation to *Christ*—seen as a growing thing—ceases to be the criterion for educational excellence in a theological setting, we will be missing the point, giving way to a sterile academia, or a plastic professionalism that will surely betray the cause.

So all the while caring passionately for learning the correctives (for without such care death is only escape), we must surely die repeatedly to what we are about to do here—in order to behold the new form, the new shape His redemptive life will bring to what we teach and learn.

This is the point to be discovered and not missed; the corrective to all our correctives, to be celebrated regardless of the stink it makes: His presence in and among us, His transformational power in and over all we deem precious. I am praying that our convictional relation to Him will give our educational effort its life; *not* that this life give our education its meaning.

Therapeutic Preaching: Three Views

by THOMAS G. LONG

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There is at least a tacit, if not an outspoken, consensus on the part of those who teach preaching that their field, educationally speaking, is a tough nut to crack. Not the least part of the problem is that it is extraordinarily difficult to stake out the boundaries of the homiletical field by coming up with a satisfying, precise, and somewhat comprehensive statement of just what preaching is. Is preaching, indeed, a *field* which can be learned and mastered? Or is it, rather, a way of using and integrating material from other fields, that is, a set of *skills* which can be acquired and sharpened? Or, perhaps, is preaching something which can not be learned or acquired at all, but rather a combination of *gifts* which can only be received and employed?

This lack of precise definition has always been annoying to homiletics, since, while they debated about where to place the property lines, their field was forever threatening to disappear, either by being foreclosed and repossessed by some other ostensibly more clearly defined field, such as biblical theology or communication science, or by eroding to the point that all that was left of the field was something narrow and nebulous like "applied theology" or "field work."

All this scrambling around after an identity used to be more embarrassing to homiletics than it is now, of course, because some of the same blurrings of

disciplinary boundaries, some of the same challenges to the status of the field, have been happening lately even in the high-rent districts of systematic theology and biblical studies. There is far more caution in theological circles about drawing rigid boundaries around fields or about predicting just what issues or methods might become appropriate to a given field as it develops.

This relaxing of some of the traditional categories has meant for homiletics not only additional encouragement to cross lines into other disciplines and to make new syntheses, but also a new freedom to propose, explore, and test definitions of preaching that are not so precise or complete—nor, in fact, are they intended to be. The value of such fragmentary notions as "preaching as parable," "preaching as dialogue," "preaching as counseling," "preaching as conversation," "preaching as drama," or whatever, is not that they circumscribe all that can be said or should be said about the nature of preaching (in fact, they lose much of their value precisely at the moment they claim to be anything more than partial insights), but rather that they serve to highlight one more way that this multi-faceted and quite complicated activity called preaching functions in the contemporary church and world.

Hugh T. Kerr pointed out in 1966 that one of the elementary assumptions

of our day is the "hunch that *fragments of truth* can be more significant than truth as a whole. There is an experimental quality to contemporary attitudes about life and the world."¹ One additional sign that this may be so for the field of preaching is the virtual obsolescence of the omnibus textbook in homiletics (the classic ones dealt with everything from "twenty places to find illustrations" to "etiquette at the church door") and the current prevalence in the field of shorter books, articles, and monographs teasing this or that aspect from the total preaching mix for analysis.

One "fragment" that has recently received attention in homiletical literature is the idea of preaching as "therapeutic" activity. As this concept has been developed it has come to mean more than a view of preaching as mass pastoral counseling or preaching as preparation for counseling, a view which subsumes preaching under the rubric of another discipline. Instead, preaching understood as therapeutic assumes that the various expressions of the Christian ministry (preaching, teaching, counseling, administering, etc.) share, to greater and lesser degrees, a common therapeutic function and goal, which is exhibited by each of them in different ways and exhausted by none of them individually. Just what is meant by "therapeutic" and just how it is that preaching becomes therapeutic are, of course, issues on which there are divergent viewpoints. It is, therefore, the purpose of this paper to review the therapeutic dimension of preaching as understood

by three writers in the field, to raise what I feel is an important theological question about the whole notion of preaching as therapy, and, finally, to explore some educational implications of therapeutic preaching for the teaching of preaching at the Seminary level.

Three Views:

Welsh, Davis, and Menninger

1.

Perhaps the most complete and articulate exploration of the concept of preaching as therapeutic is Clement Welsh's recent *Preaching in a New Key: Studies in the Psychology of Thinking and Listening*.² In order to outline the main contours of Welsh's thought (a process which will, of course, involve considerable abridgment of Welsh's rich and complex argument), it is essential to see that Welsh understands the sermon not to be an isolated event, but rather as one element in a system which occurs in relationship to other systems. One of the systems in which a sermon usually operates, of course, is the liturgical system of worship, but the sermon also operates within the larger system of human communication, a vast and complex network of coded messages occurring at various levels (genetic, neural, linguistic, symbolic). It is in this second maze of systems that Welsh seeks to describe and understand the function of the sermon, and at times he finds the terrain scattered so thickly with systems his own language virtually trips over them:

"As a communication event, the sermon attempts to form a homi-

¹"The Open Option," in *Theology Today*, XXII, 4, p. 470.

²Pilgrim Press, Philadelphia, 1974.

letical system from several existing systems, weaving together into a new supersystem the loose systems of ideas and feelings that form the religious heritage and the several secular systems operating within the culture.³

If all that seems somewhat confusing, let us hasten—for clarity's sake—to Welsh's central focus. In the midst of this labyrinth of systems Welsh finds individual persons who, far from being passive and inert receivers of all that their respective systems deliver to them, are, to the contrary, active, creative, selective "processors" of the data that bombards them. Therefore it is crucial, from Welsh's vantage point, that we understand the ways in which persons perceive, compose, and organize the information that comes their way, for those are the ways people "deal" with life, make "sense" of the world, and find "meaning" in it.

So, the Sunday preacher looks out on a congregation, not of inactive individuals waiting to be filled and energized, but of active and innovative persons already energetically involved in arranging and rearranging countless bits of data, trying to hold on to some painstakingly constructed personal model of the universe, and all the while attempting to make sense of new information coming from systems as primal as their own nervous systems and as abstract and collective as general Western culture. What, then, is the preacher to do with his sermon? Faced with the fact that his preaching is not breaking the silence, but, if

anything, breaking into the cacophony of a tangle of systems, how is he to conceive it?

According to Welsh, the preacher is to design a sermon with twin functions. First, the sermon serves an *educational* function, that is it puts new kinds of information into the stream: "religious" information, however that may be understood. But along with the educational function of the sermon—or actually *before* the educational function in Welsh's scheme—there must operate a *therapeutic* function focused upon the very processes by which listeners "hear" the information the preacher hopes to convey. The preacher cannot hope to float on the stream of information any such notions as "God" or "gospel" until he has reckoned and dealt with persons' basic ability, or lack of ability, even to think about such things as "God" or "gospel." The preacher, according to Welsh . . .

"... does not drop a "message" into a box made ready for it. He hopes to adjust, delicately, some elements of the receiving mechanism to help it function more adequately.⁴

Why does Welsh choose to call this adjustment function "therapy," rather than some less loaded term? He does so because he is convinced that the capacity of contemporary persons to make religious sense of the universe has become impaired, diseased, and distorted. This impairment, Welsh claims, is a product both of the "result of living in a non-metaphysical age"⁵ in which "the receiving and decoding

³Welsh, *ibid.*, p. 15.

⁴*ibid.*, p. 16.

⁵*ibid.*, p. 30.

process of contemporary people, when the message is religious, operates with considerable difficulty"⁶ and, also, some basic human indispositions to do the kind of ultimate thinking that religious messages require. However these dysfunctions might arise . . .

"... the preacher must become a physician of minds, alert to the very pathologies of thought that his subject matter induces, for he is asking his listener to do just that kind of cognitive work that most of us come to rather awkwardly."⁷

As Welsh actually explores, in the fascinating central section of his work, the human cognitive process, he ticks off some of these "pathologies" contemporary preachers can expect of those in the pew (and of themselves, incidentally): rigid "models" of the universe, inflexible thought, resistance to novelty and change, intolerance of ambiguity, difficulty in abstracting, closed mindedness and authoritarianism, and internal insecurity.

In the face of all this, Welsh finds it essential that "the preacher . . . include in his repertory of homiletical skills one which might be termed therapeutic."⁸

Welsh is not as clear as he might be about exactly what "therapeutic" preaching might be, but he is at pains to say that Barthian-style "kerygmatic proclamation" is in no way what he has in mind. Indeed, with its high concern for the authority of the scriptures and its lack of concern for the human factor in the communication process, kerygmatic preaching, as Welsh sees it, mud-

dles on heavy-handedly, oblivious to the fragile way which human beings actually "hear" sermons and use them to make religious sense out of their lives. Given the complexities of human thought, an unadorned kerygmatic sermon, in Welsh's view, can only lead to confusion, irrelevance, or, at worst, a reinforcement of the very pathologies of thought and attitude that the gospel seeks to heal.

Welsh's alternative is what he chooses to call "pre-kerygmatic" preaching, which serves to prepare the human mind to hear and understand the kerygma. "... if we want to preach the gospel, we must preach *not the gospel, but preparation for the gospel*."⁹ As Welsh defines it, pre-kerygmatic preaching would take as its starting point, as its "text" so to speak, some aspect of the creation, some slice of human experience, and present it sermonically in such a way that hearers might discover meaning there for themselves, much as an audience in a play might discover meaning there. The lines are fuzzy here, but the crucial elements of pre-kerygmatic preaching seem to be that some interesting piece of reality is presented, with attention given by the preacher to the ways that people cognitively receive communicated information, in a relatively neutral fashion, but structured in such a way that the hearers are forced "to re-think the data being presented."¹⁰ Direct expression of opinion by the preacher is postponed and, at one level, threat is reduced by not presenting "abstract summary statements."¹¹

⁶*ibid.*, p. 30.

⁷*ibid.*, p. 45.

⁸*ibid.*, p. 100.

⁹*ibid.*, p. 107.

¹⁰*ibid.*, p. 110.

¹¹*ibid.*, p. 112.

This sort of therapeutic preaching would, according to Welsh, prepare the way for the reception of the *kerygma* at a later time.

2.

Another scholar who developed the notion of preaching as therapeutic was Henry Grady Davis. In *Design for Preaching*,¹² Davis carefully examined the several varieties of Christian speech found in the New Testament and moved from that analysis to the conclusion that contemporary Christian preaching, which encompasses all of those early speech forms, does so by assuming three basic "functional forms": proclamation, teaching, and therapy. A "functional form" is first defined rather obliquely by Davis as "a form taken by a thing the better to accomplish its purpose,"¹³ but Davis actually means something more specific than that. In fact, he seems to equate a sermon's function with the preacher's intention for that sermon, so that he later sharpens his definition of functional form to state that "... more correctly [a functional form] is that form which almost automatically results from the intention to accomplish a given purpose."¹⁴

In Davis's scheme, each of the three functional forms of preaching has as its central content the *kerygma*, which he defines as the basic New Testament gospel message of God's redemptive action in Jesus Christ. In the functional form "proclamation" the *kerygma* is simply announced or heralded straightforwardly, and, according to Davis,

who is influenced here by the work of C. H. Dodd, "proclamation" is the only form of preaching the New Testament actually calls *kerussein*, or "preaching." In "proclamation" more concern is given to the substance of the message itself than to the people to whom the message is addressed.¹⁵

In the functional form "teaching," the content is still *kerygma*, but the form it takes is theological, ethical, and perhaps philosophical, discussion. For Davis, the teaching form is almost exclusively to be used in sermons addressed to those who already believe the *kerygma*, but who need greater understanding of its implications.

The third functional form of preaching Davis outlines, and the one that most interests us here, is "therapy." By therapeutic preaching Davis means "speech for the purpose of effecting some improvement in the hearer, some change in his state or condition, mental, emotional, or religious."¹⁶ This is a less than satisfactory definition, since Davis surely does not mean to imply that proclamation and teaching do not effect improvement or change in hearers. Fortunately, as Davis expands and illustrates this category, his meaning becomes more clear. As his thought develops, he seems to understand therapeutic preaching to mean a kind of preaching that, unlike proclamation or teaching, rivets its attention on the human listener, seeking to understand and relate to his capacities and needs, his distortions of truth, his failures and sins. In therapeutic preaching, the preacher makes contact with the actualities of the hearers' lives and

¹²Fortress Press, Philadelphia, 1959.

¹³Davis, *ibid.*, p. 98.

¹⁴*ibid.*, p. 99.

¹⁵*ibid.*, p. 109.

¹⁶*ibid.*, p. 127.

speaks directly to those actualities, exhorting the listeners to integrate the basic *kerygma* into their lives in concrete and specific ways. A number of New Testament speech forms comprise the tributaries that Davis feeds into the therapeutic stream, including exhortation, persuasion, encouragement, admonition, confirmation, rebuke, and edification. In other words, any speech activity that *focuses* upon a hearer's thoughts, attitudes or behavior, and which intends to generate a change that, in light of the *kerygma*, would be helpful and healing to the hearer, is in Davis's terms "therapeutic" preaching. If proclamation and teaching focus upon the *message* which is preached to hearers, therapeutic preaching focuses upon the *hearers* who receive the message. Davis also hastens to add that, in order for therapeutic preaching to be effective, the preacher must also be concerned about himself and his own motives, appealing to hearers not out of selfishness or ambition, but rather in meekness, gentleness, love and the other qualities of "that special kind of person called a Christian."¹⁷ Our advantage here is not in calling Davis into question for a somewhat romantic and pre-Freudian view of Christian motivation, but rather to recognize his insight that the internal health of the preacher and the integrity of the relationship between preacher and hearer are important contextual elements in any preaching that can be termed "therapeutic."

It is interesting to note that, while Welsh insists that therapy in his terms is necessary before *kerygma* can be heard, Davis argues quite the opposite.

A hearer, in Davis's view, must have heard and appropriated the basic *kerygma*, that is, he must be a person of faith, before he is ready for therapy in any Christian sense.¹⁸

One final view of preaching as therapy, which can be outlined briefly, is addressed to preachers from a vantage point outside the field of homiletics. Karl Menninger's intriguing *Whatever Became of Sin?*¹⁹ is not, of course, an attempt to develop a particular style of preaching which could be called "therapeutic" (he doesn't actually use the term "therapy" to describe preaching), but it does include a call for clergy to rediscover and exercise the "healing" potential of their preaching ministry. Menninger writes:

"No psychiatrists or psychotherapists, even those with many patients, have the quantitative opportunity to cure souls and mend minds which the preacher enjoys. And the preacher also has a superb opportunity to do what few psychiatrists can, to prevent the development of chronic anxiety, depression, and other mental ills."²⁰

We must be careful to note that Menninger considers preaching to be potentially therapeutic for a wide variety of human disorders, including, but not limited to, clinical psychological ills. It is one of Menninger's aims, for example, to reintroduce the moral dimension to guilt, expanding it beyond the medical or psychoanalytic limits of sickness. Preaching, then, may help to

¹⁸*ibid.*, p. 134.

¹⁹Hawthorn Books, New York, 1973.

²⁰Menninger, *ibid.*, p. 201.

¹⁷*ibid.*, p. 134.

"lighten burdens, interrupt and redirect circular thinking, relieve the pressure of guilt feelings and their self-punishment, and inspire individual and social improvement."²¹

How does one preach like that? Menninger's answer, and this is a corollary of the central theme of his book, is that preaching achieves its therapeutic potential when the preacher does not short-circuit the process of forgiveness and atonement by neglecting or eliminating the call to repentance, the confrontation with human destructiveness and sinfulness, the specification of moral failure, and the assertion of moral responsibility. "It is (the clergy's) special prerogative to study sin—or whatever they call it—to identify it, to define it, to warn us about it, and to spur measures for combating and rectifying it."²²

If all this sounds like a regressive call to the moralistic and authoritarian preaching of the past, we can rest assured that Menninger is far too sensitive and sophisticated for that. Not only is the proclamation of human sinfulness to be done in the context of the Christian gospel of forgiveness, and as a *step* in the process of moving toward that forgiveness, but also the preacher himself must be a "'man of God'. He is dedicated. He is unselfish. He has no wish to hurt people, but only to help people—and this is rare."²³ When the preacher speaks out of this kind of servant authority to the reality of human sinfulness, hearers can accept their guilt and sinfulness, begin the healing process of forgiveness, and assume responsibility for their lives.

If Menninger shares with Davis the view that therapeutic preaching operates principally on the moral plane, he shares with Welsh the view that therapy must come *prior* to other forms of proclamation. Welsh maintains that pulpit reassurances about the existence of God and his goodness are largely filtered out by the hearers' incapacity or unwillingness to think those kinds of thoughts. Menninger believes they are often "drowned out" by the "roar and rumble of guilt."²⁴ Whatever the cause of the deafness, both see the need for some form of preaching that is sensitive to that pathology and designed to touch it with effective therapy.

Some Intersecting Points

Having looked at the concept of therapeutic preaching as it emerges in the thought of Welsh, Davis, and Menninger, one of the most obvious observations which can be made is that, to a large extent, they aren't talking about the same thing at all. Welsh is talking about helping a hearer to tune his cognitive-perceptual apparatus in order to be able to hear something as overreachingly ambitious as a sermon in the first place. Davis is interested in hearers being helped to absorb and to express the implications of the *kerygma* in their ethical lives. And Menninger is eager to have a little of the moral courage of John the Baptist or Jonathan Edwards, back in the contemporary pulpit. It might seem, then, that all we have to hold together this notion of therapeutic preaching is the linguistic coincidence that all three sources use the word therapy, or heal-

²¹*ibid.*, pp. 200-201.

²²*ibid.*, p. 193.

²³*ibid.*, p. 198.

²⁴*ibid.*, p. 193.

ing, to describe what they are after. But, fortunately, the case is not so easily closed. Despite the apparent differences, there are several commonalities in these three views of therapeutic preaching which provide valuable insight on a particular dimension of the preaching task. It is true that the views of Welsh, Davis, and Menninger by no means constitute identical sets, but they are, to some degree, overlapping sets, and a list of some of the correspondences is worth a look:

(i) First of all, for all three writers, when preaching is viewed as therapy, the focus is upon the hearers, their abilities and particular situations, to a greater degree than in other styles of preaching. Welsh, Davis, and Menninger are all careful to place the sort of preaching they are talking about over against preaching which emphasizes comprehensive historical and theological content. Welsh, of course, doesn't think that sort of preaching can even be handled by most listeners until some help has been given to the very thought processes by which people "hear" religious messages. Menninger doesn't think it can be effectively handled either, not until human guilt and destructiveness have been confronted by the preacher at an earlier stage in the process. And Davis feels that theological preaching remains abstract and unembodied in the lives of the hearers without additional messages aimed at the particular *Sitz im Leben* of the hearers and, thus, tailor-made for more limited personal goals and needs.

(ii) If therapeutic preaching focuses its attention upon the capacities and needs of the hearers, it does so mainly because it views those hearers as troubled, distorted or diseased in some way

and in need of therapy. For Menninger the problem is best described by refurbishing the often neglected theological category "sin," which he means to be taken in the broad sense of personal and group destructiveness. Welsh might agree with Menninger's nomenclature, since he does say that "for cell or man, the original sin is seclusion"²⁵ and seclusion, therefore sin, is one aspect of the failure to make religious sense of life. He generally steers clear of traditionally theological language, however, preferring to describe man's disorder as a cultural, biological, and attitudinal aversion to do the kind of thinking and believing required by most sermons. Davis sees the disease as a life impaired by the failure fully to appropriate the implications of the *kerygma*.

(iii) All three writers see therapeutic preaching proceeding methodologically by some sort of confrontation or conflict, which the sermon precipitates in the hearers. This conflict is also seen as effective only when it occurs for the hearer in the context of trust and acceptance. In Menninger, the conflict comes by way of the preacher calling a spade a spade regarding the dimensions of sinfulness in the hearers. Davis is not too far from that view since the conflict, in his view, comes through exhortation or persuasion to redress, remedy, or correct some failure or lack.

At first glance it might seem that Welsh's aim is to eliminate conflict in preaching, since the anxiety produced by many sermons is part of the reason for much communication failure and distortion of meaning. Actually, Welsh is not out to eliminate conflict in

²⁵Welsh, *op. cit.*, p. 37.

preaching, but rather to *displace* the conflict from the preacher-hearer relationship to the sermon-hearer relationship. Pre-kerygmatic preaching moves something like a play in that "no one has told us that we were wrong, and no one is telling us what we ought to think," but the material itself is presented in such a way that it "bites deeper into our structures and forces us to *rethink the data being presented*."²⁶ Although Welsh might not like this particular formulation, I think it is fair to say that, in his understanding of therapeutic preaching, the preacher is no longer the adversary who produces the conflict; the adversary is the reality presented in the content and structure of the sermon.

It should be added that in Welsh, Davis, and Menninger the conflict that is provoked is always to be over some precise and concrete issue. Generalization and abstraction are serious faults in therapeutic preaching. Furthermore, it is not conflict alone that energizes therapeutic preaching; it is, rather, conflict that takes place in a context of freedom, acceptance, and trust, which is a product of the worship setting of preaching and of the personal integrity and intentionality of the preacher himself. Menninger's claim that the preacher "has no wish to hurt, but only to help" is a crucial statement of the need for an accepting, trust-evoking approach on the part of the preacher, and is in accord with the views of Davis and Welsh as well. To put it in other terms, only the preacher who overcomes his own egocentricity can be other-directed enough to produce preaching that is genuinely therapeutic.

(iv) Finally, Welsh, Davis, and Men-

ninger are all aware that therapeutic preaching, however they define it, is only a fragment of the truth about the total preaching task, which recalls the beginning of our discussion about the state of the homiletical field in general. For both Welsh and Menninger, any therapy done in preaching is a necessary, but only temporary, means on the way to the end of proclaiming the central gospel affirmations. For Davis, therapy is only one of three "functional forms" and clearly subordinate, at that, to the primary function of kerygmatic proclamation.

A Theological Issue

Before moving to draw a few implications from therapeutic preaching for the teaching of homiletics, it is important to consider one theological issue that is inextricably woven into the texture of our discussion: the New Testament understanding of both *kerygma* and *therapeia*. Let me put my cards on the table now. I am persuaded that Welsh, Davis, and Menninger are *all* at least partly misled by partial and faulty understandings of preaching and *kerygma*, which subsequently produces problems in their understandings of the nature of preaching as therapy.

To state the case briefly, some previous research on the New Testament understanding of *kerygma*, most notably by C. H. Dodd,²⁷ took the position that *kerygma* in the New Testament functioned as a technical term to describe the *content* of the apostolic preaching. It did not describe what the early preachers did, or how they did it, but rather what they said and the order

²⁶*ibid.*, p. 110.

²⁷*The Apostolic Preaching and Its Development*, Harper & Bros., New York, 1936.

in which they said it. *Kerygma* was the basic Christian message in outline capsule form. Moreover, preaching the *kerygma* was exclusively a missionary activity and could be sharply distinguished from *teaching*, which was ethical instruction directed toward the believing community.

More recent studies,²⁸ however, taking advantage of Jewish sources and other background materials, have disclosed a much more flexible and pluralistic communication situation in the New Testament. "Preaching" in the New Testament is now seen as overlapping with, perhaps indistinguishable from, teaching and other speech forms in the early Church. Moreover, preaching occurred both to people "outside" the Christian community and to people at all levels of commitment and need inside it. Also, the content of preaching was not confined to a rigid formula or structure, but assumed a variety of forms and included a diversity of content, depending upon to whom and by whom the preaching was done. About the most precise statement that can be made regarding the New Testament situation is that teachers/preachers in the earliest Church used whatever styles, phrases and structures their culture afforded them to carry on the important task of "interpreting the work, teaching, and person of Jesus to those around them."²⁹ The focus in the New Testament in regard to preaching is upon preaching as an *activity*, rather than upon a particular formulation of the content of the gospel. *Kerygma*, then, is a dynamic term describing,

surely, a message of God's redemptive action in Jesus Christ, but also—and more directly—the activity of making that message and its implications known to hearers.

Preaching, in the New Testament, is an *event*, and this view of preaching as activity was a direct result of the early Church's understanding of Jesus' own preaching. Ernest Best, for example, in *The Temptation and the Passion: The Markan Soteriology*,³⁰ points out that the writer of Mark wishes us to see Jesus' teaching and preaching as "a mighty work" because "in it we see Jesus' glory just as much as in the miracles . . . (and) moreover the teaching, as the mighty works, is redemptive because in it men's minds are opened to see the truth."³¹ The preaching of the early Church, then, was also a mighty work, for it was more than a mere presentation of the facts of the Christian case. Indeed, just as Jesus' power was present to save and heal in his own preaching, the power of the living Lord was present in the preaching of the early Church, and the redemption of the Kingdom became accessible to persons through the preaching of the gospel.

Therapeia, or healing, was also a "mighty work" of Jesus, and of the early Church. J. H. Moulton and George Milligan have reminded us³² that the root meaning of *therapeia* is "service," or "ministry." In the ancient

³⁰Ernest Best, *The Temptation and the Passion: The Markan Soteriology*, University Press, Cambridge, 1965.

³¹Best, *ibid.*, p. 111.

³²Moulton & Milligan, *The Vocabulary of the Greek Testament*, Eerdmans, Grand Rapids, 1949. Cf. also Thomas G. Ogden, *Kerygma and Counselling*, Westminster, Phila., 1966, pp. 147 ff.

²⁸Cf. Robt. C. Worley, *Preaching and Teaching in the Earliest Church*, Westminster, Phila., 1967.

²⁹Worley, *op. cit.*, p. 87.

Greek a tailor, an embalmer, a barber, *anyone* who rendered personal, caring, skillful, needed treatment or service was a *therapon* who offered *therapeia*. The term gradually became attached to medical treatment and care, but its meaning was not exhausted by medical connotations. Indeed, the healings of Jesus in the New Testament assume their full meaning only when they are seen to be more than mere medical feats, but as signs of that total saving ministry, or larger *therapeia*, of Jesus.

In this light, it is no mystery why the New Testament Church would have seen preaching and therapy as mutually supporting "mighty works" and would have linked them as intimately as it did. Thomas Oden has noted that Jesus was viewed by the early Church as the Servant-Messiah "who uniquely blended the dual ministries of *kerygma* and *therapeia* in genuine involvement with the world."³³ This ministry, of course, was passed on to the Church through the disciples who "departed and went through the villages preaching (*euangelizomeno*) the gospel and healing (*therapeuontes*) everywhere" (Luke 9:6).³⁴

Preaching and therapy, understood as ministries in the New Testament, are reciprocal activities. *Kerygma* interprets *therapeia*; *therapeia* validates *kerygma*.³⁵ Indeed the therapeutic activity of Jesus often served actually to proclaim his messianic identity, and, likewise, his preaching sometimes functioned to heal. Perhaps the best way to view this in regard to preaching in our own time, when we are even more

aware of the interpenetration of word and deed and *psyche* and *soma*, is to see preaching and therapy (in the full New Testament sense) as intertwined strands of the same activity: kerygmatic proclamation, in certain contexts, is *therapeia*, and all *therapeia* assumes its full meaning in the context of the kerygma.

All of this is to make the point that a more comprehensive and dynamic understanding of the relationship between therapy and *kerygma* would have strengthened the positions of Welsh, Davis, and Menninger. Davis, if he had not been influenced by C. H. Dodd's false dichotomy between kerygmatic proclamation and other New Testament speech forms, probably would not have separated "therapy" from "proclamation" and, consequently, might have produced an understanding of both proclamation and of therapy in preaching which was more dynamic and rich than the rather flat and self-contained categories that he produced.

Menninger, admittedly, did not attempt to write a precise theological analysis of preaching and, therefore, should not be held too accountable here, but there does seem to be something of an intuitive assumption on his part that preaching should present the message of the gospel according to a certain fixed step-by-step pattern: dealing with the issue of sinfulness in a precise way, *then* proclamation of the goodness of God, his grace, etc. This is, of course, not unlike former understandings of the *kerygma* as a formal pattern rather than as a dynamic and responsive activity able to shape both its form and content to meet whatever personal or existential situation it faced.

In Welsh's case, the situation be-

³³Oden, *ibid.*, p. 153 (Cf. also Mark 1:39; Luke 6:17; Luke 4:40-43).

³⁴Matt. 4:23-24; 10:1; Luke 10:8.

³⁵Oden, *op. cit.*, pp. 152-155.

comes a bit more complex, since it is not clear that the kind of perceptual-cognitive therapy Welsh describes is in any way related to the New Testament concept of *therapeia*. Any sort of close analysis, however, reveals that the two understandings are closely allied indeed. If Welsh is concerned that people be enabled to be freed from the slavery of anxious egocentricity to open security, from proximate to ultimate thinking, from rigidity to flexibility, from intolerance to the capacity to tolerate ambiguity and paradox, from blindness regarding the true shape and meaning of reality to truthful insight and accurate perception—then the case can be made that the kerygmatic activity of the Church has similar objectives, produces similar results, and, in fact, points to such freedom from mental slavery as one sign of the power and truthfulness of the gospel. Welsh, in a reaction against the stale air of German preaching and the closed shop of Barthian understandings about the nature of proclamation, wants his therapeutic preaching to be Christian but not *kerygmatic*. Based upon the New Testament integration of *therapeia* and *kerygma*, it is difficult to see exactly what kind of preaching would be Christian and therapeutic, but not kerygmatic. Furthermore, even if we think of kerygmatic preaching as equivalent to biblical, exegetical preaching, the biblical material is not necessarily a liability to the kind of therapy that Welsh desires. It is important to note that recent work on the rabbinical contributions to the structure of early Christian preaching and work on the structure and form of such biblical genres as parables indicate that biblical texts themselves are often internally constructed in such a manner

as to engage readers and hearers in an encounter which breaks through rigid defenses and moved from proximate situations to ultimate insights. In other words, the bible is in part a record of attempts to present the gospel in ways that are alert to the therapeutic needs that Welsh describes.

In brief, there is no clear reason why it is necessary for contemporary preaching to be a-kerygmatic or pre-kerygmatic in any sense to fulfill the therapeutic role Welsh has outlined.

Teaching Therapeutic Preaching

We can acknowledge, I think, that what we have received from Welsh, Davis, and Menninger is not a theoretical formulation for a new kind of preaching called "therapeutic." We have, rather, three quite valuable perspectives on the therapeutic dimension which is potentially present in all preaching. Having learned much from these three view points, the next question that naturally occurs is how can that dimension of preaching be developed educationally? How can seminarians be taught to preach therapeutically? There is, of course, nothing easy about this; we have already admitted that preaching is a tough nut to crack educationally. Indeed, my own pet theory is that seminarians acquire a preaching "style" largely in the same way they learn to tell stories or learn to be parents, by emulating certain important "models," such as their home pastor or a college chaplain, piecing their own talents as well as possible into patterns they have observed in others. This means that the teaching of preaching is a slow, individually-crafted process composed, not only of teaching theory and skills, but also offering al-

ternative "models" or patterns where the pieces perhaps fit a bit more naturally and effectively.

None of this takes away, of course, from the importance of teaching theory and skills in homiletics, and, in regard to the therapeutic dimension of preaching, here are some considered "hunches" about how it might be developed pedagogically:

(a) Since therapeutic preaching focuses upon hearers and their specific needs and abilities in more than just superficial ways, those who hope to emphasize this dimension in preaching will need to know more things about people and the way they tick than are generally included in most homiletics courses. As Welsh puts it, "the preacher must not only know something about gospels, but about thinking . . ." ³⁶ Add Menninger and Davis to the mix and the preacher needs to know, among other things, how people behave and why, why certain forms of communication threaten hearers while other forms do not, and what is the power of conflict to stimulate growth. He needs special tools beyond a pastor's compassion and intuition.

This kind of breadth of knowledge puts a strain, of course, on the teacher of preaching, who already feels swamped by the biblical and theological data that wash through his area. One solution of course is team-taught preaching workshops involving not only the biblical-theological people (the usual team partners with homiletics), but also psychologists of religion, ethicists, sociologists, communication scientists, pastoral theologians, and others.

(b) Since the preacher's own experience, integrity, and capacity for

establishing trusting relationships are salient features of therapeutic preaching, the teaching of preaching should proceed in such a way that allows for personal growth in self-understanding and in the capacity to care for others. Aside from the fact that this calls for deep sensitivity to this dimension of growth on the part of the teacher of preaching, opportunities for this kind of development can be structured into the preaching course. These might include the use of small group sermon development sessions where personal data can be dealt with and the interpersonal implications of personal preaching styles can be discussed and examined more freely.

(c) Since therapeutic preaching, however understood, involves the precipitation of conflict as a therapeutic device, conflict studies involving the analysis of interpersonal and intrapsychic conflict and resolution are appropriate areas of investigation for students of preaching. Moreover, since therapeutic preaching has as its goal engendering a healing experience of some sort for the listener, it is important that those who preach have experienced the same kind of healing themselves. One way to achieve this, of course, is to precipitate some measure of conflict in the learning process itself and to move through to resolution and, one would hope, healing. I would not underestimate student encounters with biblical texts to provoke this sort of conflict and resolution. Examples of this type of change-producing engagement with biblical material can be seen in Walter Wink's recent work ³⁷ attempting to overcome the "web of ob-

³⁶Welsh, *op. cit.*, p. 34.

³⁷*The Bible in Human Transformation: Toward A New Paradigm for Biblical Study*, Fortress Press, Phila., 1973.

jectivism" in biblical studies and to achieve personal change and healing through encounter with biblical texts.

(d) Finally, the teaching of therapeutic preaching will require greater attention to form in sermons. By form I mean not only the form appropriate to the content of the sermon, but also—and especially—the form appropriate to the hearer and to the rela-

tionships between hearer and preacher and hearer and message. Recent examinations of the story telling form, for example, have indicated the capacity of that form to produce listener involvement, to evoke change, to negotiate around listener defenses, to reduce threat, and to accomplish many of the other aims of therapeutic preaching.

The Content of Christian Preaching

by ROBERT W. MUMFORD

1. *Reflections on What Was*

Daniel Moynihan has recently intruded on a wider consciousness than had hitherto been the case. In his several personna as scholar and speech writer for a recent American administration his name occasionally came before a wider public, but in the main he was cherished by a somewhat smaller audience. His recent speeches both at the United Nations and elsewhere have changed that significantly. Those of us in the family of the Church may take some modest pride in that Moynihan turned his attention as far back as 1966 to that subject which occupies much of the time of those gathered here in Princeton in these early days of December, specifically, preaching. Though he refrained from calling preachers "racist murderers," yet his comments on preaching were essentially challenging. He wrote:

"In some 15 years of listening seriously I do not believe I have more than once or twice heard an interesting idea delivered from the pulpit of an American Church. This has occurred during a period in which periodicals, universities, intellectuals have poured forth ideas. But either the pastors do not know this or they do not know who is in their audiences. By and large the homilies produced on Sunday in America are

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an affront to the taste as well as to the intelligence of an educated layman. . . . Protest is in order. The time has come to walk out on sermons that are so purile as to threaten the very bases of faith, or at least to arrange gestures of mass inattention."¹

To be accurate Moynihan was here talking specifically of Catholic churches. But I'm not sure his assessment, however overblown it might appear, would not have been much the same had his attendance at various Protestant churches been the way in which he expressed part of the life of faith.

Over against the pungent Moynihan it is something of a relief, on the surface at least, to set some conclusions of Adolf von Harnack, gleaned from his marvellous book, *The Mission and Expansion of Christianity in the First Three Centuries*. Harnack draws these arresting conclusions:

"One may describe Christian preaching as the preaching of love and charity. Brotherliness is love on a footing of equality, ministering love means to give and forgive and no limit is to be recognized . . . ministering love is the practical expression of love to God . . . it was more than a

¹*Commonweal* (July 1, 1966).

language, it was a thing of power and action . . . the Gospel thus became a social message . . . the preaching which laid hold of the outer man, detaching him from the world and uniting him to his God was also a preaching of solidarity and brotherliness, it served to heighten the worth of men and essays to recast contemporary society. The excellence of the Church's charity . . . gave a powerful impulse to its propaganda. Christians preached a morality of pure men, not obligated to their possessions, truthful and brave men, there were members in the Christian churches whom no other religious societies would tolerate in their bounds . . . Christian preaching aimed at winning souls and bringing individuals to God, but from the outset it worked through a community . . . the preaching of Jesus Christ did not call individuals apart but built them up . . . what a sense of stability a creation of this kind must have given the individual . . ."²

There is obviously considerable difference in what Moynihan saw and that perceived across seventeen centuries by von Harnack. I'd like now to try and disentangle a few strands of the framework of preaching in which the thing of "power and action" described by von Harnack took place.

A. *Two Strands of Kerygma*

I am indebted to my colleague Dr. Daniel Fraikin of the Department of New Testament Studies at Queen's

Theological College for guiding me gently through some of the thickets of contemporary New Testament studies. This is, of course, one of the most vital and exciting areas of biblical studies. I would imagine many, indeed most, of you are much more literate than I am in this area, but assuming your indulgence I am fascinated by the reflection that the *kerygma* quite probably had two strands.

The strand that was typical for proclamation to the "outside" world, the Hellenistic culture, was not I understand very similar in detail to that which was proclaimed to those of the Jewish culture and heritage. For the latter the "proclamation" was in some sense the fulfillment of the old, old promise. Messiah had come! The hearers could accept or reject the individual for whom the claim of Messiah was being made, but the language, the expectation, the aspiration did not have to be detailed. It was essentially an issue of announcing "Messiah" is here, it was history's fulfillment, it was the announcement which justified all the tears and all the anguish of the whole Jewish torment. That it was debated and ferociously opposed is obvious from the Book of Acts. But it was on the authenticity of the person Jesus to be Messiah that the argument raged, not on the interpretation of the meaning of a people's history, nor on the familiarity with a particular God who in a special time would send the Anointed One.

Now, it is my understanding that the proclamation to the Hellenistic world was of a different dimension. Christ was surely preached, but not necessarily as the peculiar culmination of a peculiar people. He was preached quite probably as the answer to a

²Adolf von Harnack: *The Mission and Expansion of Christianity in the First Three Centuries* (Moffatt Translation), pp. 148, 149, 173, 206, 215, 433, 434.

search, not for Messiah, but as Savior in a different sense. The themes of I Thessalonians, chapter I, and particularly Paul's address in Athens are quite clear signals, so it seems to me, that the proclamation to the Greeks and those within their cultural sphere was significantly and precisely adapted to the culture in which they were operating, one considerably different from the homeland. The essence then of the proclamation to the Hellenes was in some way as an answer to a search. God, the Christians were saying to the Greeks, is accessible. They didn't have to say that to the Jews, the Jews knew that, how well they knew it. The Christians were saying to the Greeks—God is not only accessible, he in fact laid down the grounds for the search. Pascal, centuries later put it beautifully—"console yourself, you could not search for me had I not already found you." To the Jews, then, and at the risk of oversimplification the Christian proclamation was—that for which you have waited is now here, accept him. To the Greeks—that for which you have searched, we have found, we share him.

B. *An Authenticating Community*

The sources I have consulted concerning the impact of early Christian preaching seem unanimous in virtually one thing—that early Christian proclamation received an enormous authentication from the visible existence of a vital and witnessing community. Von Harnack stresses this factor almost to the point of suffocation. A. J. Festugiere in a work, *Pagan Mysticism*, talks of the "loving brotherhood," the "supportive community" which enabled the early Christian preachers to proclaim a Savior and at

the same time point to a people who were living the implications of the Savior's advent. In a way then the early Christian preachers had an enormous advantage over their later brethren—their *Kerygma*, whether directed to Jews or Greeks had about it a luminous quality of proof. There surely never was a golden age of the faith, a Church spotless and without blemish, most of Saint Paul's letters deny an easy nostalgia, but truly those early communities while they did not make *kerygma* any easier certainly provided a powerful impulse to the credibility of the proclamation.

All of us know something of the inextricable relationship in the early Church between *kerygma* and *didache*. We know how the latter attempted to trace and apply the evangelical and ethical implications of the *kerygma*; we know that the *didache* was substantially designed for new converts and the *kerygma* was in some sense going public; that *didache* was usually accomplished while sitting, *kerygma* while standing. But the issue of the early Church which seems to me to be decisive both for them and as a signal for us was the close relationship between the proclamation and the communities which the proclamation had begotten. In a word—the Church was not a problem for the preacher, it was his most powerful asset, not solely or even primarily as a licensing agency, but as a powerful, apparent, and magnetic undergirding to everything he said.

II. *Some Signals Concerning What Could Be*

In *Their Finest Hour* Winston Churchill pays a touching and provocative

tribute to his war time scientific advisor, Frederick Lindemann. The scientists, said Churchill, were sending back signals from the far horizon of scientific thought. Lindemann's great value was that he could translate these signals into "homely and lucid terms." He then wrote: "What I had to grasp were practical results and make sure that these incomprehensible truths emerged in executive decisions."³

The signals we receive and which I have very briefly discussed above are equally from a distant horizon. That horizon behind us now for close to twenty centuries has about it an incomprehensibility similar in kind to the scientific horizons of the 1940's. But it does seem to me that the principle of translating the faint signals is in its own way as crucial for teachers of homiletics as it was in that other war which now seems so far removed.

What sort of signals do we receive and what is their practical consequence? Here one enters of course on the selectively personal. But presumably that is what it is to be human and concerned.

For me as I try to think about and discover some coherence in the content of the early Christian preaching several issues emerge. First, it strikes me that if there were a specific strand in the early *kerygma* directed more to Greeks than to Jews, then I have more resonance with it than I now have with the Jewish strand and I find it more helpful in trying to preach and prepare preachers for the late twentieth century. One knows he can never recreate the past, that the past has its importance in enabling us to move to the future, but with that said I like very

much the reaction of the first preachers in assessing what it was in the Greek culture that enabled them to proclaim something more than a language, a thing which was of power and action. And I like too their willingness to meet that culture on its own ground without attempting to impose a world view on the Greeks, their willingness to adapt or to select their *kerygma* to a given situation.

Several years ago many of us both within and without the U.S.A. read of Peter Berger's landmark address before the annual meeting of the Consultation on Church Union. Most of us, I expect, responded very positively and perhaps with a sense of grateful relief for his declaration "great ages of faith are marked not by dialogue but by proclamation." Later on in the address he offered the following extremely helpful observation:

"It is self-evident to me that what the Church has to say in any age is always essentially the same. What the Church is all about is that one old story of God's dealing with man, the story that spans the Exodus and Easter morning. The Christian community consists of those people who keep on telling the story to each other and some of whom tell the story to others . . . there are different accents, it may be in tones of quiet conviction or of intransigent fanaticism . . . or in the wonder of astonishing discovery. . . ."⁴

Now that is very helpful indeed. It seems to me to point some ways toward proclamation in a given culture with the

³Winston Churchill: *Their Finest Hour*, p. 381.

⁴Peter Berger: *Princeton Seminary Bulletin* (December, 1971), p. 22.

old story which has about astonishing capacity for renewal and vitality.

One really must wrestle, however, as presumably did our ancestors, in understanding the thrusts and dynamics of the culture in which one lives so that the selective *kerygma* may be issued in concrete expression. And at this point I must say I have some difficulty in this particular setting. I simply do not understand your culture. I thought I did until I spent a year here, five years ago. It was a marvellous and touching year for me. I took away with me several irradicable impressions. One was enormous respect for the young Americans who were preparing for the Ministry; another was deep gratitude for a faculty so deeply concerned for the issues of the era; another was a perception of anger so many Americans carried for each other and focussing immediately on Viet Nam. So, your culture for me is one of impressions rather than analysis. In my own country, so deceptively similar to yours and with so many deep currents flowing in another direction, I do think I have some understanding. So, the following constitute some signals that are, I think, decisive for Canadian preachers and if there are any connecting links with you, then maybe we have some solidarity apart from a roughly similar language and occupancy of the same vast land space.

A. *A Kerygma of Support and Encouragement*

One of the issues isolated by von Harnack was the sense of stability that preaching and the Christian community must have given the early Christians. One could spend much time in talking of radical discontinuity and cultural

breakdown and the similarity in the late twentieth century and the first century of the Christian era. I shall resist that temptation. But it does seem to me, in summary, true to say that one of the most powerful elements of *kerygma* one can discern of our Fathers was the application of the sense of meaning associated with Jesus' coming. And that sense of meaning and with it the energies of support and encouragement strike me as offering the carriers of *kerygma* one of our most crucial opportunities in the last several centuries. Support and encouragement do not mean to me in the Gospel's light support and encouragement of all that is, but rather support and encouragement of that which can be in the human condition, precisely because Christ was sent, was given to the human condition. And if preachers can apply that *kerygma* with a sense of the wonder of an astonishing discovery, we are very close to the proclamation made to the Greeks so long ago, the implications of which have by no means been played out.

B. *A Kerygma of Being Launched into the Adventure of Loving*

The whole Passion account, whatever else it may mean, is an utterly devastating demonstration of Jesus Christ's capacity to love. God in Christ is saying—love is possible, whatever the evidence to the contrary may seem to be claiming. And one of the methods of presenting a *kerygma* of adventure-someness again with a sense of astounding discovery is probably in terms of questions—God's action in Christ is an indication, however vague, however flickering, that love is possible. Do you find yourself drawn to this? Can

you accept this as at least a possibility within the murk of much of what it is to live, now and here? For many of my Canadian contemporaries it is not so much a question of where to find love as a question of whether loving is even possible. And that of course leads not so much to a search as to despair or, its cousin, a sense of absurdity. And a source of love is in preaching itself, a preaching that is sustained by and offers the courage to love. Again my colleague Dr. Fraikin muses this way—"By faith we have insisted too much of accepting some facts rather than seeking the trust which makes loving possible."

C. *A Kerygma Which Sees Ethical Issues in a Context of Wholeness*

Again the historians talk of *kerygma* having social consequences. Reinhold Niebuhr was always pushing the idea that each Christian doctrine has its social and political consequences. There seems to be no way of avoiding the conclusion that a *kerygma* of support and the adventure of loving leads inevitably to a *kerygma* of concern with that which is limiting or oppressing or malevolent. There is, of course, no need in this company to delineate Christ's own proclamation and teaching the result of which was to scrape lethally against power and privilege.

I've been greatly stimulated by Paole Friere's *The Pedagogy of the Oppressed* in which he suggests that the Gospel is about freedom. Freedom for most of us in Canada is really the freedom to select various things to buy and I wouldn't want to decry that in isolation. But the notion of freedom ex-

plicit in *kerygma* is far deeper than that. Freedom in the Gospel is, it seems to me, the self-possession required in order to love. It is the ability to pull one's self together to give oneself generously. It is the ability to pull together the meaning of one's life into one constant, consistent story. It is in short an integrity, a wholeness.

Now, in that sense, ethical issues become more than a passing fancy and makes it impossible for us to sustain or claim any false distinction between what it is to be sacred and what it is to be secular. So, the question then emerges—what is it for this congregation, this nation, this person which requires a translation of love and support into profound word and action against that which hurts so many others?

Finally, Harvey Cox quoted Paul Tillich, a short while before Tillich's death, as saying:

"This is one of the most religious of the modern eras. The problem for Churches is that they do not recognize this for the religious question is not now being put in religious terms especially by the young. When the mass of mankind was preoccupied with death and guilt the Churches met this need superbly, but now the questions are of meaning and community. The institution which can proclaim meaning and manifest community will inherit the future."⁵

A *kerygma* then which carries meaning and creates community is a signal I take with utmost seriousness.

⁵Harvey Cox: Resource Tape for United Church General Council, 1972.

Towards a Theological View of Responsibility in Communication

by J. RANDALL NICHOLS

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It occurred to me some little while ago that I had never read a truly good discussion of *responsibility* in religious communication. True, we have a great deal of material that *seems* like it talks about responsibility—responsibility to the Bible, or to certain theological affirmations, or to people's spiritual needs—but it almost inevitably succumbs to a sales pitch about how to do the job (whatever it is) better or more effectively.

From a secular perspective, Richard Johannesen has written on ethics in communication, specifying his area of interest as the intentional, persuasive dimension of any communication which he calls (after Weaver) "sermonic."¹ I find it interesting, and a little unsettling, that while religious communicators are busy appropriating what they consider fruitful insights from "communication theory," it is Bell & Howell who publish a "theological" approach to the issue of communication responsibility!

I do not mean to be a doomsayer, nor do I suggest that religious practitioners are laying about wantonly with their communication wreaking havoc with people's emotional and spiritual well being. Some of that goes on, to be sure,

and I have a private hunch that the more vigorous the fervor of religious communication grows, the more liable it is to doing harm. Perhaps that is in the nature of things: getting in touch with the deepest values, actions, and hopes of one's existence is bound to be a risky business, with the potential for growth and healing matched point for point by the danger of tipping overboard into distortion and pathology.

But my interest now is more narrow. I want to deal with responsibility at the basic level of an integration of theological value and communication dynamics, irrespective of any "technological" concerns for "effectiveness," "successful communication" or distinctively dogmatic message content. In other words, I want to ask whether we can devise even an approach to the question: Do theological concerns lead us to any normative conclusion about the communication process *per se* and ultimately our operations as communicators? You can very nearly turn that question around for the same effect: Is there anything in the communication process itself which is theologically important, i.e., which provides a basis for making judgments of responsible or irresponsible communication behavior? I see that task as part of the more general program of rethinking theological presuppositions which Thor Hall has undertaken in

¹Richard Johannesen, *Ethics in Human Communication* (Charles E. Merrill Publishing Co., 1975), pp. 13ff.

wanting to get out of the narrow channel which religious communication (and homiletics in particular) has cut for itself, with its dominant interest in either theologizing about preaching or devising a Christian rhetoric.²

Since I am really asking a question about how to ask a question, the issue of relationship between theological claim or value and communication process or dynamic must therefore first be a methodological one. One way of getting into the matter of responsibility at a methodological level will be to inquire once again into the purpose or intention of religious communication, using preaching as a kind of paradigm case. Let us ask then, as the orientation of this paper, what understanding of the way theology and communication interrelate would it take to let us conceive of religious communication responsibly?

I have begun by making the assumption that we will be unable to talk meaningfully about responsibility in religious communication until we have a thorough understanding of what we *intend* with that communication. Only then, for instance, would we be able to compare what we *wanted* to happen communicatively with what in fact *did* occur, to check for congruence or conflict. Only then would we be able to ask whether our purpose in communication was ethically and theologically sound, or whether it was trivial, impossible, inconsistent, or demonic. As I say, I want in these pages to aim us in a direction that will allow us to ask the responsibility question with some hope for a fruitful answer.

²Thor Hall, *The Future Shape of Preaching* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1971), especially pp. xvff.

Two prefatory notes: First, throughout this paper I will be using the terms "religious communication" and "communication in theological perspective." Perhaps sooner than I want those words may come back to haunt me. It would be easier to talk about a particular form of religious message—preaching, for instance—partly because the existing literature has largely done that. But I am committed to trying to get beyond the level of rhetorical form and into the business of communication dynamics (which of course interact with form). The only way I have of doing that at the moment is to say that when communication behavior ("social interaction regulated by messages," in George Gerbner's very helpful definition)³ either claims to or in fact does affect religious experience, then we should speak generally of "religious communication" or "communication in theological perspective." The more explicit one becomes about such theological claims, and the more one limits the kind of message being dealt with, the easier is the discussion. But I remain convinced, (masochistically so, some of my colleagues suggest!) that the well-defined message forms of prayer, preaching, therapy, or lesson ought to be dealt with as "cases" of more general underlying communication dynamics common to all.

Second, the issue of religious charisma *per se* is taken up more explicitly by other papers. My intention in these pages is to provide part of a foundation which might be used to evaluate "charismatic communication" as well as other forms and styles of communication in religious context. Let me just

³George Gerbner, personal conversation.

indulge in a working assumption at the beginning, viz., that what we casually refer to as "charismatic communication" by no means has a corner on the oddity and mystery of communication in theological perspective, and that even our traditional theological claims call for a sharper analysis than we have usually given—sharp enough, I suspect, to embrace the "charismatic" as well without launching into a wholly different methodology or interpretation. In other words, the semantic oddity of "charismatic communication" may not be its most salient characteristic for purposes of theological discussion of responsibility in communication.

I suspect that most of us who write papers or books or lectures on religious communication feel some sort of moral pressure to begin by talking about its purpose—but to get that over with as soon as possible and go on to more interesting things! The last systematic writing I did on the purpose of preaching, for example, took me through a briarpatch of old and new literature from homiletics, Christian education, psychotherapy, and communication studies, and discharged me approximately where I began: with the general idea that preaching facilitates or occasions or interprets (but never, ever "causes") the encounter of man with the redemptive God of his life. Thus endeth the lesson, and it was a lot of work for meager results.

We ought to do better toward a new sense of the purpose of communication if for no other reason than because we realize more fully than we have in a generation that religious communicators are entrusted with an exceedingly powerful influence in the lives of their

people—more potent than they sometimes are willing to admit. Speaking of preaching, Clement Welsh usefully points out that the sermon is one of the few occasions in modern culture when ordinarily non-reflective people "encounter their only systematic exposure to any kind of reflection on the meaning of things. . . . [Preaching] is a cultural event that reveals the working of those mysterious forces that shape values and determine presuppositions."⁴ More generally, Michael Novak could have been giving us a mandate for the religious communicator's task when he wrote:

"To construct an interpretation of human life is to weave a complicated, nuanced, carefully discriminating story. For a human life manifests growth; growth is not merely organic and direct progression but transformation; and transformation is described by the moves from standpoint to standpoint, through long and intimate struggling, that constitute both human liberation and human story. Only when one can talk at some length about the human subject and his struggle toward personal and communal liberation has one entered the arena in which discourse about religion makes any sense at all, the arena in which religious consciousness is born."⁵

If we are in some sense entrusted with a major influence on the dynamics of personal transformation and personal

⁴Clement Welsh, *Preaching In a New Key* (Philadelphia: Pilgrim Press, 1974), pp. 11–12.

⁵Michael Novak, *Ascent of the Mountain, Flight of the Dove* (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), p. 87.

liberation because of our role in the communication process, taken "at full depth," then we will be irresponsible if we do not seek to know as penetratingly and coherently as possible why we are doing what most of us and our colleagues do nearly every week for their entire adult lives!

I am relying heavily on the assumption that traditional and uncritical talk about the Word of God's encountering human beings through, but not because of, the human words of message—especially preaching—is theologically insufficient talk today. I sense both a deep conviction but an equally deep murkiness in such a classic description of the purpose of preaching as E. G. Homrighausen's:

"True preaching should bring about a personal meeting between God in his saving activity and man in his historical situation. God meets man in personal encounter in his personal relationships [says H. H. Farmer]. God meets man through the preacher, and, when the preacher truly preaches, his preaching is sacramental."⁶

Let me be clear in saying that I do not fault the theology of that (in fact, I share almost the exact same position) nor the lucidity of the prose. What is disturbing is the *next* thing theologians (especially in the neo-orthodox tradition) tend to say, viz., that no experiential or behavioral data can be taken in evidence to understand how such a theological claim in fact happens! It is all the work of God or Holy

Spirit, and not susceptible to anything so irretrievably earth-bound as analysis from the point of view of human information processing, the symbolic process, clinical psychodynamics, or the psychology of insight and cognition. The theologian has boxed us in by making a theological claim *about human experience* but not allowing us to talk about it experimentally! Even on the most rigorous neo-orthodox standards, an experience of the "wholly other" God of the universe *is still an event in human awareness*, about which we ought to be able to come to some conclusions—or at least raise some questions! It ought to be a source of discomfort that we speak of the Word of God heard through the words of human beings, but then refuse on theological grounds to apply what we know about how words work to the interchange! Clearly there is something special, odd, and even anomalous about communication in theological perspective; but just as clearly our understanding and interpretation of it must be intelligible in terms of all its behavioral as well as theological dynamics. Neither a devotional nor a theologically imperialist approach will do!

In order, therefore, to talk more concretely about some new perspectives on the purpose of communication in a theological perspective we need to spend perhaps a disproportionately long time laying out and talking about some methodological bench marks. I do not expect in this short discussion to arrive anywhere close to a fully developed statement of what makes responsible communication. Instead, my concern is to suggest a way of going about the task, in light of certain highly suggestive strands of thinking relevant

⁶Elmer G. Homrighausen, *Choose Ye This Day* (Phila.: The Westminster Press, 1943), p. 143.

to an understanding of purpose and intentionality in the communication process.

I. *Prolegomenon: Toward A Methodology for the "WHY" of Religious Communication*

The following five points, taken together and interrelated, are an attempt to give us a methodological foundation for talking about the purpose of religious communication. They are not, of course, the only way to do the job; and to be honest, if one does not share my lack of confidence in the traditional approach which I just finished assuming, rather summarily, was not adequate any more, what follows may be just so much gibberish. I am not trying to talk anyone out of that, but rather to offer some new direction for those who are seeking it.

A. *Communication and "Symbolic Realism."*

We can be indebted to Robert Bellah for coining the phrase "symbolic realism" to describe the broad methodological context in which much theology is done today, and which underlies an integrative approach to theology and communication.⁷ There are many different souls huddled under that particular umbrella and they do not always get along very well; but they share the assumption that what human beings say they "know" as "reality" comes out of the symbolic interaction of subject and object, rather than in the operation of either *upon* the other. The

"reality" we know does not reside in an object, which we subjects "point to" with symbols which are legitimated only by their correspondence to the "real" nature of things. Bellah writes,

"[T]here are nonobjective symbols which express the feelings, values, and hopes of subjects, or which organize and regulate the flow of interaction between subjects and objects, or which attempt to sum up the whole subject-object complex, or even point to the context or ground of that whole. These symbols too express reality and are not reducible to empirical propositions. This is the position of symbolic realism. If we define religion as that symbol system which serves to evoke what Herbert Richardson calls the 'felt-whole,' that is the totality which includes subject and object and provides the context in which life and action finally have meaning, then I am prepared to claim that, as Durkheim said of society, religion is a reality *sui generis*. . . . [S]ince religious symbolization and religious experience are inherent in the structure of human existence, all reductionism must be abandoned. Symbolic realism is the only adequate basis for the social scientific study of religion."⁸

For example, those of us with an emerging interest in structuralism as a way of approaching theology and communication—more precisely, as a way of lifting up and analyzing the theological dynamics of communication experience—are at home here. And the point for the purpose of religious com-

⁷Robert N. Bellah, "Christianity and Symbolic Realism," *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, September 1975.

⁸*Ibid.*, p. 93.

munication can be rather sharply put: If religious communication is the construction of messages which originate in and/or give rise to religious symbol systems, then it presides over the emergence of some sense of "reality." The outcome of such communication, understood that way, is not the description or understanding of some independent reality, but the very *cultivation* of it as a real event or factor in human consciousness.

No one will say, obviously, that preaching creates the "reality" of God; but the symbolic realist will affirm, and quite happily, that our knowledge of God—our entire *sense* of that reality—emerges from the action of the symbolic process. Further, to the extent that the process can be systematized in messages, the appropriation of transcendence is a possible *outcome* of something like preaching, and hence fundamental to an understanding of its dynamics and purpose. That, of course, is a "high" view of the communication process theologically and needs to be identified and evaluated as such.

Let us be clear that the position of the symbolic realist is not "subjectivism." Quite the contrary, the symbolic realist wants to work *beyond* the usual subject-object dichotomy; he wants to do epistemology at the level of *appropriation*, which is to say in terms of how a subject comes to making judgments and having hunches about what he usually claims to be "objective reality." What the symbolic realist argues is that those judgments and hunches, that "sense" of the really-real come from the *interaction* of the symbolic process, and not from labelling or descriptive activity.

B. *Communication and "Liminal Experience."*

Our second methodological benchmark concerns the way the symbolic process, with the consequences which the symbolic realist claims for it, operates in human interaction. We have already seen that it is by no means a descriptive process but a participatory one. The further point here is: communication for which we make theological claims seems to bear fruit in what Victor Turner calls "liminal intervals" which are presided over in consciousness by religious symbol and ritual.⁹ Turner has applied his anthropological interest in the symbolic process to the experience of worship in two seminal articles in *Worship*. "Liminal intervals" are understood analogously to *rites de passage*, i.e., periods in which social structures are suspended, and when

"in liminal sacredness many of the relationships, values, norms, etc. which prevail in the domain of pragmatic structure are reversed, expunged, suspended, reinterpreted, or replaced by a wholly other set . . . Liminality is the "unconscious" of cultural man; it is where the "species life" opens into the individual "surface" life."¹⁰

Turner is straightforward in saying that some of these liminal intervals are "sacred" and "represent a stripping and leveling of man before the transcendental."¹¹ The "moment" of

⁹Victor Turner, "Passages, Margins, and Poverty: Religious Symbols of Communitas," *Worship*, Vol. 46, Nos. 7 and 8.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, p. 391-392.

¹¹*Ibid.*, p. 391.

the God-man encounter, in other words, like the moment of creative experience, is one of liminality, of living "on the margin," "between times," or "in structural suspension."

It is very difficult to specify just what one means in down-to-earth terms about that "liminal experience." How long is it? How often does it happen? What does it look like ritually or socially? Is it a flashing moment of insight or is it an extended period of concentration? Is it something like dreaming? I fervently wish the answers were clearer! I suspect we will come to a dead-end by talking in terms strictly of duration in time, though the anthropologist can perhaps do that in terms of initiation rituals and *rites de passage*. Perhaps the best thing to be said here is that liminality is a *function* which can occur in a variety of ritual and temporal frameworks. For some people it may be an extended, homogenous period. One thinks for instance of mystical experience, some of the "expanded states of consciousness," extended periods of half-conscious creative expression, or perhaps some so-called "charismatic" experiences where language is functioning non-semantically. On the other hand, we may be talking about a series of fragmentary moments of awareness which pulse through otherwise ordinary experience, much like the very rapid cutting in of only a few frames of out-of-sequence material throughout a film. I nurture the private hypothesis that liminal experiences are more common than most of us realize, but that they are for the most part "off-conscious." They may be, so to speak, "intervals" within experience which *can* be either

consciousness, or amalgamated into larger experience which is more insistent in one's awareness.

Experiences of liminality give rise to symbol patterns which themselves have the power to recreate the liminal experience in later—perhaps generations later—settings.¹² (That, by the way, would be a theoretical basis for Marshall McLuhan's famous aversion to reform in the Roman Catholic liturgy. Destroying archaic and superficially "non-communicative" symbol systems which have the power to evoke liminal experience reduces the very potential for the sacredness of the communication experience which they structure. In short, when we are dealing with liminality in the symbolic process, synonyms for the sake of modernity are risky business!)

Liminal experience seems to be another way of talking about the evocation of "felt-wholes" which Richardson believes is central to religious experience, as well as to such discovery-motif approaches to the functioning of religious language as Ian Ramsey's.¹³ I would take the same point over into the hermeneutical domain and suggest that biblical narrative has the power to recreate biblical experience in all its "first-timeness" because the biblical symbol systems arose in liminality and have the power to recreate it. A rationale for biblical preaching need not—*should* not—concern giving *information* about anything, even if it is called kerygma, but can focus instead on the recreation

¹²*Ibid.*, pp. 199, 391.

¹³Herbert W. Richardson, *Toward an American Theology* (New York: Harper & Row, 1967); Ian Ramsey, *Religious Language* (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1963).

at a deep-structural level of the very eventfulness of paradigmatic Christian experience. That is to anticipate more detailed discussion than is intended here. The crucial point is for the study of communication in theological perspective to take account methodologically of the dynamics of extraordinary, reality-defining, liminal experience.

C. *The Outcome of Liminal Experience.*

It is a difficult word to use in theological discussion, but the characteristic outcome of liminality is "conversion," in the sense of one's acceptance or "forgiveness" of social structure and a freedom from its "despotic authority."¹⁴ The outcome of liminal experience is a form of gnosis which is reintegrated into the ongoing narrative of socially structured experience—the paradigm for which is perhaps Kierkegaard's "knight of faith." The gnosis does not "save" in itself, but is a new or renewed consciousness of what Crites calls deep-structural "sacred story" in terms of which one's own "mundane story" reaches coherence and ultimate significance.¹⁵ The dynamic of liminal experience is one of disintegration and reintegration in which basic structures of cognition and experience more and more consciously interpenetrate ongoing surface experiences which are transformations from the base. That kind of knowledge is not "knowledge about" in a scientific or historical

sense, but more like being progressively more closely in touch with the inner life of Polanyi's "implicit knowing."¹⁶

It is a knowledge of the previously hidden dimensionality of one's experience, of how it was dialectical at the core and shot through with at least the potential of creativity and sacredness. It is a coming clean, as though for the first time, of the determinants of one's sense of reality—basic expectations, to use Gerbner's typology, of what one takes to exist, to be right, important, and related.¹⁷

If communication in general has the effect of cultivating that sense of reality, then religious communication in particular has a double responsibility: first of measuring the shape of that sense against theological commitments and values, whether its source is religious or other messages; and second of helping people to be in touch with the implicitly sacred structure of what they "know" in a mundane sense. All communication tells a "story" which we come to accept as being "true"; religious communication seeks to assure that it is "my story" and neither hostile to nor divorced from the underlying structure of what in our best theological perception is "sacred." It could be said, then, that religious communication has both a critiquing and a cultivating purpose.

From there it is but one more step to argue that when religious communication either abandons or distorts its critiquing and cultivating function it

¹⁴Victor Turner, *op. cit.*, p. 487.

¹⁵Stephen Crites, "The Narrative Quality of Experience," *Journal of the American Academy of Religion*, Vol. XXXIX, No. 3, September, 1971.

¹⁶Robert N. Bellah, *op. cit.*, p. 93.

¹⁷George Gerbner, "Mass Media and Human Communication Theory," in Frank E.X. Dance, ed., *Human Communication Theory*, especially p. 55.

has become fundamentally irresponsible. I have no objection, by the way, to seeing those functions as what we mean by the more traditional "prophetic" and "priestly" theological poles, so long as we are clear that the meaning of the terms has to do with the dynamic process of knowing through communication and not with a body of dogma or historical reflection.

D. *The Creation of Narrative Community.*

The fourth methodological argument is that the binding force of communication which allows Christians to talk meaningfully to each other across cultures and through history, and for that matter to share the biblical message in a personally involving way, is not primarily a shared linguistic code, but an isomorphy of structure in religious experience. The gnosis of liminality creates, on re-entry into the world of social structure, a new community among initiands. Turner calls it "communitas," the shared experience of "deep knowledge."¹⁸ But I am suggesting that it is not the linguistic code which itself creates that interchangeability of meaning which we loosely call "communication"; it seems rather to be the shared experience of communitas which binds together its participants regardless of the tempero-cultural distance among them. To put it another way: shared gnosis at a base, structural level transcends surface differences of the resulting transformations, and we are on the wrong methodological track if we concentrate on the latter. To use the language of structuralism, the community emerges

from the consciousness of synchronic likeness, and is thus able to sustain even marked diachronic divergence.

Whosoever participates in that isomorphy of experience can understand and join its conversation in some significant fashion regardless of the code employed (religious, scientific, aesthetic, behavioral, psychoanalytic, etc.). The participants should thus perhaps be thought of not as "members of the Christian church" but rather as members of what I would call a "narrative community." Weinrich helpfully says "Christianity is a community of storytellers."¹⁹ More traditionally, but with the same apparent meaning, Jossua writes

"[The experience to which Christians witness] is many-sided, and develops from tensions that exist between factors whose theoretical unity according to the message in no way guarantees immediate compatibility in fact. And yet it does admit of real unity—faith binds together the sum total of those individual experiences by interpreting them, gathering them into a single perspective, and articulating them in depth."²⁰

The narrative community may or may not be coterminous locally with Christian confessors. Perhaps we could even say that the more basic and stronger the isomorphy of experience becomes, the more cohesive grows the

¹⁸Victor Turner, *op. cit.*, p. 393, and also *The Ritual Process* (Chicago: Aldine, 1969).

¹⁹Harold Weinrich, "Narrative Theology," in Johan Baptist Metz and Jean-Pierre Jossua, eds., *The Crisis of Religious Language (Concilium, Vol. 85)* (New York: Herder and Herder, 1973), p. 48.

²⁰Jean-Pierre Jossua, "Christian Experience and Communicating the Faith," in *The Crisis of Religious Language, ibid.*, p. 63.

narrative community and the more immune to disruption from surface conflict. In any event, such a methodological presupposition suggests that an isomorphy of code is not so necessary for the creation of the narrative community, so long as the isomorphy of the experience of *communitas* is intact. To make a pragmatic slogan of it, perhaps we have worried too much about "language that communicates" and not enough about the communicative experience which gives birth to language.

In saying that I am all too aware of the heyday that talk about "experience" is now having, in sometimes testy dialogue with talk about "being" or "reality." Theologians rightly fear reducing the work of God to a matter of our "experience," as though we had all become Berklian idealists whether we know it or not! My intention with this emphasis on experience is somewhat different. One of my colleagues commented recently that we have had an abundance of commentary on what the gospel is and even how it is to be proclaimed, but what we desperately need is an investigation of the question how the gospel is *heard*. The experience of hearing—never to be confused with the nature of God—is precisely what we are concerned with in these pages.

A further question would be whether there is any unique relationship between communication experience as we are discussing it and Christian confession. Put differently: does either the Bible or the Christian language tradition make any fundamental difference in the way the communication experience takes shape? I am intrigued by the following kind of answer, even knowing that thus far it is not fully formed. If the basic structures of

human awareness (which are involved in what we are calling "sacred story") consist inherently of binary oppositions—life/death, light/dark, created/chaotic, or whatever—then it may be possible to say that the Christian language corpus' uniqueness lies in what it postulates is *the* basic structural opposition in terms of which the meaning of life emerges. Whereas other approaches (or other religions) may say the life/death dichotomy is basic, it may be that for the Christian system something like spirit/non-spirit is structurally fundamental. That is to say, it would not be the process of understanding that is unique in Christian experience, but rather the category of ultimate significance for the emergence of meaningful consciousness. What is unique may prove to be the basic parameter one finds in religious consciousness, the most significant constituent of the sacred story.

E. *Transgenerational Communication.*

We come now to the final piece of this puzzle of presuppositions. The previous bench marks have tried to place religious communication in the following methodological context: it is communication which through the symbol-mediated interaction of subject and object cultivates our sense of what is real; that cultivation of awareness goes on in specific liminal environments which are hospitable to paradigmatic religious experience; the outcome of that experience is a special kind of knowledge of the dimensions of human thinking, feeling, and acting at their depths; and the shared, isomorphic participation in that process creates a narrative community.

We are now in a position to say that

the theologically important aspects of communication experience are not informational but "processive," i.e., not the codification of descriptions of events or experiences, but their evocation in consciousness through participation in the symbolic process. *Communication in theological perspective should be understood, therefore, not as the transmission of information but as the transgeneration of experience.* In the narrative community thus established, the transgeneration of liminal experience achieves in its members a renewed participation in the interpenetration of mundane and sacred stories, whose outcome in consciousness is gnosis of a depth and power and transcendence as to be called "saving." (That definition applies elsewhere in religious behavior too, of course, but since I have some considerable investment in it I am inclined to argue that in this "high" view of communication it reaches its finest hour!)

Obviously information is present in communication: I am making no effort to render communication content-free! The point is that the information *per se* can be arranged in different ways which lead to different experiential outcomes *and still be the same information.* It is the total event in awareness which the information contributes to that interests us theologically, and establishing that "information is transmitted" still leaves most of the important theological questions unanswered! One colleague who discussed this concept provided the following mundane but accurate illustration: his wife had called him on the telephone the night before to say that their daughter Barbara had been hit by a car, though not seriously injured. That was the information. Consider, though, the different com-

munication experiences transgenerated by the following simple messages, each containing the same information (and imagining different non-verbal accompaniments): "Barbara has been hit by a car. She isn't hurt, though." Or, "Fortunately she wasn't hurt, but I thought I better let you know Barbara was hit by a car." Or, "I have bad news, dear, Barbara was crossing the street today, and a car zoomed out of nowhere and before she could get out of the way it hit her. [Pause and response] No, she isn't hurt."

The point is that identical information leads to radically different experiences; saying that communication is the transgeneration of experience includes the information, but goes beyond that into the variability of consequence which a strictly informational analysis will never turn up.

II. *The Purposes of Communication in Theological Perspective*

My intention in this section is to be a little sharper, in light of the preceding methodological bench marks, about what we may take as three reasonable goals for religious communication, in terms of which we might point to dimensions of communicative responsibility.

A. We may look to communication in theological perspective for the recovery of ethical authority in experience, conceptualized as knowing the will of God. I know of no better illustration of that issue than Crites provides toward the end of his extremely useful discussion of sacred and mundane stories. He has been discussing two strategies for avoiding the inherent ambiguity and tension of "the narrative quality of experience." We

can adopt the strategy of abstraction and reification or its polar opposite the strategy of "contraction" and immediacy:

"So long as the story retains its primary hold on the imagination, the play of immediacy and the illuminating power of abstraction remain in productive tension. But when immediacy and abstract generality are wrenched out of the story altogether, drained of all musicality, the result is something I can only call, with strict theological precision, demonic. Experience becomes demonically possessed by its own abstracting and contracting possibilities, turned alien and hostile to experience itself. When the humanities give up the story, they become alternately seized by desiccated abstractions and scatological immediacies, the light of the mind becoming a blinding and withering glare, the friendly darkness deepening in the chaotic night of nihilism. Ethical authority, which is always a function of a common narrative coherence of life, is overthrown by a naked show of force exercised either in the name of reason or in the name of glandular vitality. Contrary to the cynical theory that violent force is the secret basis of authority, it is in fact always the sign that authority has dissolved."²¹

That is quite a global distinction, of course, but its explanatory power seems to be very high. Could we not say, for instance, that the philosophical realist, whose theological counterpart is quite uncomfortable with anything smacking of "subjectivity," or occupies the "abstraction" pole of narrative dis-

tortion, while the idealist, who theologically is wedded to experience with little beyond it, falls near the "contraction" side? The tension of narrative is not unlike the tension the symbolic realist feels when trying to keep the subject-object dichotomy from coming to a vote!

Much the same point is made by Victor Turner, who reminds us that "communitas" is neither a benign nor necessarily a comfortable experience, and is often either repressed by a principle of order, or accommodated *in extremis* by the temptation "to opt out of structure altogether."²²

"[C]ommunitas, perhaps even more importantly than sex, tends to get repressed into the unconscious, there to become either a source of individual pathological symptoms, or to be released in violent cultural forms in periods of social crisis. People can go crazy because of communitas-repression; sometimes people become obsessively structural as a defense mechanism against their urgent need of communitas."²³

Michael Novak, again on the poetic side, extends an urgent plea for

"a way of imagining intelligence that is not objectifying, manipulating, alienating; a way of feeling within oneself the coursing of one's blood, the aliveness of one's nerves, the power of one's passion, the labyrinthine intricacies of one's perceptions—and still of acting intelligently. We need models of passionate intelligence, intelligent passion."²⁴

²²Victor Turner, *op. cit.*, p. 491.

²³*Ibid.*, p. 492.

²⁴Michael Novak, *op. cit.*, pp. 85-86.

²¹Stephen Crites, *op. cit.*, p. 310.

To draw the point together, though somewhat prematurely: living intelligently and passionately out of one's own story as it is experienced transformationally in the context of sacred *communitas* is to be in touch with ultimate ethical authority—the will of God—and it is a possible outcome of communication experience. Our communicative work can succumb to either chthonic or olympian perversions in the name of rest from the unceasing tension of narrative experience; or its purpose, by contrast, can be to recover ethical authority precisely by keeping that tension alive.

Whether one says that the universe is inherently dialectical (as the theologians of crisis would want to do) or that the foundation of human consciousness and expression is oppositional (as the structuralists argue), or simply that the search for transcendent ethical authority is always a tension between wholly other God and wholly sinful humanity, the point for responsibility remains the same: communication which closes down the tension of ethical existence is sham at best and pathological at worst.

B. We may look to religious communication for the recovery of transformational power in liberation and creativity, conceptualized as participating in the freedom of Christ. Fundamental to this purpose is for such communication to understand itself as presiding over the transformation of the underlying, depth structures of existence—sacred story—in everyday, surface experience—mundane story. When the transformation ceases, one is fated either to the narcissism of self-absorption or the empty protest of "objectivity," a way of telling incarnational lies. Terence Turner writes,

"Symbolic narratives, in short, represent cultural models for coping with typical patterns of subjective stress involved in the orientation of individuals to problematic situations in their social and cultural orders. They are, in a sense, meta-categories, dealing with the reintegration of divergent and often traumatic individual experience with the normative order of categories."²⁵

It may prove useful to think of such communication, above all, as "meta-categorical communication," i.e., communication in which the very categories of our experience—the perimeters of what we take as "reality"—are lifted up for inspection and both affirmed and called into question so that they can be transformed. The freedom of Christ is dual and tensed: it is the freedom of living fully into one's own story as a transformation of the sacred reality of things, and the freedom of being aware that the categories of one's own knowing, while replete with sacredness, are never beyond transcending. In meta-categorical communication both confession and pardon are experienced fundamentally in the process itself.

The communicator's responsibility is to keep alive the transformational process wherein one is able to visualize one's own story of existence in some wider frame of reference yet without losing the sense of personal ownership. When speaking of responsibility we would say: Without the wider frame of reference such communication is idolatrous; without the ownership it is demonic.

C. We may, finally, look to religious

²⁵Terence Turner, "Oedipus: Time and Structure in Narrative Form," (unpublished paper, The University of Chicago), pp. 35, 36.

communication for the recovery of a sense of the transcendent, conceptualized as living the life of the Spirit. The experience of *communitas* emerges from meta-categorical communication as a *marginal* excursion, between separation from familiar structures of existence and reaggregation in new status or self-perception. Transcendence is bestowed, one could say, in that interim period when one senses first hand that the dialectic of the universe *can* reach, though never in our experience, a resolution. It is that characteristic of *gnosis* which enables people fully to rejoin the world while still "fully imagining themselves assuming the standpoint of the sacred."²⁶

To sum up in a negative formulation: Whatever erodes authority, closes down transformation, and distances transcendence is antithetical to the purpose of communication, making it dysfunctional both to theological claims and to the personal integrity and freedom of the members of the narrative community.

Can we put it positively, asking what sort of communication behavior reaches toward fulfillment of those purposes? From what has been said even sketchily, we can envision the emergence of three parameters of messages which move toward those goals. They will be messages which (1) reach an *intensity* which transcends social structures and so evokes *communitas* as they begin to tell a recognizable version of sacred story; (2) maintain an *ambiguity* which lifts up to consciousness a sense of dialectic and creative conflict in the marginal period between disintegration and reintegration, dwell-

ing temporally as Crites says in the relentlessly tensive interval between the "tick" of the past and the "tock" of the inevitable, though mysterious, future;²⁷ (3) offer to participants the opportunity of *self-involvement*, largely through the use of narrative so that one's mundane story, carried convictionally but in the nature of things provisionally, is heard, affirmed, and transformed.

I would leave with the suggestion, in other words, that when messages reach a certain intensity, ambiguity, and self-involvement they carry the opportunity of being theologically important and responsible.

That formulation, which I have been jockeying with for some time, either as friend or enemy, seems quite close to the combined intentions of Victor Turner and Stephen Crites, who have figured heavily in this paper as illustrative sources. I want to say that the first fruit of communication experience theologically approached is the creation of a liminal environment, a moment of *communitas*, in which a participant senses the transformation of his own history in terms of the transcendence which sacred story mediates to consciousness in creative experience. The transgeneration of experience over which the communicator presides seems strikingly close to the transformation of sacred into mundane, which I take to be an interior view of the foundation of "incarnational" preaching in which the "Word of God is truly present. The intersection of intensity, ambiguity, and self-involvement has been linked with Turner's and Crites' categories and the importance of the linkage appears in

²⁶Michael Novak, *op. cit.*, p. 42.

²⁷Stephen Crites, *op. cit.*, p. 306.

the following ingenious interpretation of religious symbolization:

"So the narrative quality of the experience has three dimensions, the sacred story, the mundane stories, and the temporal form of experience itself: three narrative tracks, each constantly reflecting and affecting the course of the others. And sometimes the tracks cross, causing a burst of light like a comet entering our atmosphere. Such a luminous moment, in which sacred, mundane, and personal are inseparably conjoined, we call *symbolic* in a special sense. . . . The shock of its ap-

pearance is like the recurrence in daylight of an episode recalled from dreams. For a religious symbol becomes fully alive to consciousness when sacred story dramatically intersects both an explicit narrative and the course of a man's personal experience."²⁸

It is the transgeneration of that experience toward which religious communication may reach as a new perspective on its fundamental purpose.

²⁸*Ibid.*, pp. 305-306.

Book Reviews

Genesis 1-11, by Robert Davidson. *The Cambridge Bible Commentary*, Cambridge University Press, New York/London, 1973. Pp. x + 118 \$5.95 (cloth). \$2.95 (paper).

The author of this commentary is professor of Old Testament Language and Literature at the University of Glasgow. The aim of this series of commentaries based on The New English Bible is to make the results of modern scholarship available to the general reader, and accordingly no knowledge of the original language of the Old Testament is assumed. In a brief introduction Professor Davidson discusses the formation of Genesis and in this connection makes reference to oral transmission and the documentary hypothesis. He points out, however, that the date of a Pentateuchal document does not decide the antiquity of the material in that source. Although P is the latest stratum in the Pentateuch, he rightly notes that it contains much ancient material.

Davidson divides Genesis into two main sections: Chapters 1-11, which he calls the Prologue and Chapters 12-30, the pentateuchal traditions. Much of the material in Genesis is regarded as "myth," provided the word *myth* is properly understood. According to the author "story myths" provide answers to questions people ask about life, society, and the world in which they live; myths may be popular accounts handed down within the community from generation to generation, although their origin is lost in the mists of antiquity. In the notes at the end of Chapter 3, Davidson observes: "Faith, like poetry, communicates some of its deepest truths through symbols, which, steeped in tradition, are yet capable of being given ever new meaning."

This commentary is short and can be read by a minister as a brief resumé of his former studies in Genesis 1-11. If he wishes, however, to enlarge his library with commentaries, it is not advisable to invest the price of the cloth edition of such a limited part of Genesis; the paperback is adequate for his purposes. The previous compact commentary known as *The Cambridge Bible* contains much excellent material and may be supplemented by this new series, but it should not be discarded.

HENRY S. GEHMAN

Isaiah 1-39, by A. S. Herbert. *The Cambridge Bible Commentary*. Cambridge University Press, New York/London, 1973. Pp. xiii + 215. \$9.95 (cloth). \$3.95 (paper).

The author of this commentary was Professor of Old Testament Studies in the Selly Oak Colleges, Birmingham, England. The commentary is preceded by a discussion of the place of the Book of Isaiah in the Old Testament and an historical survey of the situation in the Near East in the time of Isaiah. This is followed by an interesting survey of Old Testament prophecy and the message of Isaiah.

In a comment on the call to Isaiah reference is made to that of other prophets. Professor Herbert emphasizes the dramatic and majestic quality of Isaiah's experience. He points out that it was the recognized function of the prophet to speak the Word of the Lord at a time of national crisis. When Isaiah said: "I am lost," the horror is not simply that of creature before the creator, but of a sinful man in the presence of holy perfection.

Naturally a brief commentary cannot go into great detail, and on 7:14 he simply says that the young woman probably was one of Ahaz's wives. On account of the importance of the passage, however, other interpretations should have been considered. Thus, for example, the Hebrew word *'almāh* has been understood as signifying the personification of the house of David or of the nation. The nation sometimes in poetic language was represented as the virgin of Israel (Amos 5:2; Jer. 18; 13; 31:4, 21); this view at any rate would connect the prophecy with the local and historical situation of c. 734 B.C. The prediction of the prophet is that nine months hence some unknown mother will call her son Immanuel as an expression of faith that God is with his people and will save them. It is furthermore possible that a number of hopeful mothers gave the name Immanuel to their sons as a sign of God's protective power and concern in a time of crisis. All these interpretations would recognize the historical situation and give an explanation within the context.

In speaking of the rôle of Assyria in God's purposes, the commentator makes the important observation that the Greek poets as well as the Hebrew prophets regarded arrogance and

tyranny as utterly destructive with the difference that the Greeks related this to fate, while the Hebrew prophets saw all this in God's holy purposes for man. The author notes that the Messianic hope was strongly persistent and that the New Testament saw it fulfilled in Jesus Christ.

In the prophecies relating to foreign nations Herbert observes that the word *oracle* is a distinctive title used ten times as a heading, and he correctly states that it carries with it a solemn sense of doom. Yet it may be felt that the RSV and NEB have lost something of the sense of *Hebrew maššā'*, which is so well expressed in the word *burden* (AV, RV, JV). God places a burden upon the prophet, who in turn lays it upon a people or nation. In this rendering the ominous character of *maššā'* is better expressed than by *oracle* (RSV, NEB).

The commentary closes with an excellent paragraph. This is a valuable book for the parish minister, and at the price of the paperback edition is a good investment.

HENRY S. GEHMAN

The First and Second Books of Maccabees, by John R. Bartlett. *The Cambridge Bible Commentary*, Cambridge University Press, New York/London, 1973. Pp. xiv + 358. \$14.95 (cloth) \$4.95 (paper).

The author of this commentary is lecturer in divinity in Trinity College, Dublin. He begins his work by giving some background information about the world to which the Maccabees belonged. I Maccabees is about the events from the accession of Antiochus (IV) Epiphanes (175 B.C.) to the murder of the high priest Simon in 134 B.C. II Maccabees deals with a more limited period (175–160 B.C.). The chronology of that period can be visualized by consulting the tables of the Ptolemies and the Seleucidae and the genealogy of the Maccabaeian family. There is also provided a list of the high priests from Judaea (c. 330 B.C.) to John Hyrcanus (134–104 B.C.). Although the author of I Maccabees is not known, Professor Bartlett regards him as a man of judgment and ability, who has made an important contribution to our knowledge of a complicated and interesting period.

In the case of II Maccabees the historian claims that his book is a summary of the five-volume work of a certain Jason of Cyrene. He writes in Greek, apparently his native tongue,

and approaches the study of history in a particularly Greek manner.

Even though I and II Maccabees are placed in the Apocrypha, they are especially valuable for the study of Jewish history in the intertestamental period. Any reader of the Bible cannot fail to notice that there is a break in the sequence from the Old Testament to the New. There was, however, no vacuity in history, and in order to fill the gap between the two Testaments a knowledge of the Apocrypha is a necessity. Theologically II Maccabees is important for our knowledge of the development of the doctrine of the resurrection from the dead. In a brief concluding chapter on the present-day value of I and II Maccabees Bartlett makes a comparison with the Nazi period in Germany and a reference to persecuted minorities. This concise commentary serves a useful purpose in Biblical studies, and Bartlett has succeeded in writing a good work within this brief compass.

HENRY S. GEHMAN

The Horizontal Line Synopsis of the Gospels, by Reuben J. Swanson. Western North Carolina Press, Dillsboro, N.C., 1975. Pp. xiii + 597. \$23.95.

Of the various kinds of harmonies or synopses of the Gospels, this is the first one with the parallel passages arranged in horizontal lines rather than in vertical columns. The advantages of such an arrangement are immediately apparent: the eye is greatly helped in observing the similarities and differences among the several accounts. Furthermore, by means of underlining and the use of different fonts of type, the user is further assisted in tracing the relationships.

Another unique feature of the volume is the absolutely impartial manner in which the material is set forth. In every other synopsis the compiler follows primarily one Gospel account and adjusts the others to that one. Swanson's volume is in four parts, and in each the entire text of one of the four Gospels is presented seriatim, and the text of the other three Gospels is adjusted to it. Thus the contents of any three accounts can be studied against the foil of each several Gospel.

Swanson's work will be highly useful to students and ministers. Church school libraries would do well to obtain a copy of this tool for Bible study.

BRUCE M. METZGER

Christian Unity and Christian Diversity, by John Macquarrie. The Westminster Press, Philadelphia, Pa., 1975. Pp. 118. \$2.85 (paper).

In this brief but compact volume, the eminent British theologian John Macquarrie expounds his views on the important question of the unity of the Christian Church. He observes that both unity and diversity have been characteristic of the Church virtually ever since its historic beginnings, and he contends that both of these have a legitimate place in church organization. So the unity which he regards as most desirable is not organic reunion—what the New Delhi Assembly of the World Council called the goal of “all in each place brought into one fully committed fellowship.” Rather, Macquarrie finds his model of church unity—at least for the determinable future—in the “uniate” relationship which exists between certain Eastern Christian churches and Roman Catholicism. These “uniate” churches, although in full communion with Rome, retain a measure of autonomy, having their own bishops and canon law. So, for example, Macquarrie would want to see in England both the Anglican church and the Roman Catholic church continuing to exist side by side, each organized separately but enjoying inter-communion and acknowledging the headship of the Pope.

Macquarrie then argues that since Rome is “the centre of unity,” the papal church must have a place of pivotal importance in any long-term movement for Christian reunion. For him, therefore, the crucial question is this: “How far is Rome prepared to become involved in movements toward greater visible unity and to become a centre drawing all Christians into a new fellowship?” (p. 51). He admits that the answer to this question is not yet clear, but he sets forth what he considers to be reasonable solutions to some of the major questions which presently divide Roman Catholicism from other Christian churches—the ministry, the Eucharist, Marriage, mariology and authority—in the hope that his suggestions will bridge the gulf and effect a reconciliation between what he calls, quoting Tillich, “Catholic substance” and “Protestant principle.”

It goes without saying that Macquarrie’s proposals are the fruit of a sincere concern for Christian unity and are based on wide knowledge of the questions at stake. It is doubtful, however, that his “uniate” solution will find widespread acceptance, since it does not eliminate that competitive

rivalry between churches which is such a hindrance to the credibility of the Gospel and the effectiveness of the Christian witness. Organic reunion as envisioned at New Delhi need not imply any mechanical uniformity; it can allow for considerable diversity and flexibility in modes of worship and general Christian life-style. Besides, Macquarrie’s hopes for a favorable response by the Roman Catholic church to his proposed solutions of the problems which still separate it from Protestantism, may prove to be oversanguine. Admittedly John Knox, whom Macquarrie quotes, is quite right in saying that “the new openness on the part of Rome . . . is the major, the miraculous, the incomparably significant ecumenical fact of our time” (p. 51); and for this and for the resulting deepened fellowship and closer cooperation between Roman Catholics and other Christians, all who are concerned for church unity will give heartfelt thanks. But any real reunion between Roman Catholicism and Protestantism seems a long way off; and meantime, Protestants are thoroughly justified in seeking organic union with one another, although Macquarrie seems to regard this kind of ecumenical activity as misguided and misdirected.

But whether the viewpoint of this book finds much acceptance or not, it focuses attention on some highly important issues in the ecumenical movement.

NORMAN V. HOPE

The Church in Victorian Scotland, 1843–1874, by Andrew L. Drummond and James Bulloch. The Saint Andrew Press, Edinburgh, 1975. Pp. 367. £5.75.

In 1973 the St. Andrew Press, the publishing house of the Church of Scotland, issued a book by Drs. Andrew L. Drummond and James P. Bulloch entitled, *The Scottish Church, 1688–1843*. Now the same press has published a successor, *The Church in Victorian Scotland, 1843–1874*, by the same two authors.

The Disruption of 1843, when more than one third of the ministers of the Church of Scotland seceded in order to form the Free Church, was a traumatic event in Scottish church history, whose effects were both far-reaching and long continuing. But during the generation which followed the Disruption, Scottish churchmen were concerned with other matters as well. For one thing, during that period the State took over poor relief and public education, two areas for which the church

had traditionally assumed responsibility. Again, during this period the three major Presbyterian churches in Scotland—Established, Free and United Presbyterian—became actively involved in the missionary enterprise in Asia and Africa. Again, in at least the Established Church, a movement started in favor of more reverent, orderly and dignified patterns in public worship. Besides, physical science—particularly geology and biology—and Biblical criticism began to make their impact on Scottish church life, raising difficult and painful questions for Devout Christian believers. Furthermore, traditional Calvinism, which had dominated Scottish life since the Reformation of the 16th century, was threatened with erosion and break-up by secular and humanistic ideals which were becoming widely diffused. Finally, despite Disruption bitterness, tentative suggestions were made during this period for Presbyterian reunion in Scotland, not only between the United Presbyterian and the Free churches, but even between the Church of Scotland and the Free Church—although nothing concrete resulted at the time.

These are the major questions with which the authors of this book concern themselves, and their treatment is topical rather than chronological. It must be admitted that their handling of their subject matter is admirable. They have read and pondered the relevant literature, both primary and secondary, including "many lives of ministers which for the most part were painfully dull." (p. 341); and they have exhibited sober and objective judgment of their own in assessments and interpretations.

One worthwhile function this book will fulfill is to debunk some of the myths which have circulated concerning the Church in Victorian Scotland. One of these is that Disruption Scotland was universally Sabbatarian, church going, upright and devout. The authors of this book provide convincing evidence that this was not so, at any rate among the lower classes of the rapidly growing industrial towns. They contend, quite accurately, that "the social structure of the industrial areas was a pyramid and its base was pagan"; and they add that "this grim fact, so often ignored is the most important element in any assessment of the religious life of Scotland in Disruption times" (p. 40-41).

Another myth refuted in this book concerns missionary motivation. The traditional idea expounded, even by such a usually well informed scholar as Alec Vidler, is that "the main motive of missions in the 19th century was the evan-

gelical one, common to Protestants and Roman Catholics, of rescuing as many of the heathen as possible from the everlasting damnation which otherwise awaited them" (*The Church in an Age of Revolution*, p. 252). But this was definitely not the case in Scotland. There the basic impulse was the urge to share the good news of Jesus Christ, the Lord of all good life—a motive which finds its sanction in the New Testament. A second motive was to end the infamous institution of slavery, and a third was revulsion at the barbarous practices which prevailed in some of the native religions of Africa and India, e.g., the slaughtering of wives when their husbands died.

A third legend which this book will help to dispel concerns the impact of Charles Darwin's *Origin of Species*. The late Dr. J. Y. Simpson stated that the publication of Darwin's book in 1859 struck public opinion like a thunderbolt; but, whatever may have been the case in England, this was not true in Scotland, where familiarity with the idea of biological evolution had been familiar ever since the publication of Robert Chamber's *Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation* in 1844.

Altogether, this book, if given the reading it deserves, will do much to provide an accurate and well-informed picture of church life in Scotland in the generation which followed the Disruption.

NORMAN V. HOPE

Watch How You Go: An Autobiography, by Martin Sullivan. Hodder & Stoughton, London, 1975. Pp. 224. £5.50.

The Dean of St. Paul's Cathedral in London is Chairman of the Chapter, which consists of four residentiary Canons and himself; and it is this body which controls all Cathedral affairs. The Deanship is one of the most prestigious appointments in the Church of England; and it has been held by many distinguished English scholars and thinkers—for example, John Colet, John Donne, John Tillotson, Henry H. Milman, Henry L. Mansel, Richard W. Church, William Ralph Inge, and Walter R. Matthews. When Matthews resigned in 1967 the Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, nominated for the position the then Archdeacon of London, Martin Sullivan. This appointment was, to say the least, surprising. For one thing, Sullivan had no great reputation as a scholar or intellectual; and besides, he was a New

Zealand, the first ever named to a major appointment in the Anglican Church.

Sullivan has now issued his autobiography under the title *Watch How You Go*, which he describes as "a statement of where I have come from, where I have been, and what I have been doing" (Foreword); and from this frank and revealing document certain facts are clear. First, born in New Zealand in 1910 and ordained to the episcopal priesthood in 1934, he has had a wide and varied experience of clerical life. He has been a parish priest, an army chaplain, a university S.C.M. representative, Principal of a Theological College, and Dean of a Cathedral—all of these as a New Zealander before he came to England in 1962 as rector of a London parish, and later was appointed Archdeacon of the London diocese. Second, this experience has been partly administrative but mainly pastoral. He has had to work closely with people of all kinds—except perhaps members of the laboring class—and to all of them he seems to have been able to relate positively and fruitfully. Third, he has been particularly effective in his contacts with young men and women, with whom he has had very close links in virtually every position which he has filled.

As Dean of St. Paul's, Sullivan has been primarily concerned to bring the Cathedral into closer relationship with the great metropolis amid which it is placed, and particularly with its youth. To this group he has made a special appeal, through programs and activities geared to its distinctive needs and tastes; and this appeal has met with a gratifying response, in terms both of numbers and interest. One by-product of this ministry is especially noteworthy. An opera setting for the Old Testament story of Joseph was written for presentation in St. Paul's by the composer Andrew Lloyd Webber and the librettist Tim Rice. After the performance was over, these two men asked for Sullivan's reaction to the suggestion that they might write a similar kind of "rock" opera based on the life of Jesus Christ. The result was *Jesus Christ Superstar*, which, as Sullivan suggests "asks fundamental questions about Jesus Christ and it is the business of Christians to attempt to answer them" (page 189).

There are those who maintain that Harold Wilson's appointment of Sullivan as Dean of St. Paul's, was—though breaking with precedent—well justified by what has happened in the Cathedral since the appointment. In this interesting autobiography they will find much evidence to support their contention.

NORMAN V. HOPE

The Nation with the Soul of a Church, by Sidney E. Mead. Harper & Row, Publishers, New York, N.Y., 1975. Pp. 158. \$7.95.

This book contains a series of essays which were originally delivered as lectures, and some of them many times. In other words, the style is the spoken word and, while at times the essays are repetitious, yet this practice does not detract from the main thrust of the work, namely, that the religion of the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States of America is one proposition, while the assertion of many theologians that this was established as a christian nation is another. Throughout the book "one motif permeates these essays: that there is, and always has been, an unresolved tension between the theology that legitimates the constitutional structure of the Republic and that generally professed and taught in a majority of the religious denominations of the United States."

The author has been Professor of Religion and History at the University of Iowa for the past ten years and, while there, he delivered the lectures which form this book at such institutions as Vanderbilt, Yale Divinity School, Union Theological Seminary in New York, Colgate-Rochester Divinity School, and Harvard. The essays always represent the main ideas of his teaching at the University of Iowa during the past decade.

The author reiterates throughout the book two essential points, that (1) the culture of Christendom and religion in this nation is pluralistic and always has been, and (2) the religion proposed by several sects is "but one among many live options offered the citizen in the free market." He believes that, unless seminary education recognizes these facts and ceases using the traditional idiom, there is danger of losing the "now" generation. Encourage the student to re-examine the thoughts and writings of the founding fathers, he asserts, and then help the student to create a new definition of religion to meet our pluralistic society. He has little confidence in the ecumenical movement because it still clings to "a dying sectarianism or temple-ism." What the civil authority does is to curb each religion so that each group is protected from the other's absolutism.

He examines the phrase post-Protestant, which has become so common among theologians, and contends that this obsession of

postmanship this or that has little credence in the legal structure of the United States which was not Protestant in a particular sense. He cites three well-known theologians, Winthrop S. Hudson, Martin E. Marty and Will Herberg, all of whom believe that we are living in a post-Protestant era, and that we have adopted the American way of life, a culture religion or secularism as a substitute.

Mead argues that "The provisions in the Constitution and First Amendment for national religious freedom and separation of church and state were conceived in actual religious pluralism and were dedicated to the proposition that all religions are equal." He further buttresses his claim of religious pluralism from the beginning of the nation by quoting Thomas Jefferson, Benjamin Franklin and other religious leaders as Josiah Strong of the late 1800's and Thomas Sugrue, a New England Roman Catholic, all of whom agree that this country was founded legally and constitutionally upon the doctrines of the existence of a divine being, the immortality of man and his accountability. He even quotes President Dwight David Eisenhower as having declared that "recognition of the Supreme Being is the first, the most basic expression of Americanism. Without God, there could be no American form of government, nor an American way of life. Our government makes no sense unless it is founded in a deeply felt religious faith, and I don't care what it is."

Mead does not mean to imply that many of the mores were other than Protestant or that the vast majority of the first settlers were other than Protestant. In fact, he admires this, and with the influx of Roman Catholics and later the Jews, he recognizes that the value standards became somewhat different. What he does claim is that the United States was from the beginning "a home for the homeless," as Chesterton declared, and that every religion was welcome and its rights protected. Mead also attacks the commonly used phrase Church and State as a false division of the relation of the two institutions. Thomas Jefferson wrote a letter to the Danbury (Connecticut) Baptist Association in the early 1800's about the wall of separation between church and state. This terminology became universally known and caused confusion. On the other hand, Mead contends that James Madison was more accurate in his statement of 1832, "the alliance between them (church and state) will best be guarded against by an entire abstinence of the Govern-

ment from interference in any way whatever, beyond the necessity of preserving public order, and protecting each sect against the trespassers on its legal rights by others." Madison envisioned a "line" between the civil authority and a church, not a "wall" as Jefferson stated. This line is not a fixed position but a constantly moving point depending upon a given situation or case at issue. Government is by law and not by a group of men or even a majority. It protects a minority religious sect from the tyranny of the majority. The Bill of Rights form the principles and the Justices determine in each case what these principles mean in a specific instance.

Mead recognizes that this situation in a pluralistic society creates tensions. Christians are torn between their loyalty to denominations and their loyalty as citizens, so that they live in two worlds. He does not attempt to answer this problem.

The reviewer tends to agree with Mead, namely, that religion in this nation has always been pluralistic and that the civil authority guarantees each sect freedom to exercise its devotion to that sect, as long as it does not interfere with the rights of others. It is important to note that the Declaration of Independence only mentions God four times: once in the first paragraph, where "nature's God" is appealed to as entitling the colonies to separate from Great Britain; secondly in the second paragraph, where it states that men "are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights; thirdly, in the last paragraph, where "appealing to the Supreme Judge of the world for the rectitude of our intentions" in declaring the colonies to be free and independent states; and lastly in the final sentence of the Declaration: "and for the support of this Declaration with a firm reliance on the protection of Divine Providence, we mutually pledge to each other our lives, our fortunes, and our sacred honor."

The original Constitution of the United States mentions God only in Article VII, when the date of the writing was "the seventeenth day of September in the year of our Lord, one thousand seven hundred and eighty-seven."

It is particularly noteworthy that James Madison, the architect of the Constitution, who was a Presbyterian, a graduate of the College of New Jersey (Princeton University), and who one time thought of entering the ministry and was presumably nourished on the Shorter Catechism, did not invoke the blessing of God and the Lord

Jesus Christ upon his work in the text of the Constitution.

In other words, in these two crucial documents there is no declaration nor even intimation that the United States is a Christian nation. This is in sharp contrast to England, which recognizes the Protestant Episcopal denomination as the Church of England and the official state church.

In this Bicentennial year this short book of lectures is a genuine contribution to an understanding of the religious heritage of the nation.

EDWIN H. RIAN

Catholicism Confronts Modernity: A Protestant View, by Langdon Gilkey. Seabury Press, New York, N.Y., 1975. Pp. 211. \$8.95.

These seven chapters grew out of lectures to Catholic audiences by Chicago's well-known Protestant theologian, Langdon Gilkey. He tries to chart the course Catholicism must follow in coming to grips with the deep effects of modernity on the Church. For approximately two centuries, Protestantism has been compelled to deal with the same developing modernity; so, Gilkey thinks, we may be able to help each other, especially since *aggiornamento* seems to have endangered Catholic thought and practice. "The Catholic crisis," writes Gilkey, "opens up theological questions fundamental to every Christian: the relation of basic changes in cultural life to the church and her theology, and to her forms of authority, piety, and daily life; the relations of the collapse of traditional structures of social and church life to new structures; and the relation of these changes in history to the divine promises and the divine activity that give to a moving and shifting history its meaning and its hope."

Gilkey's discussion of symbols is at the heart of his argument. Religious symbols today are out of touch with modern experience. Thus our participation in our inherited traditions is divorced from the day-to-day world in which we live and have our being. Our dogmas no longer speak; it is almost impossible to be theological at all, to find any meaningful form to our God-talk.

After discussing the meaning of the priesthood, the place of community, the break-down of authority, Gilkey asks, "How is the holy experienced in Christian existence?" That is, how does God relate himself to man in Christian faith? This is theology's fundamental question; and it

relates to how the modes of Christian worship relate to our real experiences of sacralty.

Present day Protestantism, says Gilkey, demonstrates its weakness in its relation essentially to bourgeois middle-class small towns and suburbs. "We are so engulfed in that world as merely to reproduce the individualistic, quantitative, moralistic, non-emotional, bourgeois world in our ecclesiastical life." Catholicism can help us by its sacramental character. But not by the old sacramental stance: "what a strange Marcionite vision within a Catholic system that names God 'being,' and then acts sacramentally as if the gift of being were" confined to the religious ghetto. Confirmation is the rite of entrance into adulthood, not solely the entrance into Mother Church. Ordination must be enlarged to the sacrament of vocation for all its members. Marriage, penance, and unction must be directed at the central issues of human existence and the world and its life. The Eucharist needs freeing until it becomes ecological and holds up all life as sacramental.

Gilkey is at his best when he writes on worship, the combination of *both* Word and Sacrament: Word as the principle of judgment on the estranged character of all human life, the Word that manifests the infinite qualitative difference between holy and profane and thus in judging brings the only grounds for hope for a reduction of that difference. But "it is impossible to 'create a sense of worship' by changing bodily movements, words, lights, or music; nor merely by re-fashioning our forms of worship to make it all more real." We must ponder how God comes to us in our community and faith, how the most Real is really present now. "No God of the future," he writes, "can be relevant to what we do politically today, unless there is that presence at work in our common life." So the character of modern culture calls more for a Catholic, sacramental principle of mediation and symbol than it does for the Protestant verbal principle. Through Catholicism reformed "all of us may discover the divinely granted capacity to allow finite and relative instruments to be media of the divine and to endow all of secular and ordinary life with the possibility and the sanctity of divine creativity."

Here is a book that helps us see ourselves from another tradition, that helps us judge not only that tradition but our own; so that Holy Spirit will be seen redeeming the times and the Church with the Glory.

BERTRAM deH. ATWOOD

Biography as Theology, by James W. McClendon, Jr. Abingdon Press, Nashville, Tenn., 1974. Pp. 224. \$13.95 (cloth). \$4.95 (paper).

The author of this book, an alumnus of Princeton Seminary, is professor of Theology at the Church Divinity School of the Pacific and the Graduate Theological Union in Berkeley, California. The subtitle explains the writer's purpose: "how life stories can remake today's theology." In the first chapter he pleads for an ethics of character which is concerned with convictions instead of Joseph Fletcher's situation ethics and Reinhold Niebuhr's Christian realism. He claims that the realm of convictions is the realm with which theology is concerned. "Theology and the ethics of character are room-mates sharing the same space and obliged to come to terms with each other's concerns." (p. 36). There appear from time to time singular and striking lives which by their attractiveness or beauty may enable the Christian thinker more truly to reflect upon the tension between what is and what ought to be believed and lived by all. In support of this contention McClendon makes a study of four lives, Dag Hammarskjöld, Martin Luther King, Jr., Clarence Jordan and Charles Ives, and shows how in each of them there is an atonement process. A key to these biographies is the dominant images which may be found in the lives of which they speak. Dr. King, for example, sees himself under the image of the Exodus. The author says: "Our biographical subjects have contributed to the theology of the community of sharers of their faith especially by showing how certain great archetypal images of that faith do apply to their own lives and circumstances, and by extension to our own. In doing so, they make clearer the answer to a preliminary theological question, What is religion?" (p. 96). The final chapter *Towards a Theology of Life* outlines the author's conviction that we are at a point where biography as theology can make a most significant contribution. This is a most readable book which suggests methods by which the work of doing theology biographically can be carried further.

JOHN BISHOP

The Religion of Dostoevsky, by A. Boyce Gibson. The Westminster Press, Philadelphia, Pa., 1973. Pp. 216. \$6.95.

The greater a text the more often it must be preached on; and the greater a writer the more books will be written about him. The late Professor A. Boyce Gibson begins his book by saying: "Of books on Dostoevsky there is no end." This is not a biography of the great Russian novelist but a scholarly and sensitive attempt to trace Dostoevsky's own religion from the words and actions of the characters in his novels. He traces the stages in the growth of Dostoevsky's religion and then analyzes the major novels with special attention to their place in the sequence. Dostoevsky's discovery of the people during the four years of his exile in Siberia led him to the people's God. There is no doubt of the reality of his religion. "I knew Christ in the family home while still a child," he wrote and in a letter in 1854 he said: "If anyone could prove to me that Christ is outside the truth, and if the truth really did exclude Christ, I should stay with Christ rather than with the truth." As Dr. Gibson says: "No account can properly present Dostoevsky, even as an artist, which in any way slurs his complete devotion to Christ."

Thomas Hardy once said, "If way to the better there be, it exacts a full look at the worst," and the worst so horrified him that he missed the way to the better. Dostoevsky thought along the same lines, but he had the courage and the spiritual vitality to see it through. He was concerned as an artist with the misery of the world, tracing it to its source in the pagan virtue of pride, and he pointed to the great characteristic of Russian religion—*sobornost*—"the spiritual togetherness of Christians"—as the only remedy. As Father Zossima put it: "Each is responsible for all." "There is only one means of salvation . . . Make yourself responsible for all men's sins." Catholicism, according to Dostoevsky, is unity without freedom; Protestantism is freedom without unity; but Russian Orthodoxy is freedom in unity and unity in freedom.

Boyce Gibson says that Dostoevsky "does not take charge of his characters but he does present through them problems which troubled him." It is for this reason that it is not only helpful but absolutely necessary to consider the novels in order to get to grips with Dostoevsky's religion. These novels have been to the author of this study not only great literature but also the inspiration of a lifetime. They have shown him that religious faith and philosophic doubt belong together and have helped him to see that the practice of his religion and his scruples as a professional philosopher enhance each other. This is a stimu-

lating guide which demonstrates Dostoevsky's relevance for our day.

JOHN BISHOP

Pastor and People: A Study of Church and Ministry in Wesleyan Methodism from the Death of John Wesley (1791) to the Death of Jabez Bunting (1858), by John C. Bowmer. Epworth Press, London, 1975. Pp. 272. £5.

This book contains the Fernley-Hartley Lecture given at the Annual Conference of British Methodism held in Liverpool in July 1975. It is based upon a Ph.D. thesis for Leeds University. Its author is the director of the Methodist Archives and Research Center in London and is already well known as a Wesley scholar from his earlier books, *The Sacrament of the Lord's Supper in Early Methodism*, (Dacre Press, 1951) and *The Lord's Supper in Methodism, 1791-1960*, (Epworth Press, 1961). The purpose of this work is to show how Wesleyan Methodism developed from a confederation of Societies into a Church in its own right; how Wesley's itinerant preachers became ordained ministers supported by a unique doctrine of the Pastoral Office; and how the Wesleyan rules and regulations were framed to embody that doctrine. It is the conviction of the author that in these days when all denominations are seeking to clarify their ideas about the role of the ministry in the twentieth century the Wesleyan doctrine of the Pastoral Office has something of value to teach us.

The first part of the book deals with the seven stormy years that followed the death of John Wesley and the Form of Discipline adopted in 1797, which became the Magna Carta of Wesleyan Methodism. The second part shows how this Methodism of 1797 and after stood up to the pressures of the early nineteenth century and tells of the minor secessions from the parent body which took place from 1797 to 1827. The third part covers the years 1827-1849 and describes the causes of the three major secessions from Wesleyan Methodism, the Leeds organ case, the Warrenite secession and the flysheet controversy. The fourth part deals with the resultant polity, the doctrine of the Pastoral Office, and the impact of the Oxford Movement on Wesleyan Methodism.

Dr. Bowmer points out that the polity of Wesleyan Methodism was not Independency, nor

was it Presbyterianism, though there are interesting parallels between Methodism and Presbyterianism, which he deals with in considerable detail. The Wesleyan connexional system was built upon three principles: episcopé, itinerancy, and mutual help. Its strength lay in the fact that "it was able to enforce discipline, to maintain sound doctrine and to facilitate expansion." Connexionalism is still one of the great characteristics of Methodism as a church: in fact, Dr. Frank Baker claims it as "one of the greatest contributions made by Wesley to ecclesiastical polity."

What is the office of a minister? This question was asked at the first Methodist Conference in 1744 and the answer given was: "To watch over the souls whom God commits to his charge as he that must give account." This is the foundation of the doctrine of the Pastoral Office. The Wesleyans steered a middle course between High Anglicanism and Dissent. Bowmer claims that the Wesleyan doctrine of the Pastoral Office could give us a conception of ministry which we could profitably recover today, a ministry with authority and a mission. "The minister would be regarded not as a religious psychologist or a quasi-social worker but one recognizably sent from God with a self-authenticating authority bestowed by God through the Church." (p. 228). His conclusion is that Wesleyanism was neither Anglican nor Dissenting, yet it combined elements from both—"a voluntary principle with an authoritative government, a Presbyterian polity with an Armenian theology, a gathered congregation without formal separation from the Established Church." (p. 260).

Much use has been made in this book of the vast storehouse of pamphlets and letters in the central archives of the Methodist Church. It is well documented, has an excellent bibliography and an ample index, and is eminently readable. In a recent book by Bernard Semmel, *The Methodist Revolution*, the author says: "The Methodist polity was a remarkable structure about which we need to know a great deal more than we do." (p. 115). This book will do much to supply that need with its lucid explanations of the inner working of a body of ecclesiastical polity, doctrine and discipline which was unique. I endorse the commendation that Professor Gordon Rupp of Cambridge University gives in his Foreword that this is a valuable and learned study which deserves to reach as wide an audience as possible.

JOHN BISHOP

Living the Adventure, by Keith Miller and Bruce Larson. Word Books, Inc., Waco, Texas, 1975. Pp. 251. \$3.95 (paper).

Books by Keith Miller (*The Taste of New Wine, A Second Touch*, etc.) and Bruce Larson (*Dare to Live Now, No Longer Strangers*, etc.) have sold in hundreds of thousands. Now, in a joint enterprise, these two writers appear in dialogue and the product is engaging and provocative. Here is an honest facing up to the perennial question: what does it mean to be included in the adventure of the Christian life today? For some it may imply perpetual excitement and escape from personal difficulties, but these authors are realists and their courageous encounter with daily issues and necessary decisions indicates that to be God's person today involves tremendous moral and spiritual struggle.

The format of this volume lends itself easily for use as a study book for church or other informal groups. In the course of twelve chapters, the writers deal with the various foci of the contemporary human struggle—loneliness, success, money, power, sex, sickness, and death—and with a comprehensive range they include so many possibilities, yet their sensitivity reaches each of us in depth. Probably the most positive observation a reviewer can make about this book is: in a time when so much writing of this kind is "sicklied o'er with the pale cast" of either civil religion or warm pietism, it is refreshing to read a treatise which is so sensible.

DONALD MACLEOD

God in the Gallery, by Donald English. Epworth Press, London, Eng., 1975. Pp. 173. £1.75 (paper).

This is a very helpful book. It should be read by every preacher, especially those who have been harassed and harried beyond patience by the liturgical anarchy of the times. Equally useful are these chapters for ministers who are attempting to reconstruct their cultic affairs after the last balloon has been punctured and the disrobing has been exchanged for the Genevan gown. The author, Donald English, is an English Methodist who is serving presently as Tutor in Practical Theology at Wesley College in Bristol. The aim of his book is to inform and direct people "who wish their worship to be more meaningful and true" (p. 9). It is not a collection of liturgies or cultic

models; it is rather an exploration of "those attitudes out of which worship grows, about the presuppositions which inform the content and determine the orders of worship."

An example of excellent arrangement and balanced thinking, this book can have a sobering effect upon the liturgical perspectives of those who read it reflectively. There are nine chapters which deal with and explain within context much of the broad and/or basic terminology of our common liturgical tradition. The writer deals competently with the meaning for our worship of such phrases as "God is," "Through Jesus Christ," "By the Holy Spirit," "Around the Bible," "With the Sacraments," "In the world," and "Now." After careful discussion of both the broad and particular implications of these captions, Professor English draws up his hopes for Christian worshippers as follows: (i) that worship be a habit but not just a matter of habit; (ii) that people should look more questioningly at the content of their worship; (iii) that the place of our worship should not be isolated ever from life as a whole; (iv) that worship should never be separated from theology; and (v) that instruction in the faith be part of the life of every local church in order that its worship may grow and deepen.

Generous footnotes open up opportunities for further reading and a concluding series of study questions makes excellent starters for discussion. This is a book to place beside Henry E. Horn's *Worship in Crisis* (Fortress, 1972) as must reading in order to lead Protestants back from having lost their liturgical way.

DONALD MACLEOD

Leslie Weatherhead: A Portrait, by A. Kingsley Weatherhead. Abingdon Press, Nashville, Tenn., 1975. Pp. 269. \$7.95.

Professor A. Kingsley Weatherhead, of the Faculty of the University of Oregon, has given us a very interesting volume, *Leslie Weatherhead: A Personal Portrait*, a sober yet affectionate tribute to his distinguished father. This is an exceedingly interesting and well written book. Composed in pure story-like prose, it is a delight to read and is a fitting summing up of the life of one who was himself a master of the use of the English tongue.

On January 3, 1976, Leslie Weatherhead died at the age of 82 years at his home in Bexhill, England, where he had retired in 1960 after twenty-

four years as minister of the City Temple in London. He had been all his life a popular and controversial figure who experienced and enjoyed the following of a great number of people who were fascinated more by how he said things than by what he said. He was undoubtedly one of the most accomplished pulpit speakers technically of his generation, with a unique gift of effective communication and a mastery of flawless English prose. His ministry spanned an eventful era in the history of Great Britain. He began as a missionary in India, a period during which he served also as a military chaplain at the end of World War I. His parishes in England were in Manchester and Leeds, from which he came in 1936 to the City Temple. His ministry there included the period of World War II when the City Temple was destroyed by a German fire bomb and the congregation spent seventeen years in various rented sanctuaries. He was the author of some thirty volumes which had a popular appeal and sold in the hundreds of thousands of copies. His best books, however, were written before 1930 (e.g., *The Transforming Friendship*); these were eagerly read by a young generation who anticipated in him a voice to call England and Europe to sanity in view of (what Churchill called) "the gathering storm."

Your reviewer, some years ago, during a sabbatical leave in London, attended the City Temple. One day a leading professor in a divinity school in the city inquired, "Where do you go to church?" "The City Temple," was the reply. "Whatever for?" was his smiling comment. On another occasion the response of a medical doctor was, "Have you discovered that Joseph Parker is no longer there?" In retrospect then and in view of these comments, what does one say about a preacher who was able to attract throngs of people to his church in the inner city as late as 1960? Church-going is not natural in London. Indeed his successor once-removed tried to make the diminishing numbers look respectable by taking out many of the back pews! (It didn't work. He left—quickly).

Probably the most reasonable criterion by which to assess Weatherhead's ministry is the fact that his congregation did not survive him. He was a popular preacher whose magnetism lured crowds, but like all popular preachers of a certain *genre*, his people—most of them kind, elderly folk—retired with him. He tried to communicate to his age in a relevant way, but underneath he was at best only an amateur theologian, a dabbling psychologist, and an irresponsible expositor of the Scriptures. He loved the sensational, spe-

cialized in debunking what was dear to some people, and was susceptible to seances bordering upon the spooky. He filled a church (or churches) but failed to establish a church. His sermons will hardly be studied in future seminars in the history of preaching; indeed, it is doubtful if they are even read today. Whereas the books of Joseph Parker (Weatherhead's predecessor by thirty years in the City Temple) are still being read; they are appearing in re-prints seventy years beyond his retirement; and his readers are stimulated by his once rugged encounter with the great concepts of the Christian faith. Errata: "tots" should read "totes" (p. 40); "Bodoglio" should be "Ciano" (p. 132); "Aquinas" instead of "Anquinas" (p. 168); a "koala" is the name of an animal, not an adjective for a bear (p. 191); "topical" should read "typical" (p. 217); and American colleges may grant an honorary D.D. or LL.D. but never a Ph.D.

DONALD MACLEOD

The End of Man, by Austin Farrer.
W. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., Grand Rapids, Mich., 1974. Pp. 176. \$3.45 (paper).

This book of thirty-eight sermons has been compiled from the literary remains of Austin Farrer, who died in 1968. The author was a distinguished Anglican theologian, one time Fellow and Chaplain of Trinity College, Oxford, and in his later years Warden of Keble College, Oxford. In his lifetime he published two collections of sermons, *A Celebration of Faith* and *Said or Sung*, and the same fine qualities found in these volumes appear again in this final legacy. In the introduction John Austin Baker says that it is rare to find the text of a genuine sermon as actually delivered which satisfies the criteria of the literary form as well. "To the tiny company of such preachers of genius Austin Farrer belongs." He urges the reader to approach these sermons as weighed and precise statements of theology and spirituality. They are all integrated into the liturgy. Some of the fine points of doctrine are dealt with, as a masterly sermon on the Ascension entitled *The New Creation*, but so also are the practical aspects of everyday life, such as relationships with parents, the use of money, the importance of a disciplined prayer life and how to deal with intellectual challenges to the faith.

Many of the sermons were delivered in College Chapels to an academic community, though

others were delivered in prominent London churches, such as St. Paul's Cathedral and Westminster Abbey. His style is concrete, sensitive, sometimes colloquial, and often beautiful, with the conscious aim of moving his hearers to perceive and accept the truth and so find healing. Much of his preaching might be described as pastoral, for he talks straight to his congregation about their faults and failings, even though it is done with a light touch. Basil Mitchell said of him: "Austin Farrer was, by common consent, one of the most remarkable men of his generation. He possessed the qualities of originality, independence, imagination and intellectual force to a degree amounting to genius." The truth of this tribute will be evident to anyone who studies this volume, which can be warmly commended as an example of Anglican preaching at its best.

JOHN BISHOP

The Trivialization of the United Presbyterian Church, by John Fry. Harper & Row, New York, N.Y., 1975. Pp. 85. \$5.95.

Five major Protestant Churches with nearly twenty million members in the U.S.A. and interests all over the world, have been changing their structures during the last ten years, and a process not too dissimilar has been going on in the Roman Catholic Church. Theological, ethical, social, economic, and demographic currents have affected these processes. Voices long unnoticed are now heard with respect in board rooms and committee meetings. Women are moving into more responsible positions and minority groups have representation many times the percentage of their membership in the churches. Pastors and members from smaller churches have a larger share in policy making. The scene is not unlike that envisaged in the Magnificat and a good many people are upset.

Like human beings in every generation the men and women engaged in these processes have suffered from limited vision and imperfect wisdom and (let's face it) downright sinfulness. Like their predecessors in other times they have avoided major dislocations for too long, then tried to change too much too fast, with very little awareness that this would hurt a number of people and slow everything down for a while. Despite all the disaffection with structural tinkering it can hardly have been accidental that individuals and groups in the rank and file of very

different communions began to press for changes at the same time. We will all be in the debt of those who analyze this phenomenon in depth and help us to see its roots in the thinking and movements of the twentieth century and its implications for theology and practice, for we can shape our structures but we must not forget that they can shape us.

This hooklet will never be more than a footnote in a description and analysis of the Church in our times. The future historian will understand how a number of those who were hurt found satisfaction in its barbed polemics.

The author seems so distracted by anger that the United Presbyterian Confession of 1967 can be castigated in the space of eighty-five pages for insisting that reconciliation assume concrete forms of social action and for presenting reconciliation as a bland rationale in the Church for narcissism which ignores social action! He is so absorbed in a small corner of the canvas that he can believe developments which occurred in a number of denominations were caused in the United Presbyterian Church by reaction to one incident. He appears so convinced that rationality is completely subverted in organized affairs that he objects to attempts even to rationalize budget-making which is by nature at once a rational and political process.

One may applaud John Fry's annoyance at the fad which sprinkles conversations with nouns used as verbs, without supposing this marks the perpetrators as incompetent or misguided. It is hard to believe the new breed will perform as well as old friends but they have hardly had a chance to show what they can do. No one knows how the vast experiment will work but we all know the Church should not be subjected to another restructuring in the next few years.

Some of us hope that John Fry will move out of the scorner's seat and apply his brilliant mind to understanding what is going on and offering coherent suggestions for strengthening the Church he loves.

ARTHUR M. ADAMS

Creative Church Administration, by Lyle E. Schaller and Charles A. Tidwell. Abingdon Press, Nashville, Tenn., 1975. Pp. 208. \$4.95

Lyle Schaller who devotes virtually all of his time to research and writing in the area of church administration has collaborated in producing this

volume with Charles A. Tidwell who teaches at Southwestern Baptist Seminary. Schaller's material, which occupies a little more than half the volume, is sprinkled with new ideas and check lists for use in the local church.

The first chapter examines (i) models of structure, nomination, and voting, in the interest of increasing participation, enthusiasm, creativity, wide-spread ownership of goals, and openness to innovation. Successive chapters deal with (ii) attitudes towards planning; (iii) ways of motivating people; (iv) enlisting and development of volunteers; (v) listening and learning from others; (vi) program planning; (vii) intentionality in membership recruitment; (viii) ministerial salaries, (ix) capital improvements, (x) the use of buildings, and (xi) the evaluation process. There is a useful bibliography.

Most pastors will feel the modest expenditure for the book is justified by the original material in Chapters I, VII, and IX, and those with limited exposure in the field will find solid value in some of the other chapters.

This book represents increasing interest in the theology of administration though the major thrust is intensely practical. One is intrigued by the practical advantages of setting budget allocations on the principle that each dollar equals one vote, but wonders about the theological assumption and social implications. However, before you write off innovative voting ideas have a look at the others suggested.

ARTHUR M. ADAMS

The Gospel According to the Wall Street Journal, by Carnegie Samuel Calian. John Knox Press, Atlanta, Ga., 1975. Pp. 114. \$3.95 (paper).

In this recent book, Carnegie Samuel Calian has drawn a helpful analogy between the "Bible of Business," as he calls *The Wall Street Journal*, and the business of the Bible. Implicit in the *Journal's* editorial posture is, he believes, a theological stance which affirms that God is alive; that mankind is not therefore eternally damned; and hence there is hope for society's becoming something of the Kingdom of God.

Like a pair of new shoes, however, analogies do not always provide a comfortable fit. While there is a curious comparison between the secularism of the world and the humanism of the Gospel, or between the theology of the *Journal* and the doctrine of the Church, what distinguishes matters of

fact from faith is a Cross. And therein lies the rub, for Calian is convinced today that "neither *The Wall Street Journal* nor the institutional church can call itself 'radical' in the sense of the Cross." Why? Because the business of American life, the business of *The Wall Street Journal*, and the business of the Church is the business of success and that is not the business of the Cross.

Calian calls instead for a "radical faith" with a "pilgrim theology." For him happiness is more than a slippery sense of status or security, just as the "real thing" in life is more than a Pepsi Cola. While society has long since found that out it has still to find the "real thing" except in those reassuring, romanticizing retreats to the past that occur each week at Apple's Way and in the serialized simplicity of family—or is it fantasy life at the Walton's?

But when were retreats ever advances? If the Church is to turn the corner of a new age it will need at least to move ahead. "Harried, tired, and ill-prepared" at present, Calian finds today's pastor "an articulate voice in a world seeking purpose and hope." What is needed are more "pastor-theologians"—people who can "interpret the Word of God within the events of human life."

To be sure, the author has done us a favor. If the *Journal* can unwittingly speak of such theological themes as God, guilt, sin, redemption, creation, etc., then surely the Church can more accurately translate its message into the business vernacular of today. It is not that the Gospel has been tried and found wanting, it is rather that it hasn't been tried because it hasn't been spoken in a language that can be understood.

Unfortunately in a book so short in size, Calian's thrift has not produced a reader's bargain. In the end one is still left gripped by the paralysis of his analysis. Like a lightening bug his illumination is fixed only on what is behind him. Today's Church, however, needs more than a backward glance to get a forward look. What will a new theological jargon be like? What will the shape of future ministry be? In a world of big business, how will the Church be in the world but not of it?

For the answers to these and other endemic questions one can only wonder . . . or wait until Calian's next book appears.

DONALD G. LEWIS, JR.

Oral Reading of the Scriptures, by Charlotte I. Lee. Houghton Mifflin Co., Boston, Mass., 1974. Pp. 198. \$8.50.

Of all the books on the subject of reading aloud from the Bible, *Oral Reading of the Scriptures* is undoubtedly the best. Dr. Lee's introductory chapters deal with the basics of oral interpretation: logical and emotive content, empathy, the use of the voice and body in interpretative speech. There is nothing new here. However, a concise statement of what has been said already by Dr. Lee in her basic text, *Oral Interpretation*, is given along with particular application of the principles of oral communication to the situation of biblical interpretation.

Dr. Lee's later chapters offer discussions of literary style and of the technical problems encountered in reading narrative and poetic passages and epistles. These discussions are most helpful. Dr. Lee's strength always has been her insistence upon responsible literary analysis for reading aloud. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that she argues for adequate response to linguistic, structural and stylistic clues in the imaginative recreation of religious experience through the interpretative reading of scriptural material. Her definitions of literary forms are functional, not generic. And her explorations of the relationships between form and expression are thorough, but not pedantic. Only her extended treatment of prose rhythm could be regarded as tedious and of questionable value.

It should be noted that *Oral Reading of the Scriptures* is a book of theory and instruction for interpretation through the spoken word. A hermeneutic is implied throughout, but it is nowhere specifically articulated.

CHARLES L. BARTOW

Rediscovering the Christ, by John R. Yungblut. Seabury Press, New York, N.Y., 1974. Pp. 180. \$7.95.

In his opening paragraph John R. Yungblut, Dean of Studies at Pendle Hill Quaker Study

Center, expresses the hope that his book will be read by "Christians, humanists, and devotees of the other living religions." It is not likely that his hope will be realized. Most likely it will be read by liberal Protestants seeking a believable picture of the Christ.

In his first chapter, Yungblut tries to show how assimilation of the evolutionary and depth-psychological perspectives has meant for modern man the death of the traditional Christ myth. In his second chapter he sketches the different forms of the Messiah myth and inquires into Jesus' own quest for identity with reference to them. The third chapter describes the birth of the Christ myth in the Apostolic Church and its growth within the New Testament writings. Chapter four tries to show how the Christ-myth has continued to evolve throughout history; it relates the Christ-myth to changing world views. Chapter five, the last chapter, is an attempt at an remythologized form of the classic myth.

This book is wide-ranging, and discusses many issues. I want to raise two of a number of questions which the book provokes. In much of the book Yungblut leans hard on the writings of Teilhard de Chardin. Is he a representative figure from evolution? Is not Teilhard, with his omega point, an uncharacteristic figure in the discipline he represents?

Yungblut has not succeeded in remythologizing the Christ. In his last chapter he says he will do this, but instead he presents a series of criticisms of the old myths. Granted, remythologizing the Christ is one of the most difficult intellectual tasks a Christian could attempt; still if we are to have done with the old myths, we must have new ones to replace them. In a kind of backhanded way, then, Yungblut sends us back to the old myths, for Christ must be expressed mythologically—if not with new myths, then with the old.

ROBERT S. BEAMAN

Graduate School
Temple University

Book Notes

by DONALD MACLEOD

FORD, D. W. Cleverly, *Preaching at the Parish Communion*. Mowbray & Co., London, 1967. Pp. 124. £1.00.

As Director of the College of Preachers (London) and Rural Dean of Westminster, the influence of D. W. Cleverly Ford has been felt increasingly through his work as teacher, administrator, and writer. Here is a useful paperback comprising thoughtful sermonettes which cover the Gospels for the Christian Year. In a brief introduction he sets down some basic requirements for sermon composition and reiterates under new terminology some timely strategies for better pulpit communication.

MACDONALD, Murdo Ewen, *The Call to Communicate*. The Saint Andrew Press, Edinburgh, 1975. Pp. 182. £2.50.

This is a very full book. It is a sort of *pot pourri* in the area of Practical Theology. The author of four books and for a number of years one of Scotland's finest pulpit voices, Dr. Macdonald is presently a professor of practical theology at Trinity College, Glasgow. This volume is the fruit of long and careful reflection upon the various facets of the ministry of the Church which he defines as follows: "Christian ministry is the response evoked when those who are gripped by the good news of the grace of God in Christ Jesus, feel compelled to communicate it to others" (p. 10). What we have here is fifteen short chapters in the form of position papers in which nothing surprisingly new is said, but where a great amount of discrete items, otherwise scattered, are brought into compact compass. Although this book could profit from a clearer sense of purpose, yet any preacher or parish minister will find in it a stream of perceptive observations of unusual value and helpfulness.

DONALD MACLEOD

HAHN, Ferdinand, *The Worship of the Early Church*. Fortress Press, Philadelphia, Pa., 1973. Pp. 118. \$3.25.

The substance of this book appeared originally in a number of separate though related fascicles. Its immediate form in English is a translation by David E. Green of "Der urchristliche Gottesdienst," with a Foreword by John Reumann. Ferdinand Hahn, a member of the faculty at the University of Mainz, Germany, provides us with a fresh review, ably documented, of the evidences and the shaping of New Testament worship. He explores the influence of the Old Testament upon the worship attitudes of Jesus and what were the new factors he introduced. In this study of the emergence of cultic patterns in the early church, Hahn takes into critical account the views of Cullman, Delling, Moule, and others. Into ten concise chapters he packs a wealth of factual material which he has annotated carefully and supported with numerous bibliographical allusions. Students of early Christian liturgies will cherish this monograph with enthusiasm and for justifiable reasons.

HARVEY, Paul, *Our Lives, Our Fortunes, Our Sacred Honor*. Word Books, Inc., Waco, Texas, 1975. Pp. 30. \$4.95.

More than a few opportunists will take advantage of our Bicentennial by marketing books which are under-nourished and over-priced. Large display advertisements in religious journals have featured this new book by Paul Harvey, American radio and TV news commentator, with such striking sentences as these: "Now, Paul Harvey asks all America to re-open the case . . ." "What really happened to the courageous men who signed the Declaration of Independence?" "Paul Harvey tells the shocking drama-filled story of the fate of our early heroes." In the light of such spirals of publicity, the book is truly a hoax. It is nicely bound and artistically designed, but in its thirty pages we have only the signatures of the fifty-six men (which are familiar to everyone from facsimiles of the original Declaration of Independence) and the fate of merely twenty of them recorded (and these quite sketchily). Incidentally, John Witherspoon's name is not even mentioned! Need one say more?

HITCHCOCK, Roswell D., *Baker's Topical Bible*. Baker Book House, Grand Rapids, Mich., 1975 (Thirteenth Printing). Pp. 685. \$9.95.

The format of this volume is an arrangement of the entire Bible according to topics. A preacher has almost instant access to texts from all books of the Bible on a specific subject. The "Alphabetical Index of Subjects" occupies over thirty pages. It is followed by a "Scripture Index of Verses" of thirty-eight pages. The body of the book consists of twenty-seven sections, each under a main heading and featuring multiple subdivisions. A handy reference book and a tool for biblical research, the student or preacher will find "the full text of every verse of the Bible topically arranged and cross-referenced for rich and meaningful Bible study." This volume is a substantial companion to one's concordances and when used intelligently it can bring into focus many fruitful passages of Scripture hitherto neglected.

HUFFMAN, John A., Jr., *Becoming A Whole Family*. Word Books Inc., Waco, Texas, 1975. Pp. 156. \$5.95.

From many angles and perspectives, factors inimicable to the American family are at work, both openly and indirectly. From first hand knowledge in a large metropolitan parish, John A. Huffman, minister of the First Presbyterian Church, Pittsburgh, Pa., has given us a very readable survey of problems currently macerating the home and a series of antidotes to arrest the rapid movement to its dissolution. He provides no ready panacea nor "packaged deal," rather he offsets the negative by presenting the characteristics and positive values of the family where "wholeness" is the result of commitment to Christ as the key to genuine commitment to one another. This is an interesting book with page after page of sound principles for living demonstrated through lively examples.

LOVETTE, Roger, *A Faith of Our Own*. Pilgrim Press (United Church Press), Philadelphia, Pa., 1976. Pp. 143. \$6.95.

The minister of the First Baptist Church, Clemson, South Carolina, an alumnus of the

Southern Baptist Theological Seminary (M.Div.) and Lexington Theological Seminary (D.Min.), is a gifted writer and preacher whose sermon studies in this book are marked by unusual insights, broad sympathies, and intimations of many facets of real culture and authentic faith. There is an "I have been there" quality about these chapters and a familiarity with the human struggle in its many aspects. From a wide range of reading in scripture and classic literature, along with his own sensitive reflections upon life with and without the Gospel, Dr. Lovette has drawn many lessons which he shares with us in a very engaging style.

MACLENNAN, David A., *Twelve Who Changed the World*. The C.S.S. Publishing Co., Inc., Lima, O., 1976.

An impressive list of authors have done sermon studies of the disciples. As a writer with a creative gift for turning human types into living characters, David A. MacLennan is well equipped to add another such study to earlier works by Barclay, Goodspeed, Macartney, McBirnie, and others. Well illustrated and factually supported, these chapters will serve admirably as resource materials for study groups and as Lenten reading for preachers and their people. Dr. MacLennan, minister emeritus of the First Presbyterian Church, Pompano Beach, Florida, who is the author of eighteen books and editor of eleven others, has made a magnificent contribution to both the American and Canadian pulpit. This latest volume is a further example of his effective writing and his ability to bring the love and judgment of the Gospel to bear upon our common life.

MORRIS, Colin, *The Word and the Words*. Abingdon Press, Nashville, Tenn., 1975. Pp. 174. \$3.95.

With a Foreword by Archbishop Coggan who describes the author's position as follows: "He believes that the most powerfully active force at work in God's world is the word of God operating in men and women obedient to that word," Colin Morris provides us with nine chapters of good material which he characterizes as "a defence of classical preaching." This book is a competent blending of biblical, theological, and communicative perspectives upon Christian preaching and provides a refresher experience for anyone who

wishes to define his or her pulpit role more clearly. Preachers and teachers of preachers will underline many telling sentences in this volume; indeed some of these statements will send them off into new and adventurous directions. It is unfortunate that proofreaders allowed so many misprints to remain and that critical readers failed to identify quotes and misquotes.

PENNINGTON, Chester, *God Has A Communication Problem*. Hawthorn Books, Inc. New York, N.Y., 1976. Pp. 160. \$6.95.

After serving churches in New Jersey, New York, and Minnesota, Chester Pennington entered the field of theological education as professor of preaching and worship at Iliff School of Theology in Denver. In this short and concise study, his theses are "that preaching is the minister's primary opportunity of communicating with the congregation" (p.5); that the critical issue today is "not what is happening to preaching, but what is happening to our faith" (p. 14); that the challenge and discipline of "creative communication" are indispensable to effective preaching (pp. 69-85); and that the individual preacher's credibility is a major key to "persuasive power" in the pulpit (p.61). For the thoughtful manner in which Professor Pennington brings together the canons of contemporary communication and the role of the preacher as one "sent" to declare a message, all teachers of preaching will be indebted to him.

SIMONSON, Harold P., *Jonathan Edwards: Theologian of the Heart*. Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., Grand Rapids, Mich., 1974. Pp. 174. \$6.50.

Since 1968, Harold P. Simonson has been professor of English at the University of Washington (Seattle) and among his published works is a collection of Jonathan Edwards' writings. In this latest volume, Simonson seeks to interpret Edwards in terms of the influence upon him of Calvin, Augustine and basically the Scriptures rather than essentially of John Locke, as Perry

Miller and other commentators have done. The main theme throughout Edwards' sermons and essays, the author feels, is "the sense of the human heart," that "capacity beyond Lockean sensationalism, beyond ratiocination, beyond speculation and 'understanding,' beyond aesthetic vision . . . finally to experience God's glory and see it as the ultimate end and purpose of His creation." Probably one of the more significant sections of this study is Simonson's discussion of religious language and Edwards' effective use of it both as thinker and preacher.

WARNER, Wayne E., *1000 Stories and Quotations of Famous People*. Baker Book House, Grand Rapids, Mich., 1975. Pp. 362. \$4.95.

This is a reprint in paperback of the 1972 edition of a compilation of quotations and stories by Wayne E. Warner, book editor for Gospel Publishing House, Springfield, Missouri. The sources are statesmen, preachers, scientists, inventors, soldiers, missionaries, etc., of many eras and social and educational levels. The items are arranged according to forty-four famous men and women whose biographical sketches preface each individual collection. A topical index of ten pages makes for ready access to these resources by author and subject.

WEEMS, Lovett Hayes, Jr., *Watchmen Over The Nation*. The C.S.S. Publishing Co., Lima, Ohio, 1975. Pp. 64. \$

Here are twelve short sermons for the American Bicentennial. The minister of the United Methodist Church of Raleigh, Miss., indicates his concern for the church's message to the nation and calls for "exciting, creative preaching in American pulpits" in 1976. These messages are biblically oriented and well illustrated from events and persons from the chapters of our nation's history. There is a prophetic note here which makes civil religion appear unequal to the challenges of our time. Dr. Weems is a good reader and a careful observer of the crises which occur when the demands of God and of men come into conflict.

On Looking at a Picture of My Father Who Died Young

The stripling frame is ramrod straight,
 eyes direct, of level gaze,
 as though to see one through.
 I have heard
and remember just a little,
he was quiet as morning mist
on a Texas cotton field,
quiet
and hard as nails,
temper only now and then showing through,
then terrible to see.

I know that he was tall and strong
to swing me up into the barber's chair
 for cutting off the four year curls,
 then comforting my mother
 when he took me home close-cropped
 as he thought a man should be.

They say, those who knew him
 all his life,
 he had more lives to live
 and worlds to gain
 than could be crowded in
 his twenty-seven years.
 I wonder, did he mean through me
 to hurtle onward, touch the time
 he could not claim himself?
 I think that he was not a man
 to settle for the passing heat
 simply to beget a son,
 nor let the last word be
 an infant in the arms.

Far-seeing eyes and set of mouth,
figure poised as though to move,
all bespeak those kingdoms
yet in him unborn.
Yet I never had to hear his word
commanding me nor compete with him
to match what I could be
with what he was.
I never had to know any single flaw,

nor watch the years
 encroach on him with change.
 The steel in him, duty, honor, country,
 service to God and man,
 escapes the rust of time,
 he is sanctified by memory,
 forever fixed behind that picture glass
 and in the frame of time,
 the youthful form long since at rest
 beneath a lone oak tree,
 the passion and the power
 now loose in all my world.

—John David Burton (Class of 1945)

ADDRESSES OF PUBLISHERS


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 Hawthorn Book, Inc., 260 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10016
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 Western North Carolina Press, Inc., P. O. Box 29, Dillsboro, N.C. 28725
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MINI-COURSES: (Register by June 28)

Independent study, June 28—August 1

Study in residence, August 2—6

Both regular and mini-courses carry full credit.

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CHRISTIAN EDUCATION: Phoebe M. Anderson, Doris K. Donnelly, John H. Westerhoff, III

CHRISTIANITY AND SOCIETY: Gibson Winter

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
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